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ABSTRACT
THE WORD BECAME FLESH: AN EXPLORATORY ESSAY ON JESUS’S
PARTICULARITY AND NONHUMAN ANIMALS

Andy Alexis-Baker
Marquette University, 2015

In this exploratory work I argue that Jesus’s particularity as a Jewish, male human
is essential for developing Christian theology about nonhuman animals.
The Gospel of John says that the Word became “flesh” not that the Word became
“human.” By using flesh, John’s Gospel connects the Incarnation to the Jewish notion of
all animals. The Gospel almost always uses flesh in a wider sense than meaning human.
The Bread of Life discourse makes this explicit when Jesus compares his flesh to “meat,”
offending his hearers because they see themselves as above other animals. Other animals
are killable and consumable; humans are not.
The notion that the Word became flesh has gained prominence in ecotheology,
particularly in theologians identifying with deep Incarnation. Unless this notion is
connected to Jesus’s particularity, however, there is danger in sacrificing the individual
for the whole. We can see this danger in two early theologians, Athanasius and St. John
of Damascus. Both of these theologians spoke of the Word becoming “matter.” Yet they
ignored Jesus’s Jewishness and rarely focused on his animality, preferring instead to
focus on cosmic elements. Consequently they often devalued animal life.
Jesus’s Jewishness is essential to the Incarnation. His Jewishness entailed a vision
of creation’s purpose in which creatures do not consume one another, but live peaceably
by eating plants. This Jewish milieu also entails a grand vision for transformation where
predators act peaceably with their former prey.
Jesus’s maleness is also connected to his Jewishness. In the Greco-Roman context
in which he lived, his circumcision marked him as less male and more animal-like.
Moreover, Jesus’s Jewish heritage rejected the idea of a masculine hunter. His theological
body was far more transgendered and connected to animality than the Roman ideal.
Finally, Jesus’s humanity entails a kenosis of what it means to be human. By
becoming-animal he stops the anthropological machine that divides humans from
animals. We see this becoming animal most clearly in his identity as a lamb, but also in
Revelation’s idea that he is both a lion and a lamb. His eschatological body fulfills the
Jewish vision for creation-wide peace.
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INTRODUCTION

In this work, I examine Jesus’s particularity as a Jewish, male human for animal
theology. My argument is simple. Working through Jesus’s particularities —Jewish,
male, and human—provides an essential lens through which to view the Incarnation’s
significance for nonhuman animals. Yet most Christian theologians writing about
nonhuman animals have taken a different path.
Working through Jesus’s particularity for animal theology seems counterintuitive.
Particularities such as Jesus’s humanness seem like barriers. After all, many theologians
have appealed to Jesus’s humanity to exclude other creatures. As a corrective,
theologians can respond by relativizing Jesus of Nazareth altogether. That God became a
Jewish male in first-century Palestine seems too specific to have universal significance.
So one way to broaden the Incarnation would be to search for a “messianic structure” of
life. For thinkers in this milieu, creation’s messianic structure does not depend on Jesus.1
The particularity of religion is one thing, but universal “faith” is quite another. Some
Christian ecotheologians have followed a similar path.
The larger climate has not favored highlighting Jesus’s particularity. In 1967,
Lynn White accused Christianity of having “a huge burden of guilt” for modern
ecological problems.2 For White, the idea that God transcends creation led theologians to
separate humans from the larger environment. Christians focus on their spiritual salvation

1

See, for example, Jacques Derrida, Decontruction in a Nutshell, ed. John Caputo (New York:
Fordham, 1997), 22. “As soon as you reduce the messianic structure to messianism, then you are reducing
the universality and this has important political consequences. Then you are accrediting one tradition
among the others and a notion of an elected people, of a given language, a given fundamentalism.”
2
Lynn White, “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis,” Science March 10, 1967, 1203–
1207.
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while ignoring the surrounding material world. Worse still, Christians promote human
domination over nonhuman creation, leading to environmental degradation. By focusing
on human needs and desires, Christians have helped to commodify nature. So White
concluded that Christianity is “the most anthropocentric religion the world has ever
seen.”3
White’s analysis prompted some Christians to take creation more seriously.4 With
such powerful arguments about Christianity in mind, focusing on Jesus’s humanity seems
foolhardy. Even so, I argue that theological thinking about nonhuman animals needs the
Incarnation’s particularity. The same could be said for his maleness and his Jewishness.
But some theologians argue that for ignoring Jesus’s particularity. Instead
they focus on Christ’s cosmic Lordship. That is, we must relativize his humanity to make
room for other creatures. We need to see a universal “structure” apart from Jesus’s
Jewishness or maleness. I will build on these previous works, but I will argue for a
different starting point. In that light I turn to a review of some relevant literature for the
task.

3

Ibid., 1205.
This is Celia Deane-Drummond’s conclusion in Celia Deane-Drummond, “What is Creation
For?,” in A Faith Encompassing All Creation: Addressing Commonly Asked Questions about Christian
Care for the Environment, ed. Andy Alexis-Baker and Tripp York (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2014), 7–
8. While we might object to the sweeping indictment against Christianity that White makes, I take it as also
true that Christians have not been quick to take the ecological crisis seriously and are even more reluctant
to take on issues around nonhuman animals. So while White’s analysis prompted some theological
reflection, Christians have not yet lived up to the task and too few theologians are taking seriously the
modern ecological and death-dealing crisis in factory farming. These are major issues of our time, and an
act of corporate repentance would at least entail serious theological work on these issues from more than
niche theologians and scholars. Deane-Drummond argues similarly: “Half a century after White’s diatribe
against Christianity, the attention ethicists and theologians have paid to ecology is still less than one might
expect, given the scale and scope of the problems involved.” Ibid., 8.
4
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The Incarnation and Ecotheology: A Review

Joseph Sittler

Some theologians have responded to the modern ecological crisis by emphasizing
the biblical notion of the cosmic Christ, found especially in Colossians 1:15–20 and
Ephesians 1:10, 20–22. In Colossians, the Pauline author claims that Christ created,
sustains, and redeems “all things.” One of the first modern theologians to use the cosmic
Christ vision in relationship to ecology was Joseph Sittler. Sittler first raised the issue of
Christology and the environment at the 1961 World Council of Churches meeting in New
Dehli. In that address, he appealed to passages from Ephesians and Colossians to argue
that God’s theater of grace is creation.5 Only a “Christology expanded to its cosmic
dimensions, made passionate by the pathos of this threatened earth, and made ethical by
the love and the wrath of God” can address the radical split between nature and grace that
has afflicted Christianity.6 This split has caused environmental damage and has made
even atoms a tool for murder. So even “atoms must be reclaimed for God and his will.”7
For Sittler, we must recover the New Testament’s vision of a creation-wide redemption.
Christ’s redemption is cosmic in scope.
Sittler’s address preceded Lynn White’s critique by eight years, calling upon
Christians to recognize something already present in Christian tradition. Sittler called for
Christians to recognize the truly broad scope of Jesus’s work. If Jesus Christ created all
things, then Jesus Christ redeems all things as well. Anything less than a creation-wide

186.

5

For the phrase see Joseph Sittler, “Called to Unity,” The Ecumenical Review 14, no. 2 (1962):

6

Ibid.
Ibid., 184.

7
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focus on Jesus’s redemptive work misses God’s radical love for creation. Sittler,
therefore, draws from New Testament Christologies to help Christian discourse more
faithfully point to God’s beauty, goodness, and truth. Sittler had an ethical agenda as
well: a cosmic Christ who redeems creation beckons Christians to care for the world
around them and to tread lightly and carefully.
Interestingly, however, Sittler’s passionate call for a cosmic Christ does not really
deal with Jesus’s particularities. It is also striking that at the same time that he has much
to say about redeeming all things, he has very little to say about nonhuman animals. He
seems concerned about environmental destruction but says little about how humans treat
animals or how such treatment would connect to environmental concerns. I will argue
that this type of move results from not paying attention to particularities, which often
loses the individual into the many. In such big pictures individuals disappear. We need
these large portraits and must recover a sense of Jesus’s cosmic work. The question is
how to get to the cosmic: do we start with the cosmic as Sittler does, or do we work
through Jesus’s particular characteristics, uniting the particular and the universal so that
Christ’s cosmic work also unites the one and the many, the particular and the universal?
For if we swing in the opposite direction, theological discourse may easily lose individual
creatures in favor of systems. To say this theologically, many theologians talk about
God’s care for the environment and creation, but tend to ignore individual creatures and
particularly whole classes of living creatures we call “animals.” Despite the beauty of his
vision and passion of his call, Sittler seems to have made this move.

5
Jürgen Moltmann

In The Way of Jesus Christ, Jürgen Moltmann attempts to develop an ecological
Christology for the modern world. His treatment of Jesus relies on the Gospel texts,
showing that Jesus’s way calls believers to a nonviolent way of life that would challenge
the structures of oppression and preach liberation to the oppressed. He therefore grounds
his Christology in Scriptures and makes Jesus normative for how Christians think and
behave in the modern world. Moltmann also turns to the “Cosmic Christ,” arguing that it
is necessary to recover this biblical vision for the modern world: “The rediscovery of
cosmic Christology will have to begin with ecological Christology if cosmic Christology
is to be of therapeutic relevance for the nature which is today suffering under the
irrationality of human beings.”8
Modern Christologies have tended to take their cues from the quest for the
historical Jesus. They have therefore focused on humanity. By contrast, Moltmann argues
that theologians should focus on creation more broadly. He then points readers to
Ephesians and Colossians, where the authors depict Jesus as redeeming the entirety of
creation. In the context of human-generated catastrophe, Moltmann argues, we must
recover this sense of cosmic Christology. He says earlier in the work: “In the danger of
annihilation that is hanging over us, God’s salvation is the healing and survival of the
whole threatened earth and all individual created beings, in their common peril.”9

8
9

Jürgen Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 194–95.
Ibid., 46.
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Fortunately, Scriptures have provided the means to refocus our theological
imaginations. Scriptures depict “the always greater Christ.”10 Every time we think we
know Christ the texts expand our vision: “Christ is the first-born among many brethren –
Christ is the first-born of the new humanity – Christ is the first-born of the whole
creation: Jesus is Israel’s messiah – Jesus is the Son of man of the nations – Jesus is the
head of the reconciled cosmos: the body of Christ is the crucified and raised body of
Jesus – the body of Christ is the church – the body of Christ is the whole cosmos.”11 The
early Christians understood Jesus as having died to reconcile the whole of creation (2 Cor
5:19). The entire cosmos needs redemption. While the Apostle Paul, according to
Moltmann, understood this cosmic redemption has not having taken place yet, Colossians
and Ephesians see this redemption as “already” beginning.
Moltmann then argues that today we need a cosmic Christology that can take
seriously Jesus’s differentiated roles. Jesus is 1) creator of all things (creatio originalis);
2) sustainer of all things (creatio continua); and 3) redeemer of all things (creatio nova).
Modern Christians have neglected the third aspect, according to Moltmann. Moltmann
understands this redemption as an eschatological peace: peace between humans, peace
between humans and other animals, peace between all creatures: “the peace of Christ is
universal and pervades the whole cosmos.”12 In this life evolution and natural selection
have created an enormous amount of suffering in the world, particularly with nonhuman
animals. Christ, Moltmann argues, suffers with all of evolution’s victims. But God

10

Ibid., 275.
Ibid.
12
Ibid., 306.
11
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redeems evolution too. The cosmic Christ takes up the process and the suffering of every
creature since the beginning of time.13
Because God is the environment within which creation evolves and God is
intimately involved in creation through the Spirit, and because Jesus redeems and
reconciles the conflicting and warring elements of creation, Christians are those who
witness to the coming kingdom that is already present in part. As such, Christians are
those who understand themselves as part of a “community of human beings, animals and
plants based on law.” Moltmann points to the Torah where the Sabbath laws apply to all
creatures, not just humans. But the law’s main function is to regulate human tendencies to
exploit one another, other animals, and the environment.
This entails an understanding of a nonhuman animal as “a living being with its
own rights.”14 Moltmann states that this at the very least means working to end “factory
farming” and genetically engineering other animals. He notes that the Gospels do not
have much to say about Christ’s relationship to other animals, except that angels and
other wild animals “ministered to him” in the wilderness (Mark 1:13), adding that “this is
an allusion to the messianic peace of creation, which is part of Israel’s hope according to
Isaiah 11.”15
Moltmann goes on to state that because human beings are embodied creatures we
have no way of speaking about human rights apart from the rights of other animals.
Presumably he means that humans share in the same evolutionary process and have deep
biological connections to other creatures. He believes that if we do not formulate

13

See ibid., 274–312.
Ibid., 308.
15
Ibid.
14
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“ecological rights and duties” toward other animals, “then the rights of human beings in
their own lives remain unrealistic.”16
Moltmann’s Christology is one that is heavily rooted in the story of the Gospels.
Jesus’s life provides a strong example for his subsequent followers in terms of their work
for justice and peace as a witness to God’s full kingdom that is still coming. Moltmann
places a strong emphasis on Christ’s cosmic redemption, which then entails new
relationships throughout creation. These new ways of relating start within the Christian
community, where believers treat each other, their enemies, and all of creation as Christ’s
very good creation that will all someday experience a full redemption, only hinted at in
Christian life. He points out that the eschatological peace Jesus inaugurates entails new
relationships with nonhuman animals, and insists that without reconfiguring the humannonhuman animal relationship, attempts at intra-human peacemaking will fail. So his
Christology is strongly ethical in orientation and includes nonhuman animals in
redemption. His cosmic Christology is rooted in Scripture and answers many of the major
problems facing the world today. How we understand Jesus, the cosmic Christ, depends
heavily on how we read his life, which Moltmann covers in detail, arguing for the
political and social relevance of Jesus’s life and teachings.
Although Moltmann sometimes speaks of Jesus’s Jewishness, the treatment of
Jesus’s Jewish roots is often too brief. However, he does bring out places where Jesus’s
Jewishness seems to matter most. For instance, in a brief section titled, “The Death of the
Jew,” Moltmann argues that Jesus’s death as a Jew at the hands of the Romans was what
many Jews before and after him experienced at the hands of Gentiles.17 Jesus’s sufferings

16
17

Ibid., 309.
Ibid., 167–68.
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and death as the Son of God are also Israel’s sufferings. So Moltmann begins with Jesus
as a human, Jewish person and moves outward to Christ the cosmic redeemer. This short
reflection shows Jesus’s Jewishness as mostly relevant for Jews only. How it might
connect to ecology, Moltmann does not say.
Of all the early proponents of cosmic Christology, Moltmann is the one who most
focuses on Jesus of Nazareth and works from that perspective toward a cosmic vision. He
is also one of the only theologians who worked on ecology to suggest that a strong stance
of justice toward nonhuman animals is a non-negotiable aspect of Christian life. Yet it is
not clear to me that Moltmann goes far enough. If the eschatological vision of Jewish
vision entails a completely nonviolent new creation, seen only in part in the new
community who love their enemies, then should that community also live as peaceably as
possible with other animals, which would entail at least a provisional vegetarianism?
Moltmann stops short and only calls for an end to factory farming and genetic
engineering of other animals.
Though Moltmann points to Scripture’s vision of an eschatological peace,
elsewhere in his theology Moltmann may undermine this vision. He uses Jewish
Kabbalah to illuminate Christianity’s doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. How do we explain
God acting outward when God is all? That is, how can creation exist at all outside of
God, and yet not be far from God? Withdrawing into God’s own self, God creates a void.
As God retracts inward, God “let’s be” a negative space: “God-forsakenness, hell,
absolute death.”18 This negative space constitutes “a partial negation of the divine Being”
and is therefore “the non-being of the Creator.”19 The threat of nothingness emerges in

18
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Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1985), 74–75.
Ibid., 87–88.
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God. For creation to continue existing, God must suppress the divine negativity, which
God does by transforming it into redemption on the cross. Since God has created
everything within God’s own void, everything exists in God. Thus Moltmann advocates
panentheism. He seems to undercut creation by positing a necessary ontological void
within God as creation’s prerequisite. Brian Walsh states the problem:
Redemption, then, is not primarily a restoration of a covenantal relationship
broken in history, but a “re-filling” of that space, an overcoming of God’s selflimitation by means of an annihilatio nihili. But if this nihil was for some reason
necessary for the creatio originalis then how can the God/creation distinction still
be maintained when this nihil is vanquished and God is all in all? Is the
distinction between pantheism and panentheism only semantic?20
Moltmann comes perilously close to making finitude evil since nothingness is a
necessary precondition for creatureliness. God’s self-negation and God’s creativity work
in dialectical opposition. Moreover, Moltmann’s idea that God first withdraws inward
and basically punches a hole in divine space and then fills it with creation, suggests that
God is some kind of spatial entity bound by time.21 God does not create space; God fills
it. God creates “nothing” within already existing space in a temporal way. Finally,
Moltmann’s view seems to require evil and suffering for God to self-actualize in the
creation and redemption of the world. Ironically, by trying to uplift creation by positing
this divine void, Moltmann has actually made creation antagonistic toward God,

20

Brian Walsh, “Theology of Hope and the Doctrine of Creation: An Appraisal of Jürgen
Moltmann,” Evangelical Quarterly 59, no. 1 (1987): 75.
21
For this critique see Alan J. Torrance, “Creatio ex Nihilo and the Spatio-Temporal Dimensions,
with Special Reference to Jürgen Moltmann and D. C. Williams,” in The Doctrine of Creation, ed. Colin
Gunton (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997), 90–93.
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something that must be constantly overcome. This makes a strange basis for a theology
that wants to see creation as something good.
Nevertheless, Moltmann’s work is a starting point for reflection on the
Incarnation in relationship to other animals. He leaves many questions open for further
investigation. How does Jesus’s Jewishness matter for the Incarnation in relationship to
other animals? If we must move away from an anthropocentric theology, then how does
Jesus’s humanity matter for other animals? Furthermore, since Jesus’s maleness is a
particularity of some controversy, is there some aspect of Jesus’s maleness that might
help us develop a theology of the Incarnation that also does justice to other animals?
Moltmann says that human ethics and peacemaking must entail peacemaking with other
animals. So he sees how deeply we are connected to other animals. My argument will
build on that basic insight and goes further, exploring some ways that Jesus’s Jewish,
male humanity works in favor of the Incarnation’s inclusion of other creatures.
Matthew Fox

Matthew Fox has also interpreted Christology in relationship to ecological
concerns.22 Citing what he considered an obsessive and unhelpful scholarly focus on the
historical Jesus, Fox looks to the cosmic Christ for aid. The quest for the historical Jesus
discounts theological reflection needed for modern ecological problems. Christology for
a new era of ecological crisis must take into account the historical Jesus. But the new
quest for the cosmic Christ must connect the stars to life forms on Earth. In Christ we
become connected anew to the universe. In the cross we see God and humanity severed

22

See Matthew Fox, The Coming of the Cosmic Christ: The Healing of Mother Earth and the
Birth of a Global Renaissance (San Francisco: Haper & Row, 1988).
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as Jesus cries out asking why God had forsaken him.23 Butthrough the cross the
connection is actually reaffirmed and strengthened. Jesus rises from the dead and
becomes the cosmic Christ. So Christ connects us to our particular time and place and
also to everything else. Christ connects us to the far-off mountains, to the homeless of our
city, and to the animals in our backyards. In short, “It connects all creatures in the entire
universe.”24
Fox believes that Christians have lost the New Testament sense of cosmic
redemption. The Enlightenment desacralized the universe and refocused Christians on
personal salvation.25 Christians exchanged the God of the universe for an individualized
salvation and a self-obsessed culture.26 Christian theologians shifted to the historical
Jesus and away from the grandeur of Christ in all things.
The only way forward, Fox argues, is to reclaim the cosmic Christ in a new
“living cosmology.” This shift would have dramatic impact on the way Christians train
theologians and pastors. The spiritual disciplines would help Christians recognize the
“primal sacraments”—sea, land, wind, fire, and life. Mystical contemplation would help
us see and hear Christ in the universe at large.27 Indeed, Jesus’s crucifixion is mother
Earth’s crucifixion. The earth and universe itself is the universal cosmic Christ. To hear
Christ one must listen to the environment.
Fox corrects a theological tendency to make humans stand aloof from other
creatures. He points to an interconnectedness that he likely learned from modern science.

23

Ibid., 133.
Ibid., 134.
25
Ibid., 7. See also ibid., 81 where Fox quotes church historian Jaroslav Pelikan who wrote,
“Enlightenment philosophy deposed the cosmic Christ.”
26
Ibid., 151–52.
27
Ibid., 40.
24
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Even the dust out of which humans are made has a cosmic element, since Earth’s
elements are a conglomerate of stardust. This can redefine what it means to be human in
the modern world from independent autonomous individuals to deeply dependent and
connected beings. Jesus’s body was no different.
Yet, whatever the merits and worthy goals, Fox’s theology leaves serious
questions unanswered. Fox maintains that early Christians put aside “nature” for
introspection. He blames Augustine and the Enlightenment for this. Several issues arise
from this story, one that Lynn White also tells. First, do Christian theologians obsess
about personal sin and salvation? Is that the root of the modern ecological problem?
Alternatively, although Christians have tended to view humans as superior to all other
creatures, a sense of interdependence with other creatures used to mitigate that
anthropology. Today we have largely lost interdependence as a part of anthropology. If
Christians no longer sense our interrelationship with other creatures, perhaps we cannot
solve the ecological crisis by collapsing the world into Christ’s body. Rather the more
helpful task is to reattach a common creatureliness to theological anthropology. The
fundamental theological division does not lie between humans and all other creatures but
between God and all creation. God relates to all creation and creatures regardless of
God’s relationship with humans.
Returning to creatureliness, we might indeed see God in everything. But only by
distinguishing God and creation can we recognize the divine in the first place. There has
to be a difference between God and creation to be able to recognize creation. Fox seems
to blur the lines between God and creation in his cosmic Christology. We encounter God
by encountering the world around us. As we gaze in awe at the immensity of the
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universe, we experience God per se. The universe does not point us toward God. The
universe, according to Fox, is God for us at that moment of wonder. But one has to also
wonder whether this God is a mere figment of human imagination projected onto the
skies. If so, then God is a creation of human thought without transcendence from the
human mind. This elevates human thinking above creation.
Indeed, Fox suggests a path that would heighten anthropocentricism. He
conflates humanity with divinity. He says, “Perhaps the most gross of all dualisms is the
dualism between the divine and us. As if we hold no divine blood in us, as if we are
creatures only and not creators. Co-creators with God.”28 We can see how problematic
this statement becomes in the instrumental value he assigns to the suffering of other
animals in creation. By conflating Christology with creation he is able to say that all
nonhuman animal suffering over the vast course of life on Earth “may well be sacrificial
suffering, a gift of our very being for others.” He goes on: “Whole species have been
called upon to lay down their lives for others, and they have done so.”29 Fox sees
nonhuman animal suffering as “sacrificial.” They live to the end of dying for “others”
(and ultimately in his view those “others” are humans). But evolutionary suffering is not
teleological or voluntary. In trying to renew creation in Christian theology, Fox creates
more problems than he solves. He universalizes Christ but creates a problematic
anthropocentricism.
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Sallie McFague

While Fox ignores Jesus’s particularity, Sallie McFague goes further. She
explicitly rejects the Incarnation's particularity. For McFague, Christianity teaches that
God has become human form. The central message is not the particular person Jesus.
McFague sidelines the particular man Jesus and focuses on humanity. Christian theology
must do two things. “The first is to relativize the incarnation in relation to Jesus of
Nazareth and the second is to maximize it in relation to the cosmos.”30 So the world is
“God’s body.” Since this view echoes Fox’s I will not belabor the point by
critiquing McFague. McFague’s impulse seems ethical. If Christians see the world as
divine, they will act better toward it. But the price for this impulse is high. God is no
longer perfect because God's body would have to be perfect. But this world is full of
arbitrary suffering, predation, and meaningless death. That does not sound perfect. So if
God is perfect, then God’s body cannot be “the cosmos” as we know it.31
McFague wants Christians to act more compassionately toward nonhuman
creation. This is a good goal. But marginalizing Jesus of Nazareth and claiming the
cosmos as God's body is unnecessary. Deepening traditional Christian doctrines can do
the same task.
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The only way for McFague to get out of this objection would seem to be for her to change the
terms of what and who God is. If God is a principle, an impersonal intelligence that moves all of creation,
then the world certainly could be God’s body. But that is not the God of Christianity. Nevertheless,
McFague can be very vague about what God means.
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Catherine Keller

The same tendency to relativize the Incarnation’s particularity and “maximize” it
in relation to the cosmos shows up in numerous treatments of Christology. Catherine
Keller, for example, says that she wants to open up “breathing room back in Christology:
an interval of ruach, right in between ‘Jesus’ and ‘Christ.’”32 For Keller, this means that
creation is God’s incarnation.33 For Keller, “incarnation is co-extensive with the body of
creation,” and Jesus of Nazareth’s particularity has little to do with anything.34 For
Keller, the cosmic Christ eclipses Jesus of Nazareth: “The significance of the cosmic
Christ extends—from a Christian perspective —infinitely outward, in all directions.”35
Keller charges that theologians who make a strong Creator/creature distinction
ignore the creative chaos of the watery depths depicted in Genesis 1:1. Consequently,
these same theologians rarely consider the wild animals of Scripture or daily life. “They
stand in a long line of animal erasure.”36 She notes, for example, that in his twenty
sermons on the Book of Job, John Calvin completely ignored the animals that
predominate in Job 39–41. “Christian interpreters may appreciate the sun and stars as
evidence of divine order. But animals, especially wild ones, have always posed a gamy
embarrassment to human dominion.”37 For these theologians, nonhuman animals have
nothing to say worthy of pause. They must be subjected to dominion, like all chaos and
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multitude, and made one. So, according to most interpreters, Job’s final chapters
primarily depict God’s power.38
Ironically, however, though Keller indicts mainstream theologians for ignoring
nonhuman animals, she also ignores other animals when she examines Job 38–41. She
only mentions one nonhuman animal, behemoth, and interprets the creature as a
mythological chaos monster arising from the chaotic depths rather than an actual sea
creature (or both). Indeed, a search through all of her books easily reveals that Keller
completely ignores nonhuman animal life. On her own terms, which legitimately decry
animal erasure in theology and biblical studies as a function of anthropocentricism,
Keller’s own theology does not really escape the very traps she hopes to move beyond.
Keller deliberately unhinges her theology from Jesus’s life, death, and
resurrection. Just as she ignores other-than-human animals in Job, she also ignores Jesus,
preferring instead to talk about “tehom” and “chaos.” She believes that these
Christological patterns will make Christian more open to the surrounding material world.
The incarnation is not a unique event in history, but a process of God’s own becoming.
Keller states “Creation is always incarnation—and would have been so without the birth
of the Nazarene.”39 The world as we see it is God’s incarnation. Jesus, a wisdom teacher,
coaches us to understand that “God’s commonwealth” entails sharing abundant life with
neighbors, strangers and enemies. Jesus is bait. Jesus “lures” us toward a more deliberate
becoming.40
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But unhitching Christology from Jesus does not seem to give nonhuman animals
any more importance in Keller’s theology than jumping straight to a cosmic Christ.
Indeed it is hard to understand how Christology redeems nonhuman animals at all. In her
schema the Spirit of God beckons the world toward great complexity. As the world
moves toward greater and greater complexity the possibilities for happiness and pleasure
increase, but so also do the possibilities for suffering and disorder. Without suffering and
disorder, life would lack pleasure. Thus evil and suffering are not, as in traditional
Christian theology, a distorted grasping for the good, but are inherent aspects of earthly
life. Chaos moves the world toward greater complexity, and thus the potential for greater
good as well.41 Complexity requires predation. Keller does not speak about sin or the
need for redemption and salvation within creation. For Moltmann, God redeemed the
suffering inherent in creation by becoming part of it and taking up the process. But
Christ’s redemptive work transforms evolution. For Keller, Christ does not redeem
evolutionary suffering because such suffering is simply part of life. “If incarnation is
always going on, so is the carnage.”42 Predation and death in the animal world are part of
the process leading to something, but what? Humans? It is not clear what the God of
Keller’s process thought would save us from, since notions of moral and natural evil
rarely arise. To the extent that they show up in Keller’s work, they tend to be subsumed
into a process of becoming whereby a greater good arises out of death and decay. God
lures us toward the greater good, but that might involve extinctions, disease, and other
41
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ills—evils that humans have not caused. It is hard to see how this avoids a theodicy
problem. Nonhuman animals do not play a real role in this “cosmic Christology.” Jesus
does not play a part either. The particular is lost in the chaos, sacrificed to God’s own
becoming.
––––

It is very difficult to see how any of the Christologies that relativize Jesus of
Nazareth and maximize a cosmic Christology can really accomplish the wholesale
renewal of the doctrine of creation. The only theologian I have so far examined who even
briefly examines the issue of nonhuman animals is Moltmann. His theology provides a
decent place from which to begin thinking of the Incarnation and animals, despite some
drawbacks in his overall view of the Trinity and creation broadly speaking. But most of
the ecotheologians so far examined completely ignore Jesus’s particularity. In response to
these kinds of trajectories and problems, Ernst Conradie has said that ecotheology has
generally tended “to explore the ecological significance of God’s creation more than its
Creator, God’s immanence more than God’s transcendence, the cosmic work of God’s
Spirit more than the particularity of Jesus Christ, the humanity of Jesus more than the
divinity of Christ, general revelation more than special revelation,” and other such
reductions in a polarity.43 Some of the work reviewed so far—particularly Fox, McFague,
and Keller—are prone to devolve into a thin consciousness of a Christ paradigm in
nature. While they bring the entire created order into the purview of Christology, they do
so at the expense of the Incarnation’s particularity. Their impulses are good: we
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desperately need to change our behavior and thinking about creation. But the result of a
quick turn to cosmic Christology divorced from Jesus’s particularity does not really lead
to a renewed respect for all of creation. Nonhuman animals almost never play a role in
these theologies. They detach Christology from Jesus, who is presumed to be too
particular and too historical to be of much use for a renewed Christology.44 To save the
material world from Christian dogmatic erasure, the material Jesus has to be spiritualized.
Emphasizing the cosmic dimensions of Christology at the expense of the
particular historical incarnation in Jesus of Nazareth create serious doctrinal problems,
some of which I have already noted: in process theology God and the world collapse into
one another so that evil and suffering become part of God’s own becoming. These
Christologies reflect ecological concerns, emphasizing systems and wholes rather than
particular individuals. We humans certainly need to be reminded of our
interconnectedness with all creatures and all of creation. But everything that exists does
so in a particular place, a particular time, and has its own integrity. The question becomes
whether we can encounter “the universe” as Fox and Keller suggest. I have never seen
“the universe.” I have only seen particular bodies and creatures whose own particularities
are bound up with other particularities. It is through the particular that we encounter the
universe and not vice versa.45
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Keller, McFague, and Fox denounce traditional Western “metaphysics.” Yet the
cosmic Christ they posit becomes a principle abstracted from concrete reality. Why
would anybody need such a “Christ” to respect the universe or the Earth? But there is no
need for a Christ-consciousness to respect these theoretical entities. If we want an
encounter with the Other, whose particular individual presence before us demands a
response, then we will need more than the cosmic Christ as a paradigm, and that will
come from the particular: from Jesus of Nazareth.
I will build upon the basic notion that Christ’s work is cosmic in scope and that
this theological viewpoint entails a radical shift in behavior toward nonhuman creation.
These are the insights that the theologians I have examined thus far bring to the table.
McFague, Fox, and Keller, divinize creation but they do so with deeply pious motives: to
bring God back into this world at a time when God’s transcendence would seem to beam
God straight out of this world. There is not even room for God in the Eucharist in some
theologies (Reformed and Anabaptist views, for example).46 For these theologians,
bringing God back to this Earth in our theologies is a way to reaffirm the goodness of
creation. But, as I have argued, their solutions come at a high price that probably
undermines their intent. I will move beyond these insights by focusing on the particular.
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Deep Incarnation

Niels Gregersen

In recent years, the phrase “deep Incarnation” has entered theological discourse.
Diverse thinkers such as Elizabeth Johnson, Denis Edwards, and Normal Habel use the
expression. Niels Gregersen coined the term. He first spoke of a deep Incarnation with a
view toward understanding Christology in evolutionary terms.47 Deep Incarnation,
according to Gregersen, means the Logos entered “into the very tissue of biological
existence, and system of nature.”48 The Logos does not assume humanity alone but “the
whole malleable matrix of materiality.”49
Gregersen points to John 1:14: “the Word became flesh,” arguing that the Greek
notion inherent in σάρξ does not simply point to “frailty and vulnerability” in our bodies
that make everything subject to decay. He argues that σάρξ points to the Stoic notion that
“bodies were taken to be part of a whole flux of material beings, always being in contact
with one another.”50 So our “flesh” signals the “basic elements of earth, water, air, and
fire.”51 If we translate this concept into modern ideas, then σάρξ covers “the whole realm
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of the material world from quarks to atoms and molecules, in their combinations and
transformations throughout chemical and biological evolution.”52
Drawing on a few contemporary biblical scholars, Gregersen argues that the
Gospel of John presupposes “a synthesis of Stoic thought and Jewish ideas, common to
many of their contemporaries.”53 While Jewish thinkers would have kept a strict
separation between God and creation, John maintains that the Logos “became flesh.” This
means that the Logos was “present in Jesus as flesh, with the flesh of others, and for all
flesh.”54 For Gregersen, the Gospel of John’s emphasis on flesh marks a Stoic and not a
Jewish background.
As a “semantically flexible” term σάρξ can mean Jesus’s body, sinful “flesh,”
and/or “the realm of materiality in its most general extension, perhaps with a note of
frailty and transitoriness.”55 Gregersen connects the last meaning to deep Incarnation.
The Son of God has material existence writ large. What this means is that “in Christ, God
is conjoining all creatures and enters the biology of creation itself in order to share the
fate of biological existence. God becomes Jesus, and in him God becomes human, and
(by implication) foxes and sparrows, grass and soil.”56 But this deep Incarnation, rooted
in the interconnectedness of the material world, does not spread Christ thinly across the
universe as a paradigm. Rather, “Christian people know of a more saturated or ‘thick’
experiences of the presence of Christ” in the preaching of the Word, the sacraments, and
our “communal settings.”57
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Celia Deane-Drummond suggests that Gregersen points “to the equivalent worth
of all life, caught up in a matrix of sarx.”58 She questions whether this view adequately
distinguishes between different life forms. Gregersen’s emphasis on Stoic continuity, she
suggests, stretches out materiality into a thin veneer. I am not convinced by this critique.
Deane-Drummond is right to ask if Gregersen’s Stoicism adequately makes distinctions
in forms of life. She is concerned with homogeneity. My concern is different.
Stoics did not homogenize life forms. Stoicism sharply distinguished between
rational humans and irrational nonhuman animals. Stoics made the difference between
rational humans and irrational nonhuman creatures into a cosmic principle. For the
Stoics, humans resemble the gods in that we have internal and external λόγος (thought
and language) as well as freedom to act. By contrast, nonhuman animals are ἄλογα—
without reason or language, the two forms of λόγος in Stoic thought. Human speech
(λόγος προφορικός) reflects internal thought (λόγος ἐνδιάθετος), but animal sounds
merely indicate blind reactions to external stimuli.59 As Diogenes of Babylon (ca. 230–
150 BCE) reportedly taught, “the voice or cry of an animal is just a percussion of air
brought about by natural impulse.”60 Lacking λόγος, therefore, nonhuman animals merely
act based on impulses for self-preservation, which explains why so many of them act
resourcefully: they act from innate instincts and not from deliberation and reasoning.61
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Stoics routinely used a teleological argument: all nonhuman entities exist for the
sake of human beings. One of the earliest Stoics, Chrysippus (ca. 279–206 BCE), deduced
from this teleology that “men can make use of beasts for their own purposes without
injustice.”62 Chrysippus goes so far as to claim that pigs exist for the sole sake of
nourishing humans, crudely stating that the pig’s soul “was given to it to serve as salt and
keep it from putrefaction.”63 The telos for nonhuman animals— food, clothing, and
slaves for humans—means they do not need thought and language. But the Stoic
hierarchical view of the cosmos is very clear. It is very difficult to see how an emphasis
on Stoicism could help theologians recover any kind of respect for nonhuman animals.
I am also not convinced of a strong Stoic influence on the Gospel of John. For
example, the Stoic idea that a male needed to be “passionless” and show very little
emotion might sometimes be seen in the way that John’s Jesus walks this earth without
much care. But at the same time, Jesus weeps over Jerusalem (John 11:35) and is moved
strongly by Lazarus’s death (John 12:27), an indication that Jesus’s emotional life was
not at all like a Stoic male. Jewish Psalms do not advocate a Stoic male emotional life
either. Rather, the Psalms call for unrestrained joy and praise of God as well as deep
lament at times. So the ostensible “Stoicism” of the Gospel of John seems at the very
least severely qualified, and with such severe qualification, is it even worth reading
Stoicism into the Gospel?
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Scholars have long known that once Christians mixed up Stoic doctrine with
Christianity, respect for nonhuman creation began to wane and anthropocentric arrogance
worsened. Gregersen takes the Gospel of John out of its biblical heritage, a heritage
utterly immersed in Jewish faith and life.64 This is a problem of particularity and is a
central concern of this dissertation. I am intrigued by Gregersen’s ideas, but his Stoicism
seems unnecessary and counterproductive to the extent that Stoicism is hostile to the
“irrational” nonhuman world, utterly anthropocentric in the worst way, and at odds with
the Hebrew Bible’s respect for all of God’s good creatures. Jesus’s story continues and
arises from the story of God’s faithfulness to Israel. Gregersen’s Jesus does not need
Stoicism; he needs Jewishness.
Neil Darragh, Denis Edwards, and Elizabeth Johnson

As I already noted, numerous theologians have taken up the idea of deep
Incarnation. Neil Darragh, for example, sees the Incarnation running so deep that Jesus is
not merely connected to other humans and other animals. He is connected to inanimate
creation as well. “Jesus of Nazareth is not just a human being, he is also a function in the
carbon and oxygen cycles of the planet, a mammal, an event in the productionconsumption processes of first century Palestine, and so on.”65
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Likewise, Denis Edwards says that Gregersen’s idea of deep Incarnation faithfully
reflects Christian tradition and Scripture as well as evolutionary biology, which show us
that the universe is marvelously interconnected.66 Deep Incarnation suggests that the
Incarnation of the Word in the human Jesus “can now be understood as, like all of
humanity, dependent upon the evolution of life from its microbial origins 3.7 billion
years ago. In the bodily humanity of Jesus, God is made one with all the fruits of
evolution by means of natural selection. The body of Jesus is made up of atoms produced
in the nuclear furnaces of stars. It depends upon the cooperation of the billions of
microbes that inhabit it. It exists only in interdependence with all the other organisms and
all the systems that sustain life on Earth.”67
Jesus of Nazareth was a human. That means he was interdependent with all other
creatures. His body had DNA, DNA shared with chimpanzees and gorillas.68 His body
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takes up the same dust as ours, dust made from exploding stars.69 The Incarnation is deep
in simply being fully human. It is also cosmic in being fully human. For these
theologians, there is no separation between the particular and the universal in Christology
(unlike Fox, McFague, and Keller). Because Jesus is the Logos incarnate, this means God
has entered into the biosphere in such as a way as to begin to divinize the whole world.
Jesus is the climactic pivotal point of evolution and represents the entire cosmos as well
as humanity.
But the emphasis of these Christologies is not on Jesus’s humanity per se. The
Word became “flesh.” Flesh is a wider category than humanity. Any Christology that
focuses mainly or solely on God’s relationship to humans, therefore, misses the way that
the Logos takes up flesh and all things (Col 1:15–20). Jesus of Nazareth’s body becomes
“extended” to encompass a social body, the church, as well as the vast expanding
universe.70 These theologians emphasize Jesus’s physicality and flesh rather than his
humanity. As Elizabeth Johnson notes: “‘Deep Incarnation’ understands John 1:14 to be
saying that the sarx which the Word of God became not only weds Jesus to other human
beings in the species; it also reaches beyond us to join him to the whole biological world
of living creatures and the cosmic dust of which they are composed. The Incarnation is a
cosmic event.”71 To focus exclusively on his humanity would be anthropocentric, missing
the Incarnation’s creation-wide significance. Seeing Jesus as deeply embedded in
evolutionary history, taking up humanity’s shared DNA with other great apes, stardust,
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and evolutionary history might seem strange. But according to Darragh, this is because
we rarely look at ourselves as interconnected with other creatures:
If we find it strange to describe Jesus of Nazareth in this way, it is presumably
because we are not used to seeing him as integrated within the events and
processes of the planet Earth. The core of the issue though is that we are not used
to seeing ourselves in this way. We do not commonly see ourselves as existing in
these dimensions. We have rather tended to see ourselves in terms of will, or
intellect, or consciousness, or reason, or freedom. Thus the many dimensions of
our existence within the Earth have been reduced to only a few and thereby
isolated us from the rest of the Earth.72
Deep Incarnation therefore resists modern anthropology, which sees human persons as
autonomous, thinking, individuals rather than interdependent, communal, and shaped by
our environment and bodies. We tend, in the modern world, to think we can overcome
our physical limitations by sheer will power and hard work. But the kind of Incarnational
perspective examined here sees Jesus Christ as absolutely dependent and embedded in a
deep history, a deep time, and deep physicality. Only through that depth do we get to the
cosmic Christ.
Elizabeth Johnson has developed these notions even further. If Jesus of
Nazareth’s flesh is composed of “star stuff and earth stuff” as part of the “historical and
biological community of Earth” and existed in a relationship of interdependence with the
physical universe, and if Jesus was raised from the dead in the flesh, then “this signals
embryonically the final beginning of redemptive glorification not just for other human
beings but for all flesh, all material beings, every creature that passes through death. The
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evolving world of life, all of matter in its endless permutations, will not be left behind but
will likewise be transfigured by the resurrecting action of the Creator Spirit.”73
For Johnson, Jesus’s ministry and life also have a bearing upon deep Incarnation.
If we start, according to Johnson, with cosmology, we will tend to leave behind the
historical Jesus. Jesus transgressed a remarkable number of boundaries, giving impetus
for social justice. “Concrete vignettes of Jesus’ teaching and characteristic behavior
center around the rich Jewish symbol of the reign of God, a biblical expression for the
very nature of the indescribable holy One, evoking the moment when the loving power of
God will win through over the powers that destroy. In parables and beatitudes, healings
and festive meals, some of which were scandalous and rife with conflict, this Spiritblessed prophet provided a joyous foretaste of what the arrival of God’s reign would
entail.”74 Johnson seems to be on the right track. The cosmic Christ, unhinged from the
historical Jesus, seems to me a recipe for the exact opposite of its intent to ground
Christology in the physical realm. She is also on the right track in pointing to Jesus’s
Jewishness, though she does not develop this aspect. Unlike Gregersen, who grounds
deep Incarnation in Stoic metaphysics, potentially setting up a new anthropocentric
arrogance, Elizabeth Johnson points to Jesus’s indispensable Jewish particularity. But
again, she does not develop how this is the case. In my argument, Jesus’s particularity as
a Jew will be a bedrock for understanding the Incarnation’s significance for nonhuman
animals.
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Celia Deane-Drummond

One approach to grounding the notion of deep Incarnation in Jewish thinking is to
approach the issue not from the humanity and flesh of Jesus but from the other end:
Logos Christology, or to put it in terms of Hebrew Scriptures: Wisdom. Celia DeaneDrummond has done significant work in this area. Deane-Drummond agrees with
Gregersen and others that the Gospel of John’s prologue is extremely important for
understanding the Incarnation. But rather than focusing on what σάρξ means Deane
Drummond starts from the Logos, which she interprets as primarily grounded in Jewish
tradition first and foremost.75 While Gregersen would emphasize the Greek influence on
Logos, Deane-Drummond points out that the Hebrew term דָּ בָר, which combines “word”
and “deed,” seems more suitable for understanding the Gospel since it emphasizes ethics
in addition to more abstract philosophical notions inherent in the Greek. As she says, “it
is the concrete, then, rather than the universal that is implied by dabar.”76 But the Logos
is also associated with Wisdom, an idea with deep roots in Jewish literature.
Celia Deane-Drummond’s work takes Jesus’s Jewish background seriously but
from the perspective of Wisdom Christology. If what it means to be a human being is to
be embedded in an ongoing evolution of life on Earth, then Jesus’s humanity was also
part of evolution on Earth. God’s transcendence does not place God at odds with creation.
In a kenotic reading of the Incarnation, Deane-Drummond focuses less on the ontological
status of the human and divine “natures” of Jesus Christ, and more upon the union of
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divine and human obedience in the one person, Jesus of Nazareth. Jesus’s whole life
exhibits this theodrama. The “deep incarnation” connects Wisdom to the entire creation
and whole cosmos. All of created existence contains a hidden mystery that nevertheless
shows forth beauty, which we humans can appreciate even if we cannot fully understand
it. We can still wonder at the mystery, which prepares us for the beauty of Christ. Jesus’s
death on the cross redeems all of creation. Nonhuman animals have their own morality
and rules, and fall short of the kind of justice and peaceableness that even they sometimes
aspire to according to the work of modern ethologists like Frans de Waal. So nonhuman
animals need redemption as well, and the Wisdom of God on the cross redeems these
creatures, takes them into the divine life to which all of creation is destined in Jesus
Christ.77
Deane-Drummond’s Christology powerfully appropriates “deep Incarnation” and
respects Jesus’s particularity while focusing on cosmic redemption that other theologians
emphasize. Her Christology is meant to make sense of Christology in an evolutionary
view without some of the shortcomings of other attempts, which often make evolution
part of the very being of God so that God “becomes.” The Incarnation and Resurrection
are not radical breaks with evolutionary history in her theology, but continue the hidden
sophianic beauty inherent in all things that prepare us for God’s becoming flesh.
Deane-Drummond critiques cosmic Christologies for the same reasons I have
done so in this introduction. She says, “Theological descriptions of cosmic Christology . .
. suffer the disadvantage of detaching Christ from the historical Jesus as understood
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according to the Gospel accounts.”78 She places Jesus in the Jewish Wisdom tradition and
her appropriation of Hans Urs von Balthasar’s theodrama for Christology helps her
respect the Incarnation’s particularity while also showing a cosmic redemption.
Nevertheless, I think there is a lot more to say about Jesus’s particularity. By focusing on
a Logos Christology, Deane-Drummond is able to talk about the Incarnation in broad
terms that make sense in a world in which evolution of life is the predominant narrative.
But what happens when we focus on the “historical accounts as understood according to
the Gospel accounts” where we see Jesus’s maleness, Jewishness, and humanity in full
view? Does a Wisdom Christology by itself fully address the scandal of particularity that
these three identities in particular have represented? I am concerned that the sweeping
theodramatic narrative she develops loses the individual at times. Bypassing Jesus’s
specific gendered, species, and ethnic/religious identity in favor of a Wisdom Christology
does not face head on the scandal that these identities present to the modern theologian.
Nor does it allow us to refocus the particularity in new ways to develop a theology that is
not only ecological, but begins to reshape the human/nonhuman animal relationship.
Nonhuman Animals and the Incarnation: Recent Literature

Long before ecotheologians had taken up the mantle, Christian theologians who
have written on theology and nonhuman animals have claimed similar things as those
speaking about a “deep Incarnation.” One of the earliest attempts to see the Incarnation as
touching on nonhuman creation comes from Andrew Linzey. In his introduction to an
edited volume titled, Animals on the Agenda, Linzey briefly states that “by becoming
flesh, the Logos identifies . . . not only with humanity but with all creatures of flesh and
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blood.”79 He did not elaborate further but clearly argued that the Incarnation should not
be limited to humans alone, any more than it should be limited to males alone. In another
book Linzey claims that the λόγος became a mammal: “for the flesh assumed in the
incarnation is not some hermeneutically sealed, highly differentiated human flesh, it is
the same organic flesh and blood which we share with other mammalian creatures. There
is no human embodiment totally unsimilar to the flesh of other sentient creatures.”80 Here
Linzey uses the concept of “flesh” to broaden the Incarnation to all mammals. Likewise,
Stephen H. Webb wrote: “animals are a part of the incarnation because traditional
Christology combines the divine and the human without subtracting anything from the
physical or material aspects of creation, and humans are mammals, flesh and blood
creatures with bodily needs and functions.”81 These are clear and early indications that
theologians working on nonhuman animal issues have seen how fruitful something like a
“deep Incarnation” theology can be.
There was a time when Andrew Linzey and Stephen Webb were two of the
predominant voices in a small cadre of theologians who cared about nonhuman animals
and theology. Today, however, there are more Christian theologians, biblical scholars and
ethicists than ever working on this issue. In the past six years or so there has been an
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explosion of books and articles dealing with Christianity and nonhuman animals.82 The
literature I have reviewed so far is more broadly concerned with ecology and Christianity,
but all of it has a strong bearing on thinking about nonhuman animals in relationship to
the Incarnation. Books that deal with Christianity and nonhuman animals often focus
more narrowly on biblical interpretation and/or ethics. For example, I co-edited a book
along with Tripp York in which the vast majority of the chapters deal with interpreting
various passages of Scripture that some Christians use to reject focusing on nonhuman
animals at all.83 Charles Camosy recently published a book that deals mostly with how to
think ethically about nonhuman animals as Christians.84 Two books published that bear
upon the subject of Christianity and animals, Theology on the Menu: Asceticism, Meat
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and Christian Diet co-authored by David Grummet and Rachel Muers and Eating and
Believing: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Vegetarianism and Theology co-edited by
David Grummet and Rachel Muers, largely deal with the issue of vegetarianism and
Christianity. While these books are helpful and I will draw from them occasionally, they
do not focus squarely on the Incarnation as the works I reviewed by Gregersen and others
do.
Deane-Drummond’s new book, The Wisdom of the Liminal: Evolution and Other
Animals in Human Becoming, draws extensively from ethological studies to reconfigure
theological anthropology. But she explicitly leaves aside what her work in this area
means for Christology per se. Instead she refers readers to her book Christ and Evolution:
Wonder and Wisdom, which I have already reviewed. But obviously, any theological
anthropology is tied to Christology in some way. Her conclusions in this new book
therefore should have some implication for Christology, but she avoids drawing any.
In Creaturely Theology, editors Deane-Drummond and David Clough bemoan the
fact that Christian theologians have by and large ignored questions about nonhuman
animals with any depth. Theologians have based their own anthropology on the
distinction between humans and all other animals. But these reflections, Clough and
Deane-Drummond argue, are usually shallow and not conversant with contemporary
philosophy, science, or political theory, which have all given extended attention to
questions about other animals, and have been doing so for quite a while. Jacques Derrida,
Giorgio Agamben, Martha Nussbaum, Mary Midgley, and many others have been
carrying on a conversation that when coupled with ethological research represents a
significant philosophical, political, ethical, and scientific challenge for theologians to
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consider. The idea that the most fundamental distinction in Christianity is that between
God and all creatures is what underlies the basis for this edited collection, and is what the
editors believe is a distinctive theological contribution to the ongoing conversation writ
large.
While the essays in this book are all fruitful and challenging, the primary essay
that is relevant for this dissertation is Denis Edwards’s chapter, “The Redemption of
Animals in an Incarnational Theology.”85 Drawing on the cosmic Christology he finds in
the New Testament, Edwards looks to develop a theory of “redemption through
incarnation” that includes other-than-human animals.86 To do this Edwards turns to
Athanasius. For Athanasius, the fact that all of creation exists in the precarious state
between being created out of nothing and falling back into nothing means that all of
creation exists and is sustained by God’s grace. By becoming a creature, God moves
beyond simply restoring humanity to an original sinless state. Jesus’s death into the
precarious state of creatureliness and his resurrection lifts “all things” out of the balance
and toward a new life. Christ becomes the “firstborn of all creation” (Col 1:15), a sign
that all of creation will be released from the death struggle (Rom 8:19–20) by a process
of deification.87
Edwards moves on to extrapolate from Athanasius’s theology. Edwards wants to
“develop an ecological theology that is also a theology of animals.”88 Salvation through
the Incarnation provides an alternative model to atonement theories that focus squarely
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on human sin. By becoming part of creation God changes the ontological status of
creation and moves all things toward divinization. Nonhuman animals will also be taken
up into the life of the Trinity, and indeed already bear the imprint of God’s Wisdom,
according to various biblical passages. Humans who are aware of their redemption in
Christ, therefore, are called to live nonviolent lives that help to heal the world rather than
destroy it.
What is striking to me about Edwards’ interpretation of Athanasius is how he has
to extrapolate from Athanasius: Athanasius himself does not focus on nonhuman animals.
In chapter 2, I will look closely at whether Athanasius and also John of Damascus, who
takes a similar line using John 1:14, are really all that helpful for thinking about
nonhuman animals. The “ecological theology that is also a theology for animals” way of
thinking seems, again, to start with the cosmic Christ and ontological categories that
bypass the particularities of the Incarnation. I suggest that the focus on the cosmic Christ
needs strong supplementation with a focus on Jesus of Nazareth in order to be more
balanced and provide more space than the “also” in Edwards’s statement allows.
Finally, David Clough’s groundbreaking book, On Animals—the first book on
systematic theology in relationship to nonhuman animals—has some helpful and
pertinent sections for this dissertation. Because I will focus on particularity, Clough’s
chapter on the Incarnation and nonhuman animals is most relevant.89 The Incarnation is
the central chapter of Clough’s book and the central idea in his systematic theology. In
the first section of the chapter, “Reading the Particularity of the Incarnation,” Clough
passes over Jesus’s Jewishness and maleness with a few sentences and quickly moves on
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to the idea, which we have already encountered, of the Word becoming flesh in John
1:14. Clough ends his three-page reflection on particularity (heavily truncated because of
the enormous footnotes) with the assessment that “the particular creature God became
was a human, male, Jewish, Palestinian, first-century one, but none of these specifics
seem to have been first in the mind of the New Testament authors who chose the term
‘flesh’ to characterize the event.”90
The main purpose of the section on particularity is to show that the wider purview
of the Incarnation includes nonhuman animals. The Word became an animal. The Word
became a creature. He then moves on to look at the cosmic Christ in the New Testament.
This is a familiar way to argue, even though Clough does not interact with Gregersen or
others who have taken up the deep Incarnation interpretation. But his interpretation of the
Incarnation is very much in line with Edwards’s statement of desiring to develop an
ecotheology that also includes nonhuman animals. Clough’s focus is wide: the
Incarnation is about becoming a “creature” because the most fundamental distinction in
Christian theology is between God and all creatures.91 And when it comes to distinctions
within the creaturely realm, Jesus Christ provides the most fundamental distinction. Jesus
is the image of God. Following Barth’s Christocentric interpretation of the imago dei,
Clough argues that Jesus rather than humanity writ large is the one to whom Scripture
points as the image of God. If this is the case, then we can see that “the key distinction is
that between Christ and all other creatures, rather than particular groups of creatures that
image God in different ways.”92 Only when we have clarified these theological
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distinctions can we then begin to look at other differences and see how particular
creatures image God themselves.
As with other theologians reviewed so far, I find much that is helpful and fruitful
in Clough’s analysis. He and other theologians looking at cosmic Christology provide a
needed theological correction to anthropocentric interpretations of Christology. Clough,
in contrast to eco-theologians, focuses more squarely on nonhuman animals. He rightly
sees, I think, that even ecotheologians have tended to bypass other animals in favor of
ecosystems and universes.
Yet when it comes to the Incarnation itself, Clough is strikingly similar to all of
the theologians I have reviewed so far: he bypasses the Incarnation’s particularities in
favor of cosmic Christology. I am not convinced that dismissing the particularity of the
Incarnation as unimportant should be done so easily. I agree that the fundamental
distinction in Christian theology is that between God and all creatures. I also agree with
the Christocentric interpretation of the image of God found in Karl Barth. But why
should that somehow mean that the particularity of the Incarnation in Jesus’s Jewishness,
maleness, and humanity are irrelevant?
“Deep Incarnation” theologians (as I will call them and which I subscribe to as
well) only see the particularity as important insofar as it demonstrates embeddedness in
the matrix of life at its most fundamental levels. I think there is at some level a fear that
any focus on Jesus’s maleness, for instance, would lead to unhelpful gender stereotypes
written into the doctrine of God. Karl Barth and Hans Urs von Balthasar argue this way.93
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These theological moves can also underwrite systems of patriarchy within human society.
But this only has to be the case if we essentialize gender in particular ways. Could it be
that Jesus of Nazareth’s particular way of being male might actually tell us something
important for theology concerned about nonhuman animals? I think it might, and I will
argue why in chapter 4.
I am also concerned about the long history of Christians erasing Jesus’s
Jewishness in favor of some more universal Christ images. This tendency has had dire
consequences for Christian faith and life through the centuries. No theology, even one
trying to expand the purview toward nonhuman creation, can afford to bypass Jesus’s
Jewishness. The stakes are too high given how Christians have stereotyped, erased, and
obliterated Jewish people both figuratively in written texts and actually in real life
pogroms and concentration camps. If there is anything Christian theologians should have
learned after the Holocaust, it is to pay attention to Jesus’s Jewishness in more than a
passing manner. Ecotheology and animal theology do not get a pass on this.
After all—since Clough uses Barth as a helpful resource in the endeavor to
develop a theology for animals—Barth did more than highlight the Creator/creature
divide and the Christocentric reading of the imago dei. Barth also wrote: “The Word did
not simply become any “flesh,” any man humbled and suffering. It became Jewish flesh.
The Church’s whole doctrine of the incarnation and the atonement becomes abstract and
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valueless and meaningless to the extent that this comes to be regarded as something
accidental and incidental.”94 However, it seems to me that much of the deep Incarnation
interpretation marginalizes Jesus’s Jewishness in precisely the way Barth warns about:
Jesus’s Jewishness is incidental to the Incarnation, an accident that shows the particular
“deep” matrix, but not all that fundamentally important.
Overview of this Work

This dissertation is a dialogue with deep Incarnation theologians’ ideas. But
where they move immediately outward and upward to the cosmic Christ, I go in the
opposite direction: to the flesh. My question is whether the Incarnation’s particularity,
specifically Jesus’s Jewishness, maleness, and humanness might be vital aspects of
Christology so that ignoring these aspects of the Incarnation does not help to develop “an
ecotheology that is also a theology for animals.” Rather than retreat into the cosmos and
away from Jesus’s particularity I will address some of the issues directly and turn the
question around: it is precisely through Jesus of Nazareth that space opens up for the
other-than-human animals Christians have been so quick to dismiss. This dissertation is
not a critique of any one person’s theology or, even less, a whole school of theology. I
find deep Incarnational ideas to be extremely fruitful. My work, again, supplements and
contributes to the work these theologians are doing. Therefore, most of this dissertation is
constructive theology. In saying this I align myself with Karl Barth, who claimed that on
the basis of the Incarnation “the sense and sound of our word must be positive.”95 A
dissertation that mostly tears down other people rather than building upon their best
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insights would be a betrayal of what I wish to do in this work. This dissertation is part of
a dialogue about how we Christians can recover a sense of our own creatureliness and
affirm the goodness not only of creation itself, but also those creatures—nonhuman
animals—who so often go ignored even in ecotheology.
In the first chapter I will look at the issue of the Word becoming “flesh.” The
Gospel of John’s claim that the Word became flesh has been a central idea in recent
literature around ecotheology and theology and nonhuman animals. Some of the authors,
such as Gregersen, have placed this notion within a Greek philosophical context in order
to give the notion airs of a wider significance. I do not think such a move is helpful or
necessary, as I already noted. So in the first chapter I will look at how the notion of God
becoming “flesh” functions in the New Testament and how it relates to ideas from the
Hebrew Bible.
In the second chapter I will examine how two patristic scholars use this notion of
God becoming flesh. Both Athanasius and John of Damascus use John 1:14 to speak of
the Word becoming “matter.” Denis Edwards and some other modern scholars think that
Athanasius therefore offers some hope for modern theologians in recovering a more
balanced theology that would be more respectful of nonhuman creation. I am not so sure.
Both Athanasius and John of Damascus point to the cosmic Christ at the expense of
Jesus’s particularity, as do theologians I have reviewed in this introduction, but
Athanasius and the Damscene do so in a context decidedly anti-Jewish. As such, their
thoughts on the Incarnation, while intriguing, are of limited use. They do not pay enough
attention to Jesus of Nazareth.
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In the third chapter I begin my positive argument by looking at how Jesus’s
Jewishness is essential for any theology concerned about nonhuman animals. Jesus stands
in a prophetic tradition of messianic and eschatological hope. Without the specific Jewish
eschatological hope that Jesus embodies, in which predators and prey no longer interact
with one another in a cycle of violence, our theologies of nonhuman animals would be
much impoverished. But there is much more than eschatology at stake.
In the fourth chapter I build upon the idea that Jesus’s Jewishness is essential for
the Incarnation by examining his maleness. Jesus is a Jewish male. His maleness provides
a very specific challenge to dominant ideas of maleness in antiquity and even in our
modern American culture. The ideal male only shows a limited range of emotion, like a
Stoic, but also learns the virtues by becoming a hunter and a warrior. But Jesus’s
Jewishness challenges these ideological performances of gender. His male body not only
seems radically transgendered at times, but is also a circumcised male body. This has
specific ramifications for maleness in antiquity and beyond that make his maleness
helpful for thinking about how the Incarnation relates to nonhuman animals.
In the final chapter, I will take up the challenge of Jesus’s humanness. Even if I
can successfully address the Son’s Jewish and male particularity, it would seem that the
“humanity of God,” as Barth called it, is the decisive particular that makes theological
thinking about nonhuman animals at best a weird side-project and at worst a terrible
distraction from the real work of thinking about how the Son’s humanness saves
humanity alone. But I think that would be a hasty conclusion. Jesus’s humanity, I argue,
is a kenosis of humanity: a giving up of human privilege and domination, indeed, giving
up on the very idea of the human/animal distinction because that quest is one that serves
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domination not liberation. Drawing on philosophical currents from Jacques Derrida,
Giorgio Agamben, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guatarri, and others, I see Jesus as
“becoming-animal” in a way that problematizes all attempts to define anthropology in a
way that allows humans to dominate other creatures.
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CHAPTER 1
THE WORD BECAME FLESH

At every Roman Catholic Mass and at many Protestant worship services,
Christians recite the Creed, part of which states: “I believe in one Lord Jesus Christ . . .
for us men and for our salvation he came down from heaven and by the Holy Spirit was
incarnate (σαρκωθέντα) of the Virgin Mary, and became man (ἐνανθρωπήσαντα).”96 This
is the English version of the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed that American Roman
Catholics repeat. Other churches have modernized the language from “man” to human:
“and became human.”97 Anselm of Canterbury titled one of his works, “Why God
became human” (Cur deus homo). There is a long history of Christians affirming Jesus’s
true humanity and emphasizing it.
However, the language used in the Gospel of John is that the Word became
“flesh” (σάρξ —John 1:14). In line with common parlance, modern commentaries on the
Gospel of John have generally interpreted σάρξ in John 1:14 as a synonym for “human.”
In his commentary on John, for example, Ben Witherington states that John was
concerned to “make clear that the Logos really took on human flesh, and that he is the
only mediator between human beings and God.”98 Witherington gives no attention to
what σάρξ might mean but assumes it implies humanity exclusively. Likewise, Ernst
Haenchen’s commentary passes over the meaning of flesh, opting instead to discuss the
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absent virgin birth story.99 Raymond Brown, in his groundbreaking commentary on
John’s Gospel, states that “‘flesh’ stands for the whole man” without inquiring whether
the term could have broader implications.100 Finally, Rudolf Bultmann attempts to show
that John’s statement, “the Word became flesh,” counters a common tendency in the
ancient world to pit the spiritual against the created material world. Yet Bultmann does
not take this to its logical conclusion by drawing more creation-wide implications from it.
Instead he states that σάρξ in John 1:14 refers to “the sphere of the human and the
worldly as opposed to the divine.”101 Σαρξ has to do with what is fleeting, weak, and
arrogant in the human sphere, but says little about anything else.
Theologians have generally taken a similar path. Thomas F. Torrance, for
instance, interprets σάρξ as Jesus taking up humanity’s “fallen flesh.” For Torrance, the
reason for the Incarnation is atonement.102 Humanity sinned and needed God to heal the
rupture between humans and God, humans and humans, and human and “nature,” which
could only happen through the Incarnation. The meaning of the word “flesh” is “that the
Word participates in human nature and existence, for he became man in becoming flesh,
true man and real man.”103 Part of being truly human is having flesh “marked by Adam’s
fall, the human nature which seen from the cross is at enmity with God and needs to be
reconciled to God.”104
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But these commentators assert rather than argue for interpreting σάρξ as “human.”
Since most of these commentators do not give any arguments for this assumption, readers
have no good reason to accept their position. In fact, I will argue in this chapter, we have
very good reasons to think that “the Word became flesh” within a broader perspective on
the Incarnation. A few modern interpreters have already begun to draw this conclusion.
As noted in the introduction, Andrew Linzey has long viewed the Incarnation as
relating to nonhuman animals: “The incarnation is God’s love affair with all fleshly
creatures.”105 More recently, biblical scholar Richard Bauckham has pointed to “the
Word became flesh” as a statement with ecological importance. While the passage clearly
has in mind that Jesus became a human—with all the vulnerability, weakness, and
mortality that humanity implies—the passage has wider significance. “The Word
‘became flesh’, the mortal nature humans share with all living things, in order to give the
eternal life of God to all flesh.”106 Some biblical scholars have argued that John’s Gospel
devalues creation through a series of dualities.107 But if the prologue can be read as
having a wider significance than humanity, if “flesh” signifies human and nonhuman
creation, then the Gospel is about opening up eternity to what is non-eternal broadly.
Human and nonhuman creation share a common destiny in Christ.
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Denis Edwards has also taken up this line of thought. Concerned that humans
have done irretrievable damage to forests, water, soil, and the atmosphere, as well as
written off other animals to extinction, Edwards has worked to place nonhuman creation
within a Trinitarian framework. He argues that if God is a dynamic of mutual love in
God’s self, then every part of creation must be an expression of God’s love. For Edwards,
the second person of the Trinity is best understood as “the Wisdom of God,” through
whom all things were created and who became incarnate.108 But the Wisdom of God
became incarnate in a deeper way than merely becoming human:
The Word becomes flesh in solidarity with all flesh, and this includes not only
humanity but also the whole of biological life. The cross of Christ represents not
only God’s identification with suffering humanity and God’s will to bring
forgiveness and healing to human beings, but also God’s identification with
suffering creation and God’s promise of new creation that will bring healing and
fulfillment to all things. The meaning of the incarnation, of becoming flesh, is not
restricted to humanity, but involves all the networks of interconnected organisms,
the whole of biological life.109
Likewise, David Clough has drawn on John 1:14 for a renewed understanding of
the Incarnation. Commenting on the passage he states that, in essence, this verse means
that the Word took on “the life-substance common to humans and other animals.”110
Yet theologians and biblical scholars like Linzey, Bauckham, Edwards, and
Clough have neither given detailed work on how the Gospel of John uses σάρξ nor have
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they done extended work on the meaning of flesh. Like those who claim that σάρξ refers
to humanity alone, these theologians also generally assert or too briefly argue their
counter interpretations. Clough has done more work than others by connecting the term
σάρξ to its Hebrew counterpart, a move that I will draw from and expand upon in this
chapter. Connecting σάρξ to Jewish notions is essential for grounding the Gospel in
Hebrew Scriptures. But on all accounts what is needed is a more extensive survey of the
Fourth Gospel and a close reading of the text. Furthermore, these scholars have generally
bypassed other texts that could lend support to their expansive theological agendas such
as 1 John 4:2, 2 John 4:7, 1 Timothy 3:16, and 1 Peter 3:18 and 4:1.
Therefore, in this chapter I will closely examine the Gospel of John’s use of the
term σάρξ as well as these other passages. Throughout, I will attempt to show how
understanding σάρξ influences how we understand the Incarnation. Because σάρξ carries
a wider semantic range than being a synonym for human, it could very well be that there
is strong biblical precedent for seeing the Incarnation in broad terms, and doing so
precisely from the particularity of σάρξ. But I think it is crucial to remember the Jewish
roots of “flesh” since divorcing the term from the story of Israel can lead to the opposite
of respect for life.
Hermeneutics

In this chapter I offer readings of various biblical passages. Although I engage
with historical-critical scholarship, my readings are not bound to these methodologies,
which sometimes maintain that I must base my readings in what the author originally
intended or what the original audience must have heard. Modern interpreters who posit an
authorial intention in the text of the Gospel of John do not agree: which original “author”
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I choose would seem to depend my own inclinations asmore than on actual fact. Roland
Barthes announced the death of the author several decades ago. For Barthes, this absence
frees the text from the contraints of elite scholars.111
Nevertheless, Barthes may have exaggerated his claims and assessed the author’s
role too negatively. In response to Barthes, Michel Foucault argues that the author is
never absent from a text. Authors function in a variety of ways within our discourses. But
authors always limit interpretation: they use specific genres, employ specific literary
devices, and write within specific social settings. One authorial function, according to
Foucault, is as “founders of discursivity.”112 Foucault maintains that Freud, Marx, and
Engels were not just authors of specific books but also “established an endless possibility
of discourse.”113 These authors made possible a range of discussions that align with or
differe from their thinking. Even the differences belong to the discourses that these
authors founded. They make it possible to diverge from their thinking within the specific
discourse they founded. For example, Freud founded psychoanalytical discourse.
Subsequent generations function within this pyschoanalytical discourse even when
concepts of libido or dream analysis are absent from laer authors’ works.114
Foucault argues that expanding a specific discourse does not transform the
discourse a generic form that disrespects the texts. Rather, discursive expansion opens the
discourse “to a certain number of possible applications. To limit psychoanalysis as a type
of discursivity is, in reality, to try to isolate in the founding act an eventually restricted
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number of propositions or statements to which, alone, one grants a founding value, and in
relation to which certain concepts or theories accepted by Freud might be considered as
derived, secondary, or accessory.”115 According to Foucault, we do not say that Freud’s
statements are “false” and therefore dismiss his texts. Rather we set aside and explain
some statements regardless of their current acceptability. We still use Freud’s work.
Foucault calls this a “return to the origin,” which is part of the discourse and will modify
our current discussions.
Foucault’s analysis of the “author-function” fits well with my reading of
Scripture. The author still lurks withing the anonymously authored Gospel of John. This
Gospel has founded an enormously influential discourse about God. For instance, the
Gospel of John’s statement that the Word became flesh has been a theological bedrock in
Christian history. In one of his catechetical addresses, Pope John Paul II stated that,
“Truly, we are at the central and decisive point of our profession of faith here: ‘The Word
became flesh and came to dwell among us.’”116 The idea of the Word becoming flesh has
created a discourse in itself. Returning to the Gospel text to re-examine this “central and
decisive” idea is an essential part of the discussion.
But, as Foucault ably demonstrates, the field of discourse is bound to develop
beyond simply restating and repeating statements from the Gospel. Sometimes we
develop ideas that diverge from the Gospel but in the divergence are still within the
Johannine field of discourse, or more broadly within Christian theological discourse. But
my reading does not really seek to diverge so much as to expand the Gospel’s horizon. In
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Christian discourse, the usual way to speak about the Word becoming flesh has been to
equate “flesh” with “humanity” or, even more narrowly, to “man.” I will broaden rather
than narrow the meaning of flesh.
I do not claim that the following reading is based in the “authorial intentions” of
the author of John’s Gospel. The Jesus of John’s Gospel shows little interest in other
animals. Nevertheless, the trajectory of theological discourse that this Gospel sets into
motion may expand in a direction that makes other animals essential to the discussion.
Furthermore, we may expand this discussion by returning to the text and re-reading it in
light of our own questions.
The text shows us a horizon and therefore limits inerpretive possibilities to some
degree. Again Foucault is insightful: “The author is not an indefinite source of
significations which fill a work; the author does not precede the works, he is a certain
functional principle by which, in our culture, one limits, excludes, and chooses; in short,
by which one impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, the free composition,
decomposition, and recomposition of fiction.”117 The author is a “necessary or
constraining figure.”118 My reading respects this constraint. My reading also sees
discurive trajectories set into mostion by the Gospel. So I push the theological vision of
the Gospel of John into different areas. In short, my reading of the texts and my
hermeneutical assumptions sit within a specific way of seeing texts and authors within
postmodernity that does not simply discard authors and meaning, but also uses those texts
to say new things. This is the way Christians have often used Scripture in practice as we
preach and relate them to everyday life.
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The Gospel of John

The Prologue: The Word Became Flesh

The Gospel of John introduces the Incarnation in the prologue (1:1–18). Many
studies on John’s Gospel have argued that this prologue is not a mere opening for the
narrative. The prologue pervades the entire Gospel narrative as the story repeatedly
circles back to the opening. John’s prologue sets up a narrative world: a time (the
beginning), a place (the world), and the setting (among us). All the major characters in
the Gospel narrative exist within this narrative world that the prologue establishes.
Compared to Luke’s preface, which is outside the narrative structure, John’s prologue is
an essential part of the narrative.
John’s prologue provides a thematic overview to the Gospel, setting out some of
the Gospel’s major themes: light and darkness; sending; witness; the world; authority;
rebirth; enfleshment; glory; truth; and revelation. Some important terms in the prologue
do not appear in the rest of the Gospel, indicating that it likely originated as an early
hymn within the Johannine community.119 Whatever its origins, however, the Gospel of
John uses the prologue as a starting place for the story that follows. The prologue is a
beginning point that is repeatedly re-evaluated by what unfolds in the narrative
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sequence.120 The idea that the divine λόγος, who has an intimate relationship with God
and is God, enters into the creaturely realm to forge intimate relationships within the
created order pervades the Fourth Gospel. Many commentators see John 1:14 as the high
point of the prologue: “the Word became flesh (ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο).” The Incarnation
is something to which the Gospel returns over and over, a theme that makes sense of the
entire book.
The Λόγος Rooted in Hebrew Scriptures

The λόγος has at least four main semantic domains derived from the Hebrew
Bible, the Gospel’s narrative world. First, the idea connects to the creation narrative in
Genesis 1 (see also Psalm 34:6). John’s Gospel opens with the same words that the
Septuagint uses in Genesis 1: Ἐν ἀρχῇ (“In the beginning”). In the well-balanced
symmetry and movement of Genesis 1, at the beginning of each day of the first week God
speaks all things into existence (Καὶ εἶπεν ὁ θεός — LXX), names each thing, tells each
thing where it belongs, and blesses each thing that God makes. From the initial chaotic
waters, God makes order, beauty, goodness, lushness, and diversity. On the fifth day God
creates water creatures and birds that fly through the air. They teem with life. On the
sixth day God creates land animals and humans.
Alluding to the narrative world of Genesis 1, the divine λόγος in John’s Gospel
provides the foundation for all that exists, causes all creatures to flourish, and is the
source of all that is good. The prologue takes the idea of God speaking things into
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existence and uses the term λόγος in a different semantic field by giving it its own
existence. But Genesis 1:1 seems to fit well as for intertextual reading with John 1.
Against this reading, Norman Habel suggests that the prologue has an anemic
view of creation compared to Genesis 1, which lavishly describes creation and declares
everything to be “very good.”121 In contrast to Genesis 1, where the earth brings forth life
of all kinds, the prologue, according to Habel’s reading, says that the Word—not the
earth—creates all things, negating the earth’s role in creation and reducing the lavish
diversity of creation to one word (πάντα in Greek). Therefore, Habel claims that Genesis
1 and John 1 have “two discrete subjects as the sources or agents of life.”122
Habel argues that John’s prologue replaces Genesis 1. Rather than replace
Genesis 1, however, we can just as easily read John 1 as presupposes Genesis 1. The
Fourth Gospel does not need to repeat the details of Genesis 1. Instead, John sums up the
account by referring to “all things” that have been created (John 1:3). The evangelist
reads Genesis 1 in light of the story he is about to tell about Jesus. Jesus is the one
through whom all things all things are created. “All things” is a reference to the
lavishness of Genesis 1. John does not discount the role of the earth in bringing forth
other creatures. Rather, the evangelist highlights the part of Genesis 1 in which God’s
word is the primary mover in the narrative. The earth brings forth other creatures only
because God first verbally summons the earth to do so. That λόγος is Jesus in John’s
Gospel.123
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The second Hebrew domain for reading λόγος is the foundational events in
Israel’s history: the call and promise to Abraham; giving Jacob a new name, Israel;
telling Moses the divine name and liberating Israel from slavery; giving the Torah at
Mount Sinai; and the prophets who speak God’s word of judgment and salvation. God’s
word in the prophets purifies (Mal 3:2–4), renews the covenant (Jer 31:31–34), and
consoles the suffering (Isa 40:1–11). As in the creation story, God’s word brings life: As
the prophet Ezekiel looks into a valley of death and destruction, God speaks and long
dead skeletons begin to rattle, flesh starts to re-form upon them again, and breath enters
them as they hear “the word of the Lord” (ἀκούσατε λόγον κυρίου — Ezek 37:1–14).
The λόγος that judges and saves pervades John’s Gospel. The word that judges
and saves in Hebrew Scriptures has become incarnate in John’s Gospel. In the Hebrew
Bible the λόγος κυρίου or λόγος θεοῦ (LXX) comes to specific prophets at specific times
with specific messages. The typical phrase in the LXX— “the word of the Lord came to”
(καὶ ἐγένετο λόγος κυρίου πρός, e.g., Ezek 21:1 in the LXX)—almost suggests a divine
visitation. Psalm 33:4, 6 suggest that the λόγος κυρίου has personal characteristics and a
role in creation: “For the word of the Lord is upright, and all his work is done in
faithfulness. . . . By the word of the Lord the heavens were made, and all their host by the
breath of his mouth.” But John’s prologue takes the idea of the λόγος a step further:
rather than a message coming to a prophet the message and the messenger become the
same.
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The third Jewish field for the divine λόγος comes from the wisdom tradition.124
Raymond E. Brown sees Wisdom personified in the Hebrew Bible as the key influence
on John’s Gospel. In Wisdom literature, σοφία parallels the λόγος of John’s prologue in
the following ways: σοφία pre-existed the created order (Prov 8:22–23; Sir 1:4; Wis 9:9;
cf. John 1:1), was “with God” (Prov 8:30; Sir 1:1; Wis 9:4), actively participated in
creating all things (Prov 8:27–30; Wis 7:22; and 9:9), reflects God’s glory (Wis 7:25–26),
is the light and life of the world (Prov 4:18–19, 8:35; and Bar 4:1), enjoys human
company (Prov 8:31), dwells with humans (Sir 24:8), has grace (Sir 24:16), but some
reject Wisdom (Sir 15:7 and Bar 3:12). Brown concludes his study by stating that there
are therefore “good parallels for almost every detail of the prologue’s descriptions of the
Word.”125 The Wisdom tradition sometimes even uses σοφία and λόγος as synonyms as
in Wisdom 9:1–2.
Connecting John’s prologue to Jewish Wisdom literature is nothing new. Already
in the third century, Origen said that “just as we have learned in what sense wisdom is the
‘beginning of the ways’ of God and is said to have been created, in the sense, namely,
that she fashions beforehand and contains within herself the species and causes of the
entire creation, in the same manner also must wisdom be understood to the Word of God.
For wisdom opens to all other beings, that is, to the whole creation, the meaning of the
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mysteries and secrets which are contained within the wisdom of God, and so she is called
the Word, because she is the interpreter of the mind’s secrets.”126 Likewise, Augustine,
citing the Psalms, claimed that Jesus is “the Wisdom of God” that created all things.127
But John does not use σοφία but λόγος. Brown and others have given several
plausible reasons that John’s Gospel uses the masculine noun λόγος in place of the
feminine noun σοφία. James D. G. Dunn summarizes the reasons: “The concept ‘Word’
is given preference over ‘Wisdom,’ perhaps simply because the masculine concept
seemed more appropriate, but probably mainly because ‘Word’ was the more serviceable
concept to provide a bridge of communication between Jewish monotheism and Greek
religious philosophy (as with Philo).”128
Daniel Boyarin makes a convincing case that there was a “binitarianism”
circulating in Jewish circles around the time of Jesus and Paul. In his view of the λόγος,
Philo drew from a Jewish tradition that had absorbed Greek philosophy in such a way
that one cannot legitimately tell the difference between what is Greek and what is Jewish.
Philo, Boyarin argues, “oscillates on the point of the ambiguity between separate
existence of the Logos, God’s Son, and its total incorporation within the godhead. If
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Philo is not on the road to Damascus here, he is surely on a way that leads to Nicaea and
the controversies over the second person of the Trinity.”129
Philo was not an isolated person with esoteric views, nor was he a “Hellenized”
Jew in distinction from Palestinian Jews. Boyarin demonstrates that the “Memra of God”
held the same place for Semitic Jews as Greek-speaking ones. He quotes Alfred
Edersheim stating that “And yet, if words have any meaning, the Memra is a hypostasis,”
that is, has its own personal identity alongside YHWH.130 These non-rabbinic forms of
Jewish faith call into question any sharp divisions we might be tempted to make between
“Christians” and “Jews” at that time. These are simply later constructions, the result of an
unfortunate split that was far from inevitable.
Finally, Jewish reflections on the Torah provide another field of meaning within
which the prologue’s λόγος functions. The Wisdom tradition already connected wisdom
with the Torah. Sirach 24:1–24 starts with Wisdom, moving to the idea that she “comes
forth from the mouth of the Most High” (24:3), and then connects Wisdom to “the law
that Moses commanded us” in verse 23. Connecting σοφία, λόγος, and νόµος (Torah) is
common in the Septuagint, according to Naomi Cohen. She provides numerous examples
where the Septuagint uses the term λόγος to mean Torah, for example, Exodus 20:1;
35:1; Deuteronomy 9:10; 10:4; and Leviticus 8:36.131 As part of the implicit background
for the λόγος in John’s prologue, we have yet another deep Jewish root for the Gospel,
but another one that the Fourth Gospel builds upon rather than simply accepts as is.
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The reason I have belabored this point about the λόγος and the Hebrew Bible is to
emphasize the Jewish roots of John’s Gospel because this is important for how we read
the term σάρξ later. I want to establish a strong Jewish milieu for the Gospel. This Jewish
tradition is not simply one among many possible lenses through which to read the
Gospel, but a very plausible lens given the importance of God’s Word in Hebrew
thought.
A Narrative Reading

The prologue unfolds sequentially. Starting with the first verses, we learn more
and more information about the λόγος, constantly inviting us to rethink what we “know”
about the λόγος. With each verse the focus narrows from the cosmic origins in the first
verses to more and more specific aspects until we finally reach the name Jesus Christ in
1:17. Between the λόγος in verse 1 and Jesus Christ in verse 17 we learn that “all things”
are created through the λόγος, who gives all things life and light that sustains them (1:3–
5), and that the λόγος was not recognized by “the world” (ὁ κόσµος)—but those who do
recognize him relate to God in a new way (1:12–13)—has entered the created order in
material form and has revealed God in this created world (1:14, 16–18), and that grace
and truth come through the man Jesus Christ, who is “the Word became flesh (ὁ λόγος
σὰρξ ἐγένετο).” So the final verse of the prologue circles back to the first in which the
Son, who has an intimate relationship to the Father, turns toward the world and in so
doing reveals God’s nature (1:18).
The prologue’s focus keeps narrowing. The λόγος is the one through whom “all
things” (πάντα) are created in verse 3. As already noted, this is a way of summarizing the
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lavish, detailed account of Genesis 1. “All things” is the most comprehensive statement
about what has been created through the λόγος.
Verse 6 claims that God had already sent “a human” (ἄνθρωπος) named John who
witnessed to the “light” (φῶς)—the φῶς equated with the divine λόγος.132 This light
“which enlightens every human” (ὃ φωτίζει πάντα ἄνθρωπον) “was coming into the
world” (ἐρχόµενον εἰς τὸν κόσµον—John 1:9), that is, into the creaturely realm created
through the divine λόγος.133 The juxtaposition of light and darkness could be read in
dualistic terms of two opposing forces, but given the supremacy of light being associated
with the λόγος that would be a misreading. If this passage hearkens back to Genesis 1,
darkness itself is under divine control, being named “night.” Theologically speaking,
darkness is created as well and as God’s creation must be good. We need a little darkness
on this earth. Looking directly into the sun can blind. Our eyes need the contrast between
darkness and light. John contrasts light with darness, but this contrast does not signal a
fundamental binary in which light is good and darkness per se is evil. In people’s
132
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everyday experience of day and night, light, according to the Gospel, allows “all” (John
1:9) to see what they would not otherwise be able to see (John 11:9–10). In the final
chapter, I will argue that prologue allows us to se some very specific things about
creation and humanity in relationship to the divine λόγος that undercuts some of our most
cherished self-definitions.
But for now, it is enough to note that the prologue has moved from an utterly
cosmic scope at the beginning of all things, to a narrower picture in which the λόγος is
entering into the κόσµος. The term κόσµος is a narrower term than πάντα in verse three.
Whereas πάντα signifies a creation-wide statement, κόσµος in verses 9 and 10 more
likely refers to “the world beneath the sky, excluding the heavens where God dwells.”134
The Fourth Gospel uses the term κόσµος seventy-eight times. Four of these are in
John 1:9–10. Raymond Brown suggests that the Johannine literature uses the term with
three areas of meaning: 1) cosmic order; 2) creation able to respond to God; and 3)
human society.135 In the prologue, the first three uses of κόσµος have positive
connotations. “The true light, which enlightens everyone, was coming into the world”
(John 1:9) shows the κόσµος as receiving the Light’s attention and being a bearer of light.
“He was in the world” (1:10a) once again demonstrates a positive use in that the Light
wills to be in the world. The meaning of κόσµος seems to be Earth. “The world came into
being through him” (1:10b) is yet another positive association in that the κόσµος is
created through the λόγος and φῶς, which are good. Again, the meaning of κόσµος seems
to be the terrestrial planet we inhabit. The final use in the prologue, “yet the world did not
know him” (1:10c) has different connotations. This is the first time the κόσµος acts on its
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own, rather than receiving action from the φῶς. When the κόσµος neglects its Creator it
fails miserably. Yet the prologue may not expect the world to recognize the λόγος at all
since it is in darkness. The idea in this fourth use of κόσµος in the prologue suggests the
text has in view human society.136 But the second and third instances have broader
implications given that the prologue has spoken about “all things” having been created
through the λόγος.137
The overarching idea in John 1:9–10 seems to be that the Creator will enter into
creation, and perhaps even more specifically, that the Creator is coming to Earth. The
Creator will become a particular creature, but the prologue moves slowly, steadily
narrowing to a particular focus. Here the purview seems wider when the evangelist uses
the term κόσµος, with the first three uses denoting earthly creaturely reality at large and
the fourth possibly zeroing in on human society.
Then in John 1:14, the author repeats the idea of the Word entering creation in the
starkest of terms by unambiguously stating that the divine λόγος has become flesh: ὁ
λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο. The Gospel seems to use the word σὰρξ very deliberately. The text
does not say that the Word became “human” (ὁ λόγος ἄνθρωπος ἐγένετο). To say the
136
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“Word became human” is too narrow for the moment. Yet the term σάρξ fits with the
unfolding sequential narrative from a wide panoramic view to focus and refocus to
particulars.
“Flesh” Rooted in the Hebrew Bible

In the prologue, the word “flesh” (σάρξ) appears twice in close proximity. In its
narrative context within the prologue the second use of σάρξ refers to “Jesus Christ”
(1:17). The prologue makes a particular claim about Jesus, namely, that he is “the Word
became flesh.” John’s prologue is rich with scriptural allusion, as I already established by
looking at the scriptural domains in Hebrew Scriptures for the term λόγος. Indeed, the
Hebrew Bible provides the principal background for the Johannine literature.138 Just as
the primary semantic background for λόγος lies in numerous Jewish scriptures, so too
does the term σάρξ.
Σάρξ in verse 14 seems to parallel the κόσµος in verse 9. That is, σάρξ represents
a broader sphere than the merely human. But σάρξ is less broad than speaking about the
κόσµος as a whole. Such a use of σάρξ comports with the rich allusions to Jewish
scriptures in the prologue and Gospel. The Greek term σάρξ connects to the Hebrew term
שׂר
ָ  ָבּ, which the Hebrew Bible often uses for all living creatures. The Fourth Gospel shows

influence from both the LXX and a Hebrew version of the Bible, making it necessary to
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look at both the Greek and the Hebrew for “flesh.”139 The phrase  כָּל־ ָבּ ָשׂרhas particular
importance. God decides to destroy “all flesh” in a flood (Gen 6.13) and then, after the
Flood, makes a covenant with “all flesh” (9:17). Jeremiah announced that God is lord of
“all flesh” (Jer 32.27), while the Psalmist proclaimed that God gives food to “all flesh”
(Ps 136:25).140
That the “Word becomes flesh” may also reflect deeper scriptural themes about
the interconnectedness of animal life in particular. According to Genesis, the waters
produce creatures that live there (Gen 1:20). The earth produces land creatures of every
kind (Gen 1:24). God is said to have made them, but they come from their habitat. They
have deep roots in the places they live. Yet after the water and earth initially produce
these creatures, they are blessed and told to “be fruitful and multiply.” Initiailly, they
come from their habitat. Thereafter, however, these animals produce each other. Humans
are the same. God forms the first man out of the dust of the ground. Humans come from
the same earth as other animals. But after this God creates the first woman from the first
man, and subsequent generations of humans come from human procreation rather than
from new creations out of the earth.
In Genesis 1:11–12, the earth also produces the plant life that sustains humanity
and all land animals. Unlike animal and human life, however, plant life continues to
come from the earth. That God tells humans and other animals to eat a plant-based diet
continues to connect humans and other animals to the earth. It is through our diet that we
139
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continue the deep interconnectedness. While maintaining peaceable relations amongst
animal and human life. Our bodies regenerate our cells because of the food we eat. By
sticking close to the earth through eating a plant-based diet, Genesis keeps humans and
other animals rooted in the earth. A peaceable interconnectedness seems written into
animal flesh from a biblical perspective.
Hebrew Scriptures also uses “earthy” language for the human body. The human
body comes from earth and dust and will inevitably become earth and dust again (Job
21:23–26; Ps 49). The existence of humans is dust (Job 7:21; 10:9; 34:14–15; Ps 90:3;
104:29; Sir 33:10). Humans share dusty bodies with other animals. Genesis depicts
nonhuman animals as created by God’s word and the earth’s response to God’s command
to the earth to “bring forth living creatures of every kind” (Gen 1:24).141
The creation stories also describe nonhuman animals with the same terms as
humans: we are all ( נֶפֶשׁfor animals see Gen 1:20–24; 2:19; 9:10, 15; for humans see Gen
2:7; 9:5). All animals have blood and it is in this blood that Hebrew Scriptures say is life.
Even after God consents to humans eating other animals in Genesis 9, we are still
forbidden to take in blood. When we add that nonhuman land animals were created on the
same day as other humans, it is hard to avoid any other conclusion than that Genesis
envisions other land animals as having very close proximity to humans.142
Hebrew Scriptures frequently use the term  ָבּ ָשׂרto refer to animal bodies. The
term ָבּ ָשׂרrefers to cows (Gen 41:2), to oxen (Exod 21:28; 1 Kgs 19:21; Isa 22:13), to
horses (Isa 31:3), to sheep (Isa 22:13), to pigs (Isa 65:4 and 66:17), to rodents (Isa 66:17),
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to a crocodile or Leviathan (Job 41:23), and to quails (Num. 11:33). The term can also
refer to nonhuman animals in general (Gen 7:15 or Deut 14:8). So while the term  ָבּ ָשׂרcan
certainly refer to humans (Exod 30:32; 1 Kgs 21:27; Ps 78:39; Isa 63:2), it refers both to
specific nonhuman animals, to nonhuman animals in general, and to all living animals,
humans included (Gen 6:17, 19; 7:21; 9:11, 15, 16, 17; Lev 17:14; Num 18:15; Job
34:15; and Ps 136:25). Hans Walter Wolff has shown that of the 273 occurrences of ָבּ ָשׂר
in the Tanak, 104 refer to nonhuman animals.143
The Septuagint often translates  ָבּ ָשׂרwith σάρξ. Of the 267 occurrences of  ָבּ ָשׂרin
the Hebrew Scriptures that the Septuagint translates, σάρξ is used 146 times.144 For
example, Psalm 136:25 says that God “gives food to all flesh” ()כָּל־ ָבּ ָשׂר. The Septuagint
uses πάσῃ σαρκί to translate ( כָּל־ ָבּ ָשׂרPs 135:6 in the LXX). So the Septuagint used σάρξ
in the same way the Hebrew Bible used  ָבּ ָשׂר: to refer to both human and nonhuman
animals, collectively or individually.
So within one Jewish scriptural use, σάρξ has to do with having a common
creaturely origin in the earth and soil and having a common destiny to return to dust. Our
bodies are tied up with certain “spiritual” elements that enliven us and make us move
around. Moreover, we are originally meant to live on a plant-based diet like all other
animals, which keeps us connected to the earth. We have all of this in common with other
animals according to the Hebrew Scriptures.
Taking on human flesh does not mean other flesh must necessarily be set aside as
unimportant. Indeed, there is a strong current in the Bible that uses the term “flesh” in
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such a way as to level out creaturely existence among all animals. The basic stance before
God of all that exists is that of creation. By referring to all that we know about “creation”
as distinct from God, the prologue affirms what Colin Gunton calls, “the homogeneity of
the created order.”145 When “the Word became flesh” the Word assumed a human flesh
that has lots in common with the flesh of other types of creatures, an idea that has
resonance within the Hebrew Bible. Using this Jewish scriptural background helps to
keep us from making anthropocentric assumptions about the Incarnation.
The divine Word has come “into the world” and has become “flesh” and this
points directly to a particular kind of flesh. The λόγος cannot enter the κόσµος except in
some particular way. Nor can the Word become σάρξ in a generic sense. While σάρξ has
broad implications, enfleshment can only be as a particular kind of creature. The
prologue clearly makes the claim that Jesus Christ is the enfleshment of the divine Word
(1:17). So while there is a wider meaning to the term “flesh” rooted in ancient Jewish
literature, the prologue moves to making a particular claim about Jesus.
Sinful Flesh

Karl Barth argues for a significant particularity to the prologue’s use of σάρξ. On
the one hand, he says that σάρξ in 1:14 “simply denotes the vital animal nature.”146
Becoming flesh obviously means taking on these general characteristics, according to
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Barth. The Word becomes human in general, for example.147 However, in Barth’s
reading, the reason the evangelist uses σάρξ has to do with humanity in its fallen state.
Simply becoming human was not enough. The Word has to become part of weak and
sinful humanity.148 This is the reason the evangelist uses σάρξ rather than another
theologically rich word such as ἄνθρωπος, ἀνήρ, or σῶµα. The Word does not take on
just any flesh. The Word takes on the flesh that characterizes humans in their sinfulness.
The λόγος assumes this sinful flesh in order to save it.
In Church Dogmatics IV/1, Barth calls upon the Hebrew Scriptures as witness to
his interpretation of John 1:14, stating that “the Old Testament testifies pitilessly what is
meant by ‘flesh.’”149 But he neither backs up his statement with examples nor analyzes
the Tanak’s use of “flesh” at all. Hebrew Scriptures definitely use  ָבּשָׂרin ways that
suggests weakness and the fleetingness of all life. For example, Isaiah 40:6–8 says: “All
flesh ( )כָּל־ ָבּ ָשׂרis grass, and all its beauty is like the flower of the field. The grass withers,
the flower fades when the breath of the Lord blows on it; surely the people are grass. The
grass withers, the flower fades, but the word of our God will stand forever” (ESV
translation).150 I have cited numerous verses in my analysis above that speak about the
fleetingness of life in general here on Earth. But the Hebrew Bible also uses  ָבּשָׂר/σάρξ in
a fairly wide sense, and does not make a particular claim about humans alone.
Recognizing this, some theologians have claimed that nonhuman animals sin and
therefore need salvation. Following Barth’s reading that σάρξ makes a particular claim
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about Jesus’s sinful flesh, Clough tries to show that nonhuman animals can sin. He points
out that in Genesis 6 God sent a flood in response to the violence that “all flesh” had
perpetrated. God made a covenant with the nonhuman animals and makes them
accountable for killing humans (Gen 9:5–17). If sin means “missing the mark” or
“covenant breaking” then it would seem that Genesis presupposes that nonhuman animals
can sin. Moreover, the Torah enacts legislation to punish nonhuman animals for various
actions, particularly if they kill a human or engage in sexual misconduct (Lev 15–16).
And humans and nonhuman animals all repent when Jonah preached repentance to
Nineveh (Jon 3:7–10).151 Drawing on ethologists’ observations about nonhuman animal
behavior, Clough goes on to show how various animals both act altruistically by helping
other creatures without any immediate reward and also selfishly by doing shocking things
like killing their young. If sin means to forget God’s command to flourish and multiply,
then killing one’s own young clearly falls under the rubric of sin, according to Clough.152
Given that the Hebrew Bible uses “flesh” to speak mostly about all animals,
human and nonhuman, and given that Jewish Scriptures in particular frequently depict
nonhuman animals as morally accountable for their actions before God (regardless of
whether our modern sensibilities want to accept this or not),153 it does not seem
reasonable on biblical grounds to reduce the meaning of Jesus’s flesh to humanity alone,
if by flesh the Gospel means human sinfulness.
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Barth narrows the meaning of John 1:14 too much. He has brought in ideas that
do not comport well with the prologue or the general trajectory of Scripture concerning
the term σάρξ. While Clough has made a good case for extending the notion of sin to
other animals, it is not clear that we must do so in order to make sense of the Word taking
on flesh in the Incarnation. Within one story of salvation the Incarnation is a response to
human sin. But the Incarnation might also be read more positively as God’s intention all
along regardless of human sin. For flesh to be relevant to other creatures, therefore, does
not depend upon their ability to sin but on God’s willingness to unite with all animal
creatures through a specifi human form.
Barth opens up the possibility for extending the Incarnation to nonhuman creation
without importing notions of sinful flesh onto the Gospel when he states, “‘the Word
became flesh’ also means ‘the Word became time…’ It does not remain transcendent
over time, it does not merely meet it at that point, but it enters time; nay, it assumes time;
nay, it creates time for itself.”154 If “flesh” can mean that God takes up a concept like
“time” why would “flesh” exclude nonhuman animals? If God even takes up time, then it
makes sense to say that the Incarnation takes up nonhuman animals as well. Flesh moves
through time, changing constantly from one moment to the next, shedding cells and
replacing them with new ones so that flesh is always in a state of becoming in a certain
sense. Becoming “flesh” does not necessarily indicate a static identity. The notion of
taking on time signals the vulnerableness of the Incarnation: the Word taking on flesh
that ages so that even one’s visible identity changes.
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It makes good sense of the text to read σάρξ as narrower in scope than κόσµος.
That scope is much narrower in that it refers to animal creatures in particular. The
evangelist sets up a dramatic prologue that keeps us in suspense until we hear the name
Jesus Christ. We do not have to positi that the author’s intention was to deliberately
connect Jesus to other animals to see how well such a reading fits within the prologue and
Gospel. In this reading, σάρξ is a narrower term than κόσµος, but certainly a wider scope
than speaking of the Word becoming human or male. Both κόσµος and σάρξ leave open
the possibility to interpret the Incarnation from the particularity of humanity to
nonspecies-specific implications. The prologue moves toward the particular claim that it
is Jesus Christ that is the creator, sustainer, and redeemer spoken of in the first verses.
The entire dramatic prologue points toward Jesus, who is rooted in the Jewish story that
forms the background for the Gospel.
The Jewish scriptural background comes to the foreground after John states that
the Word became flesh. The Jewish background comes forward in a way that can point us
toward understanding Jesus’s humanity in a very different way than we may be
accustomed to doing. His humanity is deeply connected to other animals and the earth,
because that is what it means to be human. The Word becomes flesh and “dwells among
us” (ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡµῖν—John 1:14b). The verb σκηνόω recalls yet another idea derived
from the Hebrew Bible: God setting up a tent and dwelling “among humans” (Ps 78:60;
οὖ κατεσκήνωσεν ἐν ἀνθρώποις in Ps 77:60, LXX). In Exodus 25:8–9 God tells Moses to
make a tent (σκηνή, LXX) so that God can dwell among Israel. Christ’s flesh, then, is the
new dwelling place of God on earth who later in the Gospel replaces the temple (John
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2:19–22). That the prologue says we see God’s “glory” (δόξα) in Christ’s flesh confirms
this connection even further since “the glory of the Lord” fills the tabernacle that Moses
erects in Exodus 40.
In sum, John’s prologue begins with a wide view to show that the λόγος was the
one who created all things in Genesis 1, and that this same λόγος has moved to become
part of creation. With an increasingly narrow focus, the prologue leads its reader from the
κόσµος, to σάρξ, and finally to Jesus Christ, circling back to the idea of God the Creator
at the end of the prologue. The statement that the Word became flesh is a wide
theological statement with broad implications. Its background lies in the Jewish scriptural
use of  ָבּשָׂרto denote all animals, human and nonhuman, and in the idea that human and
nonhuman animal life (σάρξ) is unable to sustain its own life apart from God’s
providential care. Even if flesh denotes rebellion as well, this does not limit the term to
humanity alone as there is plenty of Scriptural warrant—let alone the ethological
evidence—to see σάρξ as meaning all animal creatures.
Now I will read other passages from the Fourth Gospel, noting how the Gospel
uses the term σάρξ in a way that sharpens the Incarnation’s connection with humans and
other creatures, which makes my reading of the prologue even more plausible.
John 3: Flesh and Spirit

Jesus’s “flesh” becomes an important aspect of John’s Gospel. After the prologue,
the next explicit use of σάρξ in the Fourth Gospel comes in chapter 3. There, Jesus speaks
of “flesh” in the context of new birth as he responds to Nicodemus’s statements that Jesus
is a man from God. Jesus responds in a cryptic manner by saying that a person had to be
“born again” (γεννηθῇ ἄνωθεν—John 3:3). Nicodemus fails to see that Jesus is using
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birth differently than a literal biological sense. John’s Gospel uses ἄνωθεν as “from
above” rather than “again,” which connects the term to the Holy Spirit (3:6).155 Jesus
speaks in eschatological tones about how a person must be transformed. Every human is
born “of the flesh” but to enter God’s kingdom requires a birth from the Spirit (3:6). By
contrasting σάρξ with πνεῦµα Jesus does not set up a dualism in which spirit and flesh
compete with one another. Nor does he say that the flesh is evil or imply a pejorative
meaning for the flesh. A person has to be born in the flesh to even receive the Spirit. That
is the ground or condition for being “born again.” This use of σάρξ connects to the
prologue (1:13), where children of God are “not born of blood nor of the will of the flesh
nor of the will of man but of God.” In both cases, flesh is not evil. Flesh is powerless.
Only God can rebirth a person in the Spirit. But this transformation does not mean a
person becomes disconnected from their earthly life. Rather, Jesus suggests that this new
birth draws out the true meaning of birth in the flesh so that a person can live differently.
John 6: Eating Jesus’s Flesh

The next explicit use of σάρξ in the John’s Gospel is in chapter 6 in Jesus’s
discourse on the bread of life. The larger context connects Jesus’s speech to his
miraculous feeding of five thousand people (6:1–15). In that miracle, Jesus takes a
meager offering from a little boy of a few loaves and a couple fishes and somehow Jesus
is able to distribute a large enough quantity to the crowd that the people were not only
satisfied but the disciples gathered up twelve baskets full of left-over bread (6:13).
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The story is rich with allusion: the time of the feeding is near the Passover (6:4)
but the people do not go to Jerusalem, but to Jesus, foreshadowing a shift in the locus of
worship from the temple to Jesus.156 The place is on a mountain (6:3, 15), bringing to
mind the various stories taking place on mountains such as Moses and the burning bush
(Exod 3:1–4:17), the Mount Sinai theophany (Exod 24:15–18; 32:15–16), Elijah’s
theophany where God comes in a silence or quiet wind (1 Kgs 19:8–18), and Elijah being
fed bread by ravens (1 Kgs 17:89). The food calls to mind the bread from heaven in
Exodus 16–17 but also a Jewish eschatological banquet in which the elect would “eat and
rest and rest with that Son of Man forever and ever” (1 Enoch 62:12–14). The Messiah
would gather “from the four quarters of the world” the kingdom of Israel to eat with him
(1 Enoch 48:10). The food at this eschatological banquet is often bread, which they refer
to as manna or “heavenly food” (2 Bar 29:8).
While the meals seem to be largely vegetarian (bread and grapes), 2 Baruch thinks
that the elect will also eat the great sea monsters of chaos, Leviathan and Behemoth (2
Bar 29:4–5, see also Psalm 74:13 where God gives the sea monsters as food for wild
animals but not for humans). The fish, then, are part of the traditional imagery of an
eschatological banquet that is otherwise plant-based.157 But the fish in John’s telling play
a minor part and disappear entirely once Jesus speaks. The bread (ἄρτος) plays the most
important role. Both in the leftovers and in the later telling about why the crowds have
followed Jesus, the evangelist emphasizes the bread alone (John 6:23, 26).
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After this miracle, Jesus retreats in solitude so the crowd cannot “take him by
force and make him king” (6:15). After walking on water to find the disciples, according
to John’s Gospel, Jesus and the disciples go to the other side of the lake, but the crowd
followed them in boats. Jesus accuses the crowd of following him only because he gave
them bread (6:26). The crowd responds by asking for more bread, this time explicitly
calling upon the manna story from Exodus 16 (John 6:31). At this point Jesus gives the
famous bread of life speech.
Jesus tells the crowd that he is “the bread of life” and that the manna people ate in
the wilderness did not keep them from dying. But Jesus is the bread of life that can keep
people alive forever: “the bread that I will give for the life of the world is my flesh (ἡ
σάρξ µου)” (6:48–51). This confuses the crowd: “How can this man give us his flesh to
eat?” (6:52). Undeterred, Jesus declares the necessity of eating his flesh and drinking his
blood (6:52–58).158 In the discourse, the word σάρξ comes up six times, the word αἷµα
(blood) four times, and each time that Jesus speaks the words have the pronoun “my”
attached, making it clear that the “flesh and blood” the people must consume is Jesus
himself.159 Jesus’s flesh dies and rises again. It gives and sustains life. But Jesus does not
mean that his flesh and blood only give and sustain our physical lives in the present, but
that his flesh gives us an eschatological life (eternal life). Jesus’s flesh becomes “meat.”
158
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The Word becomes “meat.” This meat replaces the paschal lamb. This grotesque imagery
begins to problematize the divisions between human flesh and nonhuman animal “meat.”
Here in John 6, σάρξ has a broad significance as Jesus speaks about himself as
“bread.” Jesus, the risen Christ, becomes present to the community as they partake in the
Eucharist.160 John does not associate the Eucharist with the Last Supper as do the
Synoptic Gospels (see Mark 14:12–21; Matt 26:17–25; Luke 22:14–23). Instead John’s
Gospel associates the Eucharist with the feeding of the five thousand and the subsequent
bread of life discourse. In John 6:11 we read, “Then Jesus took the loaves, and when he
had given thanks, he distributed them to those who were seated; so also the fish, as much
as they wanted” (ἔλαβεν οὖν τοὺς ἄρτους ὁ Ἰησοῦς καὶ εὐχαριστήσας διέδωκεν τοῖς
ἀνακειµένοις ὁµοίως καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὀψαρίων ὅσον ἤθελον). Key words from this verse
appear in the Synoptic accounts: ἔλαβεν . . . τοὺς ἄρτους and εὐχαριστήσας. All three
Synoptic Gospels use εὐχαριστήσας (Matt 26:27; Mark 14:23; Luke 22:17; see also 1 Cor
11:24). The Synoptics and 1 Corinthians 11 depict Jesus as claiming the bread is his body
and the wine is his blood, while John 6 parallels the idea about bread saying that his
“flesh” is the bread of life.161
The most important point is that σάρξ in the Gospel of John can readily be
interpreted in a way that severely problematizes any attempt to focus on Jesus’s humanity
as set apart from other types of creatures. In this case, Jesus’s flesh becomes the plantbased diet that sustained Israel during a trying time of sojourn through a hostile
160
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environment. In the Exodus story as well, God sends some quail at one point, and in the
evening God sends “manna” which the Israelites ate for forty years (Exod 16:35). The
narrative emphasizes the bread. The quail barely get a mention and have no real
importance in the story since it is the heavenly bread that sustains the Israelites. It is
important to note that Jesus does not compare his flesh to the fish or the quail, a natural
thing to do with the word σάρξ given how it is used in Hebrew scriptures to refer to
nonhuman animals. Instead, Jesus speaks about his flesh as bread that does not require
the disciples to intentionally kill other animal creatures for human spiritual survival.
Jesus, in the Gospel of John’s telling, uses σάρξ in a very different way than the
Hebrew Bible normally used it for human and nonhuman animal life. But this does not
mean that σάρξ in this context has no bearing on nonhuman animal life. It is noteworthy
that Jesus does not compare his flesh to dead animal flesh that people might have eaten as
well. His flesh, in some sense, saves nonhuman animals from becoming ritual victims in
the worship life of the community and re-establishes “bread” from Exodus 16 and the
plant-based diet from Genesis 1 as the important element for sustaining life.162 I will
return to this theme in later chapters.
John 17: All flesh

The next reference to σάρξ in the Fourth Gospel comes in Jesus’s long prayer in
chapter 17. In the prayer’s opening, Jesus says, “Father, the hour has come; glorify your
Son so that the Son may glorify you, since you have given him authority over all flesh
(ἐξουσίαν πάσης σαρκός), to give eternal life to all whom you have given him” (John
162
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17:1–2). The phrase “all flesh” could refer to all humans or more broadly to all living
creatures. The NRSV makes human beings alone the focus of Jesus’s words, translating
πάσης σαρκός as “all people.” Yet the phrase echoes the Hebrew  כָּל־ ָבּשָׂרthat the
Septuagint translates with πᾶσα σάρξ. To give yet another example, Leviticus 17:14 says
that when a person hunts an animal and kills it for food, the person should not eat or
drink the creature’s blood because the blood of “every creature” or of “all flesh” is its life
(ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ πάσης σαρκὸς αἲµα αὐτοῦ ἐστιν, LXX).
The NRSV masks another problem with its translation of the next phrase: “to give
eternal life to all (πᾶν) whom you have given him.” The underlying Greek word for “all”
is in the neuter case. But we would expect a masculine form if the phrase referred solely
to humanity (ὁ ἄνθρωπος). Brown and other commentators resolve the discrepancy by
saying that the neuter “all” in 17:2 refers to the later neuter “one” in John 17:21–23.163
But other commentators suggest that the neuter πᾶν in 17:2 suggests, like “all flesh,” a
wider scope than humans alone.164 Dorothy Lee argues that a wide purview makes sense
because of parallels between John 17:1–5 and the prologue. Authority, life, glory,
preexistence, and an intimacy between the Father and Son preoccupy both passages.165
Lee comments that Jesus “turns toward” (John 1:18) the Father in prayer, addressing the
Father intimately as the source of life who gives the Son authority over all things.
Reading the prayer in light of the Prologue thus makes a difference to the way we
interpret 17:2. Apart from anything else, it is clear that there is nothing negative
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about the understanding of flesh as it is presented here. As with the Prologue,
Johannine Christology is rooted in creation as the fundamental manifestation of
the Son’s dominion. Thus, while at one level, flesh in 17:2 refers to human beings
and their capacity to enter a knowing relationship with God through Jesus, at the
same time, understood more comprehensively, “all flesh” is synonymous with “all
things” in creation, for which the Logos is the source of life.166
Following Lee and other commentators’ reading, therefore, Jesus’s words about
“all flesh” in John 17 hearken back to the prologue, which states that ὁ λόγος σὰρξ
ἐγένετο. The same Redeemer who has taken on flesh has authority over all flesh. “Flesh
addresses flesh in this cosmic context,” writes Lee.167
The most compelling case, however, from within the Fourth Gospel for
interpreting σάρξ in a non-species specific manner comes from the bread of life discourse
in which Jesus explicitly expands the meaning of σάρξ to refer to nonhuman creation:
bread. That Jesus’s flesh becomes bread, and the bread becomes Jesus’s flesh, confounds
a species barrier and opens up the Incarnation to a broader purview than saving humanity
alone. All of this has resonance with the interpretation of John 1:14 beginning with
Andrew Linzey’s insight that the passage would surely have relevance to all mammals
and to more recent interpretations of a “deep Incarnation.”
1 John 4:2

Other passages in Johannine literature also speak of σάρξ in connection to the
Incarnation. 1 John 4:2 states: “Every spirit that confesses that Jesus Christ has come in
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the flesh is from God (ὃ ὁµολογεῖ Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν ἐν σαρκὶ ἐληλυθότα ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ
ἐστιν).” Commentators and translators have read the statement in 4:2 in several ways.
The debate surrounding the passage centers on two issues: first, the grammatical
construction, which bears on what content a person should confess, and second, whether
the author intended to emphasize an aspect or rule out other expressions. Scholars have
interpreted the passage in four primary ways:
1.

That Jesus is the Messiah who has come in the flesh. The emphasis here is

on confessing that Jesus is the Messiah. The secessionists from the Johannine
community, in this view, were denying that Jesus the man was the Messiah. The issue is
Jesus’s identity. Some interpreters think that the author is opposing a group that
distinguished between the historical Jesus and the heavenly Messiah. The author of 1
John is saying that the historical fleshly Jesus is the divine Messiah. The problem with
this translation is that it adds both a definite article to Christ and the verb “is” neither of
which are in the Greek. Instead, “Jesus Christ” seems to function as a proper name itself
in 1 John (1:3; 2:1; 3:23; and 5:6, 20).168
2.

That Jesus Christ has come/having come in the flesh. The emphasis is on

Jesus Christ coming to us. There is more stress in this translation in the belief in the
Incarnation as a fact. The Son’s “coming into the world to bring salvation” is what is
most important in the confession.169
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3.

That Jesus Christ has come in the flesh. This interpretation stresses that

Jesus took on flesh. The secessionists the author is preaching against may have denied
that the Son could take on the material world but only “appeared” to be human. Because
these opponents treat the material world as evil, the author of 1 John is making the
fleshiness of Jesus a confessional issue.170
4.

Jesus Christ has come in the flesh. In this view the entire statement is the

confession. The emphasis is on the confession itself, highlighting the person of Jesus with
no separation from the role of Christ, and Jesus’s ministry in the flesh.171
Regardless of which interpretation(s) one finds most compelling, the text still
states that Jesus Christ came ἐν σαρκί (“in flesh”). Commentators who view the third
option as most plausible have said the most about why the author might have used the
term σάρξ. For them the issue is Docetism. Raymond Brown, by contrast, argues that
there is very little textual evidence for a docetic teaching to which the statement would be
responding.172 The issue is not that some people are denying the material reality of the
Incarnation, but that “they are denying that what Jesus was or did in the flesh was related
to his being the Christ, i.e., was salvific.”173 Nevertheless, σάρξ still has to be interpreted
even if the other interpretations are plausible readings.
The only other place the term appears in this letter is in 2:16, where it carries a
negative connotation: “lust of the flesh” (ἐπιθυµία τῆς σαρκός). Lust of the flesh belongs
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to what is in the world and is fleeting. According to Bultmann, 1 John 2:16 uses flesh in a
way that opposes God and is incompatible with what is of God.174 But God has
challenged the oppositional way of seeing the world and flesh by sending the Son “into
the world” (4:9, 14). Just as the false prophets went “into the world” (4:1) and the
antichrist “came” and “went” in the world (2:18-19; 4:1, 3), so too God has sent the Son
into the world, removing any doubt about what any appearance from the Son might mean.
Jesus Christ was here in a physical form, in this world. But this is a different use of σάρξ
from what we find in 1 John 4:2.
In my view, “flesh” in 1 John 4:2 should be interpreted within a broader range of
biblical and early Christian affirmations in which “flesh” denotes the sphere of creaturely
activity. In addition to the passages already examined above, 1 Clement uses the term
σάρξ in ways that have bearing on biblical interpretation because they show us a sphere
of use in the ancient world. 1 Clement speaks about the way God as “Creator of the
universe” and the “primal source of all creation” can forgive sins and save people from
their destructive tendencies. “You alone,” Clement prays, “are the Benefactor of spirits
and the God of all flesh” (θεὸν πάσης σαρκός).175 Through God’s works God has
“revealed the everlasting structure of the world” (τὴν ἀέναον τοῦ κόσµου).176 Because of
this God is able to give “harmony and peace” to “all who dwell on the earth” which
includes every creature.177 The “Lord of all flesh” (κύριος πάσης σαρκός) is a God of
peace and will grant it to creatures.178
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Regardless of which interpretation makes the best sense of 1 John 4:2, σάρξ
should not be strictly limited to Jesus’s humanness as most commentators have done. For
instance, David Rensberger says that this “rather obscurely worded formulation” seems to
mean “Jesus, the divine Christ and Son of God, entered the world as a physical, mortal
human being.”179 In other words, the main point for the author of 1 John is that Jesus
became human.
Jesus was human. But focusing exclusively on the Word becoming human as an
interpretation obscures how the term σάρξ connotes something broader than the word
ἄνθρωπος. Even if Brown is correct that the original context involved denying Jesus’s
earthly ministry any salvific value, not denying the material reality of the Incarnation,
that does not preclude theologians today from seeing in this passage a further pattern.
Humans are part of a larger material world. Georg Strecker, for example, suggests this
when he interprets “flesh” as “the sphere of the tangible and mutable.”180 Humans are
part of this sphere but not the only part.
Whether at the time of 1 John or later, some Christians saw the material world as
too problematic for the Son to truly assume. Brown argues that the docetic denial of
Jesus’s bodily reality is a later phenomenon. Later Christians used the Johannine
statements about “flesh,” which originally were not about denying physical reality but
179
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salvific value to Jesus’s earthly ministry, in this new context. The later interpreters were
not misreading the text, but using it for different purposes. The later patristic arguments
were, according to Brown, arguments with those who did not identify Jesus of Nazareth
with the Son of God and regarded the bodily form of Jesus as a mere apparition. The Son
of God only “seemed” to be in a material body. The Son of God could not become
trapped in a body and soul, which were made by lesser, demonic spirits. Instead the Son
of God appeared as a human, without truly becoming part of the material world, so as to
release true human spirits from their imprisonment in bodies and souls. The human spirit
is related to the Son by virtue of its light nature and once released would fly to the
heavens. But only the spirit that knows how to break free would do so.181
For these later Christians, the issue was not simply whether the Son could or
would become a human body, but whether God created this material world, whether this
material world is therefore good, and whether salvation means redeeming this material
world or escaping from it. Patrisitic authors used the Johannine Epistles and the Gospel
of John to combat this view, regardless of its original intent. It meant something new in
this new context.
We should not be bound today by the original intent, about which we are unsure
in any case. We can follow the patristic method of using these Scriptures in our own
context. We can admit and respect the texts for what they were, while still pressing them
into service today for a broader argument in light of new insights and new problems.
Today, in light of what we know about the deep biological and evolutionary connection
humans share with other creatures, we can legitimately say that those who deny Jesus’s
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connection to all other creatures are in some sense denying his “flesh,” even if that is not
the original meaning of the passage.
Flesh stands in for a larger material reality. Today we can even interpret it as
having to do with the bodies we have in common with all other animals. God created this
animal flesh and took it on so that we might have a chance to move beyond such things as
murder, a sin Cain committed (1 John 3:12). If there is any term in 1 John that refers
primarily to the human world it is “world” (κόσµος). In 1 John, unlike the Gospel of
John, which has a more complex use of the term κόσµος, here it seems to mean human
society and culture over against “flesh,” which is the material reality that God created.
Flesh can serve the κόσµος or God. Jesus shows us the way of the flesh within God’s
reign.
So here in John’s First Epistle, σάρξ stands in for a reality that includes humanity
but is also beyond humanness and refers to creaturely animality in general. Animality can
be something that is joyous, but it can also be painful and community breaking. The Son
took on this animality and redeemed this flesh so that we can have joy and fellowship.
2 John 7

2 John reaffirms what 1 John states about the Incarnation. “Many deceivers have
gone out into the world, those who do not confess that Jesus Christ has come in the flesh
(ἐν σαρκί); any such person is the deceiver and the antichrist!” (2 John 7). One way to
read this is that these are people who “do evil” as a result of their denying the
Incarnation’s material reality.
Once again, Raymond Brown argues that the issue is not docetic views that deny
Jesus’s material body, but that some people denited his earthly ministry had any salvific
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value. The Johannine community insists that “the coming was not completed by the
incarnation but continued in the kind of life Jesus lived (‘in the flesh’).”182 Moreover, the
opponents who deny “the coming one” in the flesh also deny the eschatological second
coming, according to Brown.
This is a very short letter to a group of believers that centers on this exhortation to
confess that the Word has come in flesh and to deny fellowship to those who do not.
Even if Brown is correct that the opponents of the Johnannine community were denying
Jesus’s ministry salvific value and perhaps also denying the second coming, theologians
have always used this passage and parallels like it in new contexts to address new
concerns without necessarily distorting the sense of the passage. We can do so today as
well. Jesus’s flesh connects with other creatures in a larger creaturely reality. This
respects the context and brings in Jewish notions of this connection into our own time,
where it is desparately needed in theological debate.
1 Timothy 3:16

Johannine literature is not the only place that refers to the Incarnation in terms of
“flesh.” 1 Timothy 3:16 contains an early seventeen-word Christological hymn.183 The
author presents the hymn as if it is well known in the community rather than as a novel
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composition. The author says that the community confesses this hymn as part of their
traditional worship. In his commentary, Robert Wall says that 1 Timothy 3:16 “is
arguably the passage of gravitas in this letter, if not of the Pastoral Epistles as a
collection.”184 Philip Towner says that this hymn is a “capsule summary of the gospel.”185
The hymn begins with a basic affirmation: “he was manifested in the flesh (ὃς
ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί).” The earliest Christians interpreted this phrase as referring to the
Incarnation. The Epistle of Barnabas, for instance, uses this phrase several times (5.6;
6.7, 9; 12.10).186 On the one hand the phrase indicates that the Son pre-existed the
Incarnation. On the other hand, the phrase emphasizes Jesus’s bodily reality. The phrase
could both refer to the life of Jesus and also the bodily Resurrection.187 There is no good
reason to exclude either, nor is there any good reason to see them as mutually exclusive.
As a form of poetry, the references run deeper than single referents.
But the hymn uses the term “flesh” rather than “human.” “Flesh” contrasts with
the “vindication” the Son receives in “the Spirit” (ἐδικαιώθη ἐν πνεύµατι). So the hymn
uses “flesh” to refer to a material reality writ large, and “spirit” to refer to another reality
that bears upon the material. Jesus was both “flesh” and “spirit.” Flesh and spirit do not
oppose one another per se in this letter.
So the term σάρξ in this hymn refers to something broader than humanity. The
Son was “manifested” in the realm of “flesh” which would include all kinds of creatures.
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1 Peter 3:18 and 4:1

1 Peter contains some further clues to seeing the Incarnation in broader terms than
just dealing with humanity. 1 Peter 3:18–22 contains early hymn material.188 Like the
hymn in 1 Timothy 4, this hymn-like passage also speaks of Jesus’s “flesh”:189
For Christ also suffered for sins once for all, the righteous for the unrighteous, in
order to bring you to God. He was put to death in the flesh, but made alive in the
spirit, in which also he went and made a proclamation to the spirits in prison, who
in former times did not obey, when God waited patiently in the days of Noah,
during the building of the ark, in which a few, that is, eight persons, were saved
through water. And baptism, which this prefigured, now saves you—not as a
removal of dirt from the body, but as an appeal to God for a good conscience,
through the resurrection of Jesus Christ, who has gone into heaven and is at the
right hand of God, with angels, authorities, and powers made subject to him.
This passage contains some of the most enigmatic Greek in the New Testament and is the
most debated passage in 1 Peter due to some of the doctrinal issues that arise (for
instance, whether the dead can repent). Even the line that is most pertinent for my
argument—“He was put to death in the flesh, but made alive in the spirit”—is much
debated.
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For most of Christian history, theologians have interpreted this passage as
referring to different aspects of Jesus. “Flesh” refers to Jesus’s human aspect while
“spirit” refers to his soul, or more precisely, his soul united with his divinity. Augustine,
for instance, wrote a long letter dealing with the issues in 1 Peter 3:18-22. He was
particularly disturbed by the ideas of Jesus preaching only to those up to the time of Noah
and the idea that the dead might repent of their sins. But Augustine also took pains to
make sure his reader did not interpret Jesus’s death “in the flesh” to mean that his “soul”
died as well. “When Jesus was put to death for us in the flesh, who would dare assert that
His soul was also killed, that is, his life-giving principle as man, when there is no death
for the soul except through sin.”190 Peter meant only that Jesus’s body died, but Jesus’s
soul lived on to preach to the dead. Jesus’s body was revived when his soul was reunited
to the body by an action of the Spirit. But the Son “created a soul for Himself as He
creates for the rest of mankind, but His did not mingle with sinful flesh . . . For He took
the true substance of flesh from the Virgin.”191
Modern scholars have largely abandoned the traditional reading that sees the flesh
and spirit as different aspects of Jesus. To modern readers, this way of reading 1 Peter
imports an anthropology that too sharply splits a person into two “parts.” That split is
foreign to the biblical thought. Instead modern scholars read, “He was put to death in the
flesh, but made alive in the spirit” in several different ways:
1.

Some scholars interpret “in the flesh” as a dative of agency so that σάρξ

refers to “humanity.” Read this way, the passage would say that Jesus was “killed by
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humans, but made alive by the Spirit.”192 Although this interpretation reads the datives in
a parallel manner and gives personal agency to the term “spirit,” σάρξ appears a few
more times as a dative in 1 Peter 4:1, and the clear meaning is not to “humanity” but to
Jesus’s material body.
2. Most contemporary scholars interpret “in the flesh” to mean Jesus’s mortal
nature as a creature in general. The datives are datives of “sphere” that denote ways of
living: in the flesh or in the spirit. These are modes of existence not parts of Jesus.193
William Dalton states this view well: “the flesh-spirit distinction . . . refers to two orders
of being, the flesh representing human nature in its weakness, its proclivity to evil, its
actual evil once it opposes the influence of God; the spirit representing the consequence
of God’s salvation, the presence and activity among us of the Spirit of God.”194 In this
reading, we should interpret the datives σαρκί and πνεύµατι in different ways. But 1
Timothy 3:16 most likely does this as well.
3.

A slightly modified view of the second reading interprets “flesh” as

referring to Jesus’s body, without it being an issue of mortality per se.195
4.

Some modern scholars interpret the fleshly “sphere” in decidedly

anthropocentric terms. Joel Green states, “‘human’ translates σάρξ (sarx), which for Peter
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has to do with ‘life as it is reflects and/or pertains to this world’ (1:24; 3:18, 21; 4:1, 2,
6).”196 Likewise, J. N. D. Kelly says, “By flesh is meant Christ in His human sphere of
existence, considered as a man among men.”197 For these scholars, σάρξ means “human”
and they do not discuss what this dative of “sphere” might mean for other creatures.
5.

Other scholars either avoid making such anthropocentric statements, or

better, connect “flesh” to a wider issue beyond humanity. Commenting on this passage,
Fred Craddock states, “When the church seeks to express in today’s terms and categories
the convictions of this hymn, it suffers the poverty of language. Christ is Lord of all life.
The truth about God revealed in the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ is that no
one—past, present, or future—lies outside or beyond that seeking and saving love. In
fact, not only human life but also all life is the object of God’s care. Thoughtless
exploitation of the earth, sea, and sky are therefore acts contrary to the love and
providence of God.”198 While Craddock brings out a reading that has implications for
how humans treat inanimate creation, it is striking that he says nothing about the main
creatures that would have “flesh” in common with humans: nonhuman animals. Instead
Craddock highlights environmental concerns.
Indeed, the hymn as a whole beckons the hearer beyond his or her personal
suffering, beyond their own community, beyond the Mediterranean world to consider the
cosmic significance of Christ’s death and resurrection.199 1 Peter 3:20 mentions that eight
humans were saved in Noah’s ark and then oddly compares this to Christian baptism. The
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mention of the ark, in which God not only saved humans, but also saved all other
animals, coincides well with interpreting “flesh” as a term that includes but also reaches
beyond the human body. 1 Peter does not mention that God also saved other creatures,
but then his use of the ark story is not systematic. He merely refers to the larger story.
While the author may have overlooked the other creatures, in light of his own reference it
is neither illegitimate to point out that the God of all flesh saved humans and nonhuman
animals alike in the ark, nor to point out that this idea coincides well with his own use of
σάρξ, regardless of whether he intended to bring this wider meaning to the foreground.200
Excursus: 1 Corinthian 15:38–41

Although the passage from 1 Corinthians 15:38–40 does not deal directly with the
Incarnation, it is possible that somebody might object to my reading based on this lone
passage. In it the apostle Paul says: “Not all flesh is alike, but there is one flesh for
human beings, another for animals, another for birds, and another for fish. There are both
heavenly bodies and earthly bodies, but the glory of the heavenly is one thing, and that of
the earthly is another. There is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and
another glory of the stars; indeed, star differs from star in glory” (1 Cor 15:39–41). One
way to read this is to make a sharp distinction between humans and all other creatures.
Each type of creature has its own “flesh” so that the Word takes on this particular human
flesh, not other flesh. The issue is about identity. We can be recognized by our flesh.
Yet by talking about flesh at all, Paul has recognized that there is a category or
genus called flesh. He uses the term flesh to describe different types of animals: humans,
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“animals,” birds, and fish—the various categories from Genesis 1 (and uses the term
“body” for inanimate creation). This is in line with the Jewish scriptural use of “all
flesh.” Flesh here is nearly equivalent to the term “animal.” Paul is only saying there are
different kinds or species of the genus flesh. There are different types of animals. Not
everyone is the same. Paul is making a fairly basic claim that in no way overshadows the
all-encompassing sense of flesh that we see in the Tanak and that I am arguing is present
elsewhere in the New Testament with regard to the Incarnation and flesh. Flesh is the
genus of the different types: human flesh, “animal” flesh, and bird flesh, fish flesh. But
human, animal, bird, and fish are modifiers, that is, they are not the genus but the species.
Conclusion

In this chapter I have examined the use of σάρξ in key biblical passages that deal
with the Incarnation or confessing the Incarnation in church life. The Gospel of John
provides the most useful material for grounding all of creation in Christology and the
Incarnation. Opening with broad strokes, John’s Gospel states that the λόγος who created
all things has become part of the world in which we live. From there the evangelist
narrows the focus further stating that the “Word became flesh,” a statement with exciting
possibilities since the term σάρξ connects so well with Jewish scriptural ideas about flesh
and animality being unable to sustain its own life without God’s care. Flesh has Jewish
roots.
The Gospel of John uses σάρξ fairly consistently with these broad outlines.
Jesus’s bread of life discourse explicitly opens up σάρξ to the nonhuman world by
connecting his flesh to a plant-based food. By doing so Jesus connects his own life as the
Incarnate Son of God to a wider purview than humanity alone. But it is not just in what
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Jesus says his flesh is (bread), but what he does not say: σάρξ in the Tanak connects to
animality. It would have been easy for Jesus to connect his flesh to eating other animals,
since σάρξ generally has that connection. But Jesus replaces animals with bread,
hearkening back to the manna episodes in Exodus 16 and the plant-based diet mandate in
Genesis 1. In Christian worship, killing other animals whom the Hebrew Bible connects
with humans in very intimate ways has no place in Christian worship. This is an issue I
will return to in chapter 3 when I look at animal sacrifices in Jewish thought.
First, however, it seems useful to look at how a few patristic authors used the
statement that the “Word became flesh.” So in the next chapter I will look at Athanasius
and John of Damascus who explicitly used the prologue’s central statement to talk about
the Incarnation in ways that open up the possibility to see the Incarnation’s particularity
as having relevance for how we think about other animals theologically.
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CHAPTER 2
THE WORD BECAME MATTER

In the first chapter I looked at how the New Testament uses the idea that the
“Word became flesh.” I argued that the term has deep roots in Old Testament notions that
connect human and nonhuman animal life, along with ideas that connect the Incarnation
to nonhuman creation: Jesus is the bread of life, which not only connects him to plant life
but also has relevance for nonhuman animals in that consuming them is no longer the
focus of messianic life. Flesh is a term that covers the deeply interconnected layers of all
life: human life cannot exist without the rest of creation. So the Incarnation must touch
upon and have relevance for nonhuman animals for humans to be saved: we are all in this
together. This is a deeply Jewish idea rooted in Scriptures. But the idea seems radically
new today. If it is such a traditional idea, how did the early Christians see the idea of the
Word becoming flesh?
In the patristic era, authors often cited John 1:14. So in the first section of this
chapter I will describe the how patristic authors used the Gospel of John’s statement that
the Word became flesh. Broadly speaking, when Christian authors in the first three
centuries used “the Word became flesh” they do so in a polemical setting to demonstrate
the reality of the Incarnation over against other Christologies. That is, they generally used
it in apologetics rather than in constructive theology. This, I believe, kept the doctrine of
the Incarnation from developing its fullest potential.
Yet there were two theologians who attempted to broaden constructively the idea
of the Word becoming flesh to include the nonhuman world: Athanasius (ca. 296–373
CE)

and John of Damascus (d. 754 CE). For Athanasius, the statement that the Word
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became flesh had special prominence. For example, in his Orations against the Arians,
Athanasius quotes John 1:14 at least 42 times.201 He uses John 1:14 as hermeneutical key
to scriptural interpretation against the Arians. Yet my interest in Athanasius is not in his
explicit quotations of “the Word became flesh” but in how he expanded from the Gospel
of John to speak about the Incarnation in a way that can include more than humanity.
Similarly, John of Damascus uses John 1:14 as a key element in his defense of using
icons in Christian worship. But he does so in a way that suggests that the particularity of
the Incarnation is not tied to humanity alone. Both of these authors provide a resource
and example of Christological thinking on the Incarnation that moves beyond
anthropocentricism. Nevertheless, at the same time that they represent a direction toward
an expansive Incarnation, they both make moves that undermine their best theological
trajectories. They do this, I will argue, by not paying enough attention to Jesus’s
particularities. So they stand as examples of positive directions that deep incarnation
theology is now taking, but their theologies are also a warning about ignoring the
Incarnation’s particularities.
The Word Became Flesh: Early Christian Uses

When Christians in the first three centuries used John 1:14 they did so within the
context of debates about God’s relationships to creation. How could God have created a
world so full of evil? Various Gnostic groups came up with slightly different answers to
this question, but all of them distanced the Creator from creation through some kind of
mediating entities. These Christians attempted to make sense of Jesus within a
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philosophical framework. I will briefly review the Valentinians as a good example of
Gnostic thinking.
Valentinians radicalized Plato’s cosmology in the Timaeus.202 Plato maintained
that a benevolent deity, the Demiurge (craftsman), created the Cosmic Soul to animate
the body that the Demiurge had fashioned from eternal, unformed material.203 As a
superlative principle, the Cosmic Soul is another deity: “a perceptible god which is an
image of the intelligible, as the greatest and best, the most beautiful and most
complete.”204 The Demiurge created other lesser deities to populate the heavens and
charged them to fashion animal bodies to populate earth, leaving to the Cosmic Soul the
single task of animating and giving rationality to its cosmic body as a whole. But the
Demiurge did not then withdraw and watch the lesser deities make earthly beings.
Instead, the Demiurge created and implanted rational souls—made from a similar mix as
the Cosmic Soul and united to a star—into the earthly bodies. Therefore, all souls are
immortal. Well-trained souls will return to their native star; those that failed to adequately
live rightly and contemplate the forms would be reincarnated as women, the first time,
and thereafter would become suitable animals according to the vices the souls had
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developed as humans.205 Thus Plato thought the world was good, but that the Demiurge’s
good will finds a limit in the physical world since material bodies cannot fully mimic the
Demiurge’s or the Cosmic-Soul’s eternal goodness (otherwise the body itself would be
God) and therefore has a tendency toward evil due to the ways in which the world’s laws
cause bodies to crash around, interrupting rationality. Indeed, Plato thought the world we
live in requires every kind of living animal possible so that it would be complete. Cosmic
completeness, therefore, seems to necessitate moral imperfection and predation.206
For the Valentinians, a world that necessitates moral imperfection and predation
cannot come from a good God. Attempting to uphold God’s goodness and transcendence,
these Christians contended that God did not create the physical world, which is rife with
evil. Another deity, who is part of a long chain of deities between the true God and the
world, created physical reality, but did so out of fear, ignorance, and grief, all of which
characterize the physical world: “irrational animals, wild beasts, and people came from
fear.”207 With Jesus, however, we learn about the highest and true God as well as other
deities above the Creator-God in the Tanak, whom they identified with the Demiurge of
Platonist cosmology. One of those higher deities had planted “seeds” in the world, which
meant that some elite humans, the spiritual (πνευµατικοί), possess a divine spark that
makes them outsiders to the world’s creaturely community. Spiritual people are by nature
saved, regardless of how they behave.208 Earthy people (χοϊκοί), however, correspond to
Cain and are ontologically evil. Jesus came to save rational people (ψυχικοί), the
common church person who fits between the spiritual and earthy classes and who must
205
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behave well to get the knowledge necessary for salvation.209 The common rational person
must take a huge leap of faith in an effort to focus on spiritual things, becoming less at
home in this world as the person travels spiritually upwards back to their true home: we
are pilgrims and nomads on this earth. People are born into one of these three classes.210
This low view of creaturely life led popular Christian leaders like Marcion (85–
160 CE)—who was not a Gnostic per se, but he agreed with them on important points—to
view animal life negatively. For example, Marcion considered insects such as
mosquitoes, flies, gnats, and others to have no other purpose than destruction and
annoyance. A benevolent God would not create such creatures; they either come from a
lesser, malevolent deity or arise from the nature of matter itself.211 The true God has
nothing to do with the material world. Such a view leads Marcion to excise New
Testament passages where God cares about anything beyond spiritual and rational souls.
For example, he removed Luke 12:6–7, which states that God loves sparrows.212
The Valentinians divided God into different deities. They also divided humanity
into the spiritual, rational, and earthy people. Further, they divided the individual person
into the soul and the material body. Finally, they divided creation into the spiritual and
the material. In each case, good and evil characterize one side or the other in such a way
that by its very nature only a portion of creation merits salvation and only a portion of the
divine deserves worship. Creation and salvation are completely separate.
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Against Valentinian divisions, Irenaeus and Tertullian stressed unity. God is one.
Humanity is one. The individual is one. Creation is one. Jesus is the creator, and there is
no other God.
Irenaeus and Tertullian found Valentinian and Gnostic cosmological Christologies
and explanations of creation out of step with what the tradition they received had taught.
But the Valentinians and the Marcionites helped shape what would become “orthodox”
theology by forcing thinkers like Irenaeus and Tertullian to wrestle with the nature of
creation, God’s goodness, and how these come together in Jesus of Nazareth.
Gnostic Views of the Incarnation

The Valentinians could affirm that the Word became flesh, but they interpreted
“flesh” as a “spiritual flesh.” Irenaeus claims that the Valentinians teach that the Word
“enclothed himself with a body of the ensouled substance . . . but he did not take on any
material element, since material substance is incapable of receiving salvation.”213
Irenaeus’s summary lines up with Valentinian sources from the Nag Hammadi Library.
The Tripartite Tractate, for instance, claims that the Word conceived of Jesus’s flesh in
such a way that it would not share in the passions of human flesh; Jesus has a spiritual
flesh.214 Valentinus purportedly wrote about Jesus: “A body, therefore, was spun for him
out of invisible psychic substance, and arrived in the world of sense with power from a
divine preparation.”215 We find a similar teaching in Marcionite theology. The Marcionite
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Apelles, for example, claimed that though the Word took on flesh, that flesh was derived
from stars.216 In other words, the Word only seemed to take on human flesh.
Sometimes these Christians change the wording of John from “flesh” to another
term. I already quoted Valentinus who said that Jesus had a “body” made from a “psychic
substance.” The Gospel of Truth, a Valentinian text, says, “When the Word appeared, the
one that is within the heart of those who utter it—it is not a sound alone but it became a
body—a great disturbance took place.”217 This shift from the language of “flesh” to the
language of “body” may seem insignificant on first read. There are Gnostic texts that
make even more dramatic changes in terminology. For instance, the Trimorphic
Protennoia, has the Word saying, “the third time I revealed myself to them [in] their tents
as Word and I revealed myself in the likeness of their shape. And I wore everyone’s
garment and I hid myself within them, and [they] did not know the one who empowers
me.”218 Here the change from flesh to “tents” and “the likeness of their shape” is far more
dramatic than the shift to “body.” The theology underneath the shift in the Trimorphic
Protennoia is easier to discern. The shift to “body,” however, is subtler. Jacquelin
Williams believes, however, that the shift from “flesh” to “body” represents the shocking
theology of the Gospel of John to the Gnostics, “who intentionally substituted the word
‘body’ for ‘flesh.’”219 They probably did this, according to Williams, to make their
theology more palatable to ordinary Christians.
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Irenaeus notices the subtle shift in language as well. He says of the shift from
“flesh” to “body”: “For, according to them, the Word did not directly become flesh; but
Savior put on an ensouled body, they say, which was fashioned out of the Economy by an
unutterable forethought, so that he might become visible and tangible. Flesh, however, is
the ancient handiwork made by God out of the earth as in Adam. But it is this which John
point out that the Word of God became.”220 Consequently, Irenaeus claims, “they speak
the same language we do, but intend different meanings.”221 Irenaeus insists, however, on
the language of flesh from the Gospel of John since the term “body” means something
very different in the Valentinian interpretation.
Likewise, Tertullian goes to great lengths to argue that Jesus was born from
Mary’s womb. She was truly his mother if that word is to mean anything at all. He also
claims that the Valentinians and Marcionites who denied Jesus’s true humanity also “yet
they deny the inferior substance of Christ, though he declares himself not even a man but
a worm’ [Ps. 22:6].”222 In other words, Marcionites and Valentinians deny humanity’s
common origins in the earth with other animals when they deny Christ a true human
nature. They deny that God’s creation is good. They deny that animal life is good.
These are important points for modern theology. When Sallie McFague—whom I
introduced in the Introduction—for example, claims that the cosmos is God’s body, this
is not the same as the Gospel of John’s statement that the Word became “flesh.” The
language is similar but the meaning is very different. The change from “flesh” to “body”
in this instance signifies a shift away from the particularity of flesh, upon which
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Christians like Irenaeus insisted. To update Irenaeus: flesh signals solidarity with all
animal creatures in a way that the langauge about a cosmological “body” does not.
Moreover, the term “became” is different from “is” in the two theologies because the
Gospel of John suggests that the later doctrine of two natures (divine and human) in one
person (Jesus) is perfectly in line with the intention of “the Word became flesh.”
McFague collapses these in a way that seems to blur the lines between the Creator and
created.
Where Gregersen would be helpful in this discussion is to point out that the fleshin-solidarity-with-all-animal-creatures does not exist in isolation from cosmology either.
According to some of the most current cosmological theories, our universe began
approximately 14 billion years ago from an unfathomably compact zero size yet infinitely
hot state with no space or time.223 From that searing, dense state, what we know of the
universe has been expanding and cooling ever since. Our sun emerged as one of the stars
in the Milky Way galaxy around 4.6 billion years ago. From the dust and gas that circled
the Sun, planets began to form. Earth is made from these particles that collided and were
held together by gravity. More and more collisions with comets and asteroids revolving
the Sun slowly built up the Earth’s mass and the impacts caused the mass to become
hotter. The heavier elements such as iron sank toward the center and the lighter elements
rose toward the surface. Catapulted from supernova explosions, comets carried ice and
organic material to the surface where oceans formed. Around 4 billion years ago, the
bombardment slowed, the Earth had a steady crust, the surface had cooled, the seas were
formed, and an atmosphere developed. Our planet is made from stardust that was
catapulted out from the explosions of older stars.
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In this modern scientific story, humans, like all other creatures, are literally made
from stardust. Paul Davies says that “our bodies are therefore built from the fossilized
debris of once-bright stars that annihilated themselves aeons before the Earth or sun
existed.”224 Our bodies are 65% oxygen, 18% carbon, 10 % hydrogen, and 3.3% nitrogen.
Except for the hydrogen that predates the stars, all of the elements come from the atoms
hurled into space by aged stars. This is our common story. It is a story we share with all
living creatures, planet Earth, and the cosmos in general.
So the flesh-that-all-animal-creatures-share has its common origins in cosmology
and links with our habitat here on Earth. But connecting the statement “the Word became
flesh” to a narrative of interdependence so that humans never exist in isolation is very
different from claiming that all of this “is” God’s body in some kind of metaphysical
sense. What Gregersen and others who use the language of “deep Incarnation” are doing
is a kind of narrative theology in which the Gospel story links up with stories we tell
about ourselves in the modern world. The two stories are not the same, yet the science
story helps us see Genesis and the Gospel of John in a way that makes us more aware of
our common creatureliness. McFague’s story takes away the common creatureliness to a
large extent, since everything is divine somehow.
So the debates about language derived from the Gospel of John in early
Christianity have relevance to our modern ecological debates. But the links go further.
Gregersen and others suggest that “flesh” signals a radical interdependence and
commonality amongst all of creation. Yet they do not begin with the particularity of
animal flesh and rarely point out this commonality as the actual starting point. It is not
that this negation is wrong and that we cannot find it in the tradition—Irenaeus and
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Tertullian both emphasize the commonality of all creatureliness without specifically
focusing on flesh as a common animality. What I will argue is that this shift away from
the particularity of flesh in all animals does not do full justice to the commonality that the
Christian tradition argues for vis-à-vis God.
The Word Made Flesh: Body, Matter, and Particularity

The issue of nonhuman animals and the Gospel of John’s flesh became more
acute over the centuries. The change in language away from the particularity of flesh, and
hence common animality, began to show up in those who took up Irenaeus’s theology.
While Irenaeus insisted on “flesh” against Valentinians, his successors in the fourth and
sixth century changed their language to take up the Valentinian language and subvert it.
Athanasius and John of Damascus affirmed that God became human. But they went
further: against Irenaeus and with the majority of philosophers they accepted a material
substrate for creation. God became that too. This will have some widespread
implications. They use the idea of John 1:14—the Word became flesh—in a slightly new
way. So I will turn to a more detailed account of both Athanasius and John of Damascus
in order to show both the promise of this turn, which relates directly to modern theologies
of a deep Incarnation in relationship to nonhuman animals, and to show some potential
drawbacks in this shift, historically speaking.
Athanasius

In modern ecological theology Athanasius has become a source of inspiration and
a way to connect modern concerns for creation deep within the Christian tradition.
Athanasius’s On the Incarnation generally serves as a theological foundation for thinking
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about Christology. So connecting ecological concerns with Athanasius’s view of the
Incarnation helps modern theologians make the case for the orthodoxy of their positions.
In what follows I draw from some of this research. What modern theologians have done
with Athanasius is needed in a context in which Christian care for the environment can be
seen as heterodox at best. That one of the great thinkers of Christianity argued for the
redemption of all creation and pointed to a common creatureliness is a welcome addition
to ecological theology in the modern world.
While I think theologians have now shown what we can learn today from
Athanasius in terms of theology and creation, I also think that they have sometimes
missed the moves in Athanasius’s work that are less than good when it comes to
developing a theology that cares for creation and nonhuman animals in particular.
Athanasius’s Theology of Creation

In Against the Greeks, Athanasius discusses how humans lost their ability to
know God and then began to worship idols. In his second part, On the Incarnation,
Athanasius focuses on how the Incarnation brings redemption and restoration. Both
books begin with a preface in which he explains his purpose for writing each book. In the
preface to Against the Greeks he states that people who have mocked the cross “do not
see that its power has filled the whole world, and that through it the effects of the
knowledge of God have been revealed to all. For if they had applied their minds to his
divinity they would not have mocked at so great a thing, but rather have recognized that
he was the Saviour of the universe and that the cross was not the ruin but the salvation of
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creation.”225 So from the outset Athanasius speaks of Jesus as “the Savior of the
universe” and the cross as “the salvation of creation,” suggesting that he has more than
humanity in view.226
Athanasius primarily focuses on God and God’s relationship to humanity. Yet
Athanasius did not see humanity as something completely set apart from the rest of
creation. Every created thing needs another created thing: “If one were to take the parts of
creation by itself and examine each one separately—like the sun alone by itself, or the
moon separately, or again earth or air, or the hot and cold, the dry and moist—and isolate
them from their mutual connection, and take each one by itself and examine it separately,
then he would find no one of them self-sufficient, but all in need of mutual service and
only subsisting through mutual support.”227 Creation is composed of parts, and humans
are part of creation who cannot live without the rest. Creation stands as a whole in a
relationship to God.228 In this sense, there is a decidedly non-anthropocentric logic to
Athanasius’s focus.229
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In Against the Greeks, Athanasius examines the origins of evil from the vantage
of the cross. God created humans to commune with God by contemplating the Word. God
did not intend for evil to fill the world. Evil did not exist from the beginning of creation
but came through human sin. Instead of contemplating the Word in creation, humans
committed idolatry by making creatures into gods. Christians, however, do not worship
creatures but recognize the one true God who created all things through the Word. “Who
then is he, if not the all-holy Father of Christ, beyond all created being, who as supreme
steersman, through his own Wisdom and his own Word, our Lord and Saviour Christ,
guides and orders the universe for our salvation, and acts as seems best to him.”230 This
Wisdom/Word is not a creature but “the living and acting God, the very good God of the
universe, who is other than created things and all creation.”231
Athanasius states that “the power of God and wisdom of God, turns the heavens,
has suspended the earth, and by his own will has set it resting on nothing. Illuminated by
him, the sun gives light to the world, and the moon receives its measure of light. Through
him water is suspended in the clouds, rains water the earth, the sea is confined, and the
earth is covered with verdure in all kinds of plants.”232 The universe was created out of
nothing and now tends toward dissolution into nothing. But since God is good and does
not compete with the created order for existence, God has acted to keep everything from
falling into nothingness.233
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But God does more than this. God brings all things into harmony. God is like “a
musician, tuning his lyre and skillfully combining the bass and the sharp notes, the
middle and the others” producing a “single melody.”234 God “reconciles opposites” in the
created order “producing in beauty and harmony a single world and a single order within
it.”235 Yet every individual within this harmony retains its individual identity, just like
individual instruments retain their identity in a symphony. This “wonderful and truly
divine harmony” has a divine director, the “Wisdom of God,” who is “unmoved with the
Father.”236 Because humans are created from nothing, according to Athanasius, we
cannot know God who is beyond all being. Because God loves humans, however, God
has created the world in such a way that rational creatures like humans can know of God
through looking at the harmony in creation. Once again, Athanasius’s ontology in which
the fundamental distinction in Christian faith is between the uncreated Word and
everything created forms the backdrop for his anthropology and creation theology as a
whole.
Creation, including humanity, comes from nothing and tends to return to nothing.
But God does not want to see creation dissolved and so resolved to become a human in
order to save the “universe.” Athanasius is worth quoting at length at this point:
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For the nature of created things, having come into being from nothing, is unstable,
and is weak and mortal when considered by itself; but the God of all is good and
excellent by nature. Therefore he is also kind. For a good being would be envious
of no one, so he envies nobody existence but rather wishes everyone to exist, in
order to exercise his kindness. So seeing that all created nature according to its
own definition is in a state of flux and dissolution, therefore to prevent this
happening and the universe (τὸ ὅλον) dissolving back into nothing, after making
everything (τὰ πάντα) by his own eternal Word and bringing creation (τὴν κτίσιν)
into existence, he did not abandon it to be carried away and suffer through its own
nature, lest it run the risk of returning to nothing. But being good, he governs and
establishes the whole world (τὴν σύµπασαν) through his Word who is himself
God, in order that creation (ἡ κτίσις), illuminated by the leadership, providence,
and ordering of the Word, may be able to remain firm, since it participates in the
Word who is truly from the Father and is aided by him to exist, and lest it suffer a
relapse into nonexistence, if it were not protected by the Word. “For he is the
image of the invisible God, the first-born of all creation, because through him and
in him subsist all things, visible and invisible, and he is the head of the church,”
as the servants of the truth teach in the holy writings.237
In this passage near the end of Contra Gentes, Athanasius forefronts the
fundamental distinction between the Creator and creation. God transcends creation but
God’s love manifests itself in acts that sustain and ultimately redeem creation from
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nothingness.238 It is God’s loving nature to be involved with creation, a love that
culminates in the Incarnation. God’s goodness and love are not impersonal principles that
generically pervade all things, but are manifest in acts of providential care that reach a
pinnacle in the Incarnation.239
So Athanasius gives a first hint as to the reason for the Incarnation: so that
creation/the universe/the whole world might not fall into nothingness. In this first
intimation from Athanasius in his two-part work, the reason for the Incarnation has to do
with God’s action on behalf of creation as a whole. Creation is “weak and mortal” in
itself and needs God’s providential care to keep it in existence at all and keeping the
entirety of creation from falling into utter dissolution is ultimately the wondrous reason
“why the Word of God really came to created beings.” There could hardly be a stronger
statement about the Incarnation that focuses on creation as a whole rather than humanity
alone.
In Orations against the Arians, Athanasius claims that “creation itself will at a
certain point be delivered ‘from the bondage of corruption in the glorious freedom of the
children of God’ (Rom 8, 19, 21). The Lord will be the firstborn of this creation which is
delivered and of all those who are made children, so that by his being called ‘first,’ that
which is after him may abide, united to the Word as to a foundational origin and
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beginning.”240 Creation itself will be transformed and liberated along with human beings
in Christ, who became a human being, but in so becoming also became matter and a
material body.
Athanasius’s participation language, however, is also grounded in his doctrine of
God, according to Anatolios.241 In the background is a relationship between the Father
and the Son. The Son does not participate in the Father: “He is the power of the Father
and his wisdom and Word; not so by participation, nor do those properties accrue to him
from outside in the way of those who participate in him and are given wisdom by him,
having their power and reason in him; but he is absolute wisdom, very Word, and himself
the Father’s own power, absolute light, absolute truth, absolute justice, absolute virtue,
and indeed stamp, effulgence, and image. In short, he is the supremely perfect issue of
the Father, and is alone Son, the express image of the Father.”242 Because the Son is the
perfect image of the Father, the Son contains all the meta-qualities that sustain creation.
Creation participates in the Son and thereby has access to the Father without any
hint of subordination within God. Creation exhibits the order and Wisdom of the Son that
leads to knowledge of the Father and Son. Creation shows this inner relationship within
God.243 Creation, therefore, has a twofold character: on the one hand creation comes from
nothing and rests on the abyss of nothingness. On the other hand, by God’s sheer grace
creation participates in God’s own inner life. Athanasius’s view of the nature/grace
distinction, according to Khaled Anatolios, belongs within his wider understanding of the
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distinction between the Creator and created.244 Creation by its very nature tends toward
the nothingness from which it came, but by grace participates in the divine life. All of
creation participates, but humans are able to participate in our own particular manner
because we are “rational” and therefore have a special affinity to the Word. Yet the
proper context for interpreting humanity’s relationship to God is in the radical
dependency that all creatures have for God’s grace and providential care. Even though
God has a “special care” for humans, it is fitting to describe the Incarnation in terms of
the Word becoming matter since this prior Creator/creation distinction undergirds
theological anthropology as well.
Athanasius makes the ontological status of creatureliness vis-à-vis God the basis
of his anthropology very clear in his work, Orations against the Arians.245 The Arians,
according to Athanasius, call Jesus a “creature” but then go on to say he is a special
creature that is unlike other creatures. For Athanasius this kind of statement
misunderstands the basic ontological distinction between what is made and what is not
made, between the Creator and creation. No “creature” has a special mediator status in
this relationship. Athanasius says:
But even if the Son has a relative precedence over the others, he would still be
nonetheless a creature, just as they are. For even among those who are creatures
by nature, there is to be found those who have precedence over others; thus ‘star
differs from star in glory’ (1 Cor 15:41) and everything else differs from the
others when one makes comparisons. But that does not mean that some are lords
and others do service to those who are superior; nor that some are efficient causes
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and others come to be through their agency. Rather, all have a nature which
comes to be and is created, and they acknowledge, of themselves, their own
creator.246
The basic ontological status of humanity is as a creature before God. In this sense,
Athanasius could have spoken of the Word becoming a creature. He shied away from that
language because the Arians claimed that Jesus was merely a creature with a special
status. They did not maintain the proper Creator/creature distinction according to
Athanasius and therefore their Christology was flawed.
The Matter of Christology

In On the Incarnation, the second part to his Against the Gentiles, Athanasius
continues to explicate the Incarnation’s purpose as significant for more than humans. He
opens with a reference to the Word’s “Incarnation.” The Greek word Athanasius uses,
however, is ἐνανθρώπησις, more properly translated as the Word “becoming human.”247
He starts with ἐνανθρωπήσεως because he wants to clarify why the Word would become
human rather than some other created being or “body.” So in the second chapter he
explains that God created matter (ὕλη) out of nothing (ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων)—contrary to
Platonic notions that God created things from some eternal but formless matter by putting
“forms” to it.248 Athanasius carefully explains that he had to give an account of the origin
of all things rather than launching straight into a Christological reflection because he
needed to say why the Word would become human of all other creatures.

mine.

246

Athanasius, Orations against the Arians, 2.20, in Anatolios, Athanasius, 115. Emphasis is

247

Athanasius, On the Incarnation, 1, p. 50.
Ibid., 3, p. 54.

248

117
First of all, matter stands in a Creator/created relationship with God and as such it
was important for the body of Jesus to be from “matter” (ὕλη). In this context, Athanasius
uses ὕλη in a philosophical sense. In one meaning of the word, ὕλη is the stuff out of
which something is made: clay is the matter out of which a bricks are made, and in turn,
bricks are the matter out of which houses are made. “Matter” is a relative term.249 Matter
is what survives change from one form to the other. It is what remains the same when all
the properties (size, weight, color, etc.) are taken away. There is also a substratum to all
things, which philosophers called “prime matter” that has no form and only really exists
in specific things.250 While Aristotle and others considered this prime matter to be
eternal, Athanasius maintains that God created this primal material substrate, which
means that prime matter also stands as creation in relationship to the Creator. As he
already stated at the end of Against the Gentiles, God’s very nature is such that God
becomes present to and active in creation for creation. In this sense, the reason for the
Incarnation is fundamentally grounded in God’s desire to bridge the difference between
creation and God so that creation as a whole can flourish. Becoming the fundamental
stuff of all creation thus signals God’s good and loving nature that manifests in action
toward creation as a whole. In becoming a body the Word becomes matter: “Therefore
the body, as it had the common substance of all bodies, was a human body.”251
The question arises immediately as to what it would mean for the Word to
become “matter.” Athanasius seems to accept a kind of Aristotelian sense of matter as the
substratum of all that exists. But Aristotle’s definition of matter leaves as many questions
249

Aristotle, Physics, trans. Robin Waterfield (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 194b8.
Athanasius does not discuss the issue of “prime matter” as a pure potentiality as does Aristotle
and in another sense Plotinus. On Aristotle and prime matter see H. M. Robinson, “Prime Matter in
Aristotle,” Phronesis 19, no. 2 (1974): 168–88. For Plotinus and matter see his Enneads, 2.4.
251
Athanasius, On the Incarnation, 20 (p. 95).
250

118
as it might answer. He says that matter is that which is left when we take away all the
properties like color, shape, and weight: “If all attributes are removed, nothing but
material appears to remain.”252 Matter is that which transcends all individuals. Matter is
“that which is in itself not a particular thing or a quantity or anything else by which
things are defined.”253 In other words, matter is not something anybody can see, hear,
taste, smell, or touch. According to Aristotle, we cannot even define it negatively because
“the negations, too, would belong to it only accidentally” and matter has no “accidents”
at all.254 What then is matter if it is not anything we can really know? For Aristotle it is a
concept that explains continuity in a world of change, but it has no real existence. Ὕλη is
pure potentiality. It is something we can imagine if we think away all properties.255
Perhaps this is why, long before Athanasius, Irenaeus denied the existence of
matter. The Cappadocian fathers, Basil of Caesarea (330–379 CE), Gregory of Nyssa
(c.332–395 CE), and Gregory of Nazianzus (329–389 CE), denied the existence of matter
as well. Basil’s statement is paradigmatic:
These same thoughts, let us also recommend to ourselves concerning the earth,
not to be curious about what its substance is; nor to wear ourselves out by
reasoning, seeking its very foundation; nor to search for some nature destitute of
qualities, existing without quality of itself; but to realize well that all that is seen
around it is related to the reason of its existence, forming an essential part of its
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substance. You will end with nothing if you attempt to eliminate by reason each
of the qualities that exist in it. In fact, if you remove the black, the cold, the
weight, the density, the qualities pertaining to taste, or any others which are
perceptible, there will be no basic substance.256
In Athanasius, by contrast, the Λόγος both creates ὕλη and takes it on in his body,
since all bodies are made of matter. Matter (ὕλη) plays a rhetorical role in his theology to
unite all creaturely existence. There is something unchangeable that underlies all
individual physical bodies. That unchangeable element is ὕλη. But philosophically, it has
no existence, and this is one reason why some of the early Christian theologians rejected
the concept. This empty concept, according to Irenaeus, actually functions as a mediator
between God and all individual creatures since it is this potentiality that God originally
creates, not individual creatures. Matter removes God from individual creatures and calls
into question God’s loving sustaining presence in this world.
But ὕλη does more than this. Matter, as a “shadow upon a shadow,” becomes a
synonym for the body. Because, according to Athanasius, what is unique to the human
person is our rationality what ends up being real about the human person is our thoughts
and concepts. According to Richard Sorabji, there is an early idealism in some of the
Eastern theologians precisely because this idea of ὕλη is so shaky.
Athanasius could have claimed that matter, as the underlying but formless
substance under creaturely physical reality, is taken up in Christ so that it no longer
functions as a mediator, as Irenaeus charged. The nothingness that is ὕλη is taken up in
Christ’s body and the threat that it represents is neutralized. Athanasius says exactly this
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about “nothingness,” though he does not apply it to matter. But matter is not “nothing”
for Athanasius, but a real thing of some sort underlying all physical bodies, since it was
“created out of nothing” in Athanasius’s theology.
In terms of the Incarnation and creation, therefore, it is hard to know how the
Word becoming or taking up “matter” does much good for a theology of creation. Matter
is a far cry from the positive physical flesh we share with nonhuman animals. Matter is a
step removed from direct contact with other creatures since it is an empty concept, as
Basil of Caesarea argued. Moreover, when coupled with the idea that humanity is really
defined by rationality the idea of the Word taking up matter starts to lose its potency. For
if in reality “matter” is a pure concept to describe what remains the same despite change,
but has no actual existence, then the “flesh” of the Hebrew Bible is reduced to human
thought. Matter and flesh are simply not equivalent concepts.
By contrast, Irenaeus argued that God created humans “taking the purest and
finest of earth, in measured wise mingling with the earth His own power; for He gave his
frame the outline of his own form, that the visible appearance too should be godlike—for
it was as an image of God that man was fashioned and set on earth— and that he might
come to life, he breathed into his face the breath of life, so that the man became like God
in inspiration as well as in frame.”257 The earth that humans are made from is stamped
with a form that is somehow divine. It was a common argument in early Christian
theologians that our human bodies somehow reflect the divine image; whereas later the
divine image became associated with our thoughts and concepts rather than the body. The
mud and clay, the “finest of the earth,” from which God made humans is the same earth
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that produced all of the living nonhuman animals in Genesis. This same earth is the
precondition for creatures who can glorify God. This is not the pure potentiality of
philosophical speculation but a story rooted in Jewish tradition and shows a kind of
radical interdependence of all creatures. The concept “matter” is far less rich in that
sense.
Embodied Christology

After arguing that God created the common element underlying all creation
(matter) Athanasius then states that “we were the purpose (ὑπόθεσις) of his embodiment
(ἐνσωµάτωσις).”258 By switching from ἐνανθρώπησις to ἐνσωµάτωσις, Athanasius
signals a wider issue in Christology: by becoming human the Word also takes on a body.
As I noted earlier in the chapter, Valentinians and some Marcionites had claimed that the
Word became a “body.”259 Their chnage in terminology from “flesh” to “body,” however,
signaled a theological shift away from earthly human flesh: Jesus’s body was not like
ours. Athanasius shifts meanings as well, but not in a Gnostic direction.
Here Athanasius seems to take up this idea and turn it around. The Word took a
body, which is common to all created existence. Bodies are necessarily subject to death.
He even affirms that the Son could have taken on a sidereal body just as some Gnostics
had claimed. If God only wanted to become part of creation in a body, God could have
done so “through some better means.”260 God could have become one of the “more noble
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parts of creation” or used “some nobler instrument, as the sun or moon or stars or fire or
air.”261
But God was not trying to show off. Rather the Son came “to heal and to teach
those who were suffering” because humans had sinned and had lost their way in this
world.262 No other part of creation, according to Athanasius, had gone astray. “Neither
the sun nor moon nor heaven nor stars nor water nor air altered their course, but knowing
their Creator and King, the Word, they remained as they were made.”263 Humans alone
have sinned. Such a picture hardly reflects a triumphistic view of humanity in relation to
other creatures.
Greek philosophers, Athanasius claims, “speak truly” when they say that the
whole of creation is one big body.264 And since the philosophers affirm that somehow the
divine has “come into the whole, and illumine[s] and move[s] all things” by providence,
they affirm that the universe as a whole, as a large body with parts, is somehow a fitting
way for us to know the divine. Athanasius argues that just as God can be known through
the whole, so too it is fitting for God to become a particular part of the whole. For “if the
part is unsuitable to be his instrument towards the knowledge of his divinity, it would be
most absurd that he should be made known even through the whole cosmos.”265 Although
the Word became human because only humans had sinned, God also touches every other
part of creation, bringing redemption to the whole.266 As Athanasius stated at the end of
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Against the Gentiles, the totality of God’s good creation needed God to become a
creature so that God could overcome the nothingness into which all creatures slide.
Athanasius assumes that the only way for the Incarnation to happen is through a
particular part of creation. Humans have sunk to the lowest depths, and it was therefore
fitting that God become human to rescue that which has fallen farthest away.
Athanasius uses σῶµα throughout De Incarnatione Christi, which helps him to
establish, yet again, a common creatureliness. The body is subject to death by its very
creatureliness. Σῶµα is one of Athanasius’s more important words for the Incarnation. He
uses some form of σῶµα 185 times in De Incarnatione Christi.267 Some representative
statements include:
ὁ Λόγος . . . ἐν ἀνθρωπίνῳ σώµατι ἡµῖν πεφανέρωται (1).
ὁ Λόγος . . . ἐν ἀνθρωπίνῳ γενέσθαι καὶ φανῆναι σώµατι (4).
ὁ Λόγος . . . λαµβάνει ἑαυτῷ σῶµα (8).
ὁ Λόγος . . . ἔλαβε σῶµα θνητόν (13)
The Word “appeared” and “took” a body: these verbs represent Athanasius’s normal way
of speaking about the body in relation to the word. The Λόγος assumes a body to
Godself, which is the part of humanity that is closest to us, according to Athanasius.268
Anatolios notes that Athanasius here departs from philosophical tradition, which
would treat the soul as that which defines our humanness, the body being its prison.269
Here Athanasius makes the body the definition of humanity. When humanity turned away
from contemplating God, we fixated on what is most properly our own: our bodies.
Bodies are not evil as in Gnosticism. But fixating on ourselves does not allow the kind of
267
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self-transcendence needed to live a good life. In focusing on our bodies and its sensations
we then become trapped in a tragic cycle.
The Word takes a human body to break this cycle of self-indulgence. Anatolios
notes that the redemption offered in Christ is not one that transcends the body, which is
what is “closest to us,” but one in which the whole person becomes oriented toward God
and the body becomes divinized.270 So σῶµα has great importance for Athanasius’s
Christology.
But again, though there is a sense in which σῶµα could be equivalent to σάρξ,
they are not the same. In De Incarnatione Christi, Athanasius only uses a form of σάρξ
seven times. Three of these are in biblical quotations.271 Three others uses occur in
chapter 37 and he uses the term once in chapter 40. It is σῶµα that dominates
Athanasius’s Christology. Outside of this work, however, Athanasius does use σάρξ
though again only about half as much as σῶµα.272 In Athanasius, σῶµα is what all of
creation must have. It is the precondition for any relationship to God. The entire cosmos,
he claims, could be said to be one large body. Σῶµα is never a synonym for human.273 By
contrast, Athanasius uses σάρξ as a synonym for human. Here Athanasius is forthright:
“For ‘the Word,’ as John says, ‘became flesh’ (it being the custom of Scripture to call
man by the name of ‘flesh’).”274 And again in his letter to Epictetus, Athanasius writes,
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“For to say ‘the Word became flesh’ is equivalent to saying ‘the Word became man.’”275
Athanasius does not use the verb “became” with σῶµα as he does with σάρξ in
relationship to the Incarnation, implying that the Word takes up σῶµα in a different way
than σάρξ.
In either case, both terms, σῶµα and σάρξ, have little connection to nonhuman
animals for Athanasius. In the previous chapter I demonstrated that the Septuagint uses
σάρξ in such a way to connect human life with all nonhuman animal life. The same could
be said for σῶµα. While the primary translation in the Septuagint of  ָבּ ָשׂרis σάρξ,
sometimes the Septuagint translates  ָבּ ָשׂרas σῶµα.276 In the Septuagint, according to
Eduard Schweizer, σῶµα is a concept that is not very developed. It does not mean σάρξ.
“For one thing it [σῶµα] does not have intrinsically the character of creatureliness or
corruptibility or even sin. Angels, too, have σῶµα . . . but no σάρξ.”277 In the Septuagint,
σῶµα does not reflect the “realm” of creatureliness or a part of humanity in distinction
from another part. When Jewish apocryphal literature use the term they use it to mean
human or animal bodies only, never plants or inanimate creation.278
Athanasius, however, uses the term differently than Jewish Scriptures. For him it
is a philosophical issue of how the immaterial and incorporeal can relate to the material
and body. This is not an illegitimate concern, but it is not the focus of John 1:14. The
language also changes from a common kinship in animality to largely a focus on
humanity with some commonality in “matter,” which turns out to be a vacuous concept.
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Equating “flesh” with “human” in John 1:14 is equally problematic. In the first chapter I
showed that this is not at all what John’s prologue did by using flesh.
While it is true that the Word took on human flesh in the Gospel of John, it is
simply not true that “human” exhausts the meaning of “flesh” in the prologue. Indeed,
when Athanasius makes his statements about σάρξ being equivalent to ἄνθρωπος in John
1:14, in both cases he citedsJoel 2:28, which declares that God will pour out the Spirit on
“all flesh.” Athanasius takes this as a reference to humanity alone. But, in Joel 1:18–20
we read this:
How the animals groan! The herds of cattle wander about because there is no
pasture for them; even the flocks of sheep are dazed. To you, O Lord, I cry. For
fire has devoured the pastures of the wilderness, and flames have burned all the
trees of the field. Even the wild animals cry to you because the watercourses are
dried up, and fire has devoured the pastures of the wilderness.
Joel is not concerned with humanity alone, and the term “all flesh” in Hebrew Scriptures
quite often refers to all animal creatures. There is no reason to see it as referring to only
humans in Joel 2:28 given what we read in the first chapter of the common human and
nonhuman animal travails.
To the extent that Athanasius speaks about creation he tends to speak in large
sweeping terms, dealing with planets as more perfect bodies than human bodies and the
universe as a whole body in relationship to the particular human body that Word
assumed. Other creatures, creatures more related to human animals, get no mention at all.
Again, I believe this has to do with his change away from the language of the Gospel of
John, which says ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο. It does not say ὁ λόγος ὕλη ἐγένετο or ὁ λόγος
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σῶµα ἐγένετο. Both of these ways of speaking abstract humanity from their animality in
ways that the language of σὰρξ does not because σὰρξ is connected with Jewish
scriptural notions of כָּל־ ָבּ ָשׂר. Athanasius’s shift in language from σάρξ to ὕλη, when
combined with the idea that humans have a special status because of our rationality
(λόγος), undermines some of his best insights.
It is easy, in sum, to see how modern ecological theologians would be drawn to
Athanasius’s theology. His theology makes a clear distinction between God and creation.
Humanity stands with all other creatures in this regard. The rest of creation will be
delivered from suffering because of Christ’s work as well. But the change in language
from a biblical understanding of the World became flesh to notions of “matter” and
“bodies” and an exclusive interpretation of “flesh” as meaning “human” tends to
undermine some of Athanasius’s best insights.
Life of St. Antony and Following Christ

Fortunately, however, Athanasius is better at showing what the Incarnation means
with regard to human-nonhuman animal relationships. Later in his career Athanasius
came under the influence of desert monasticism, and he was especially drawn to Saint
Antony the Great. In honor of the ascetic master, Athanasius wrote Life of St. Antony to
promote the discipline that Antony and his followers lived. In his own letters, Antony
repeatedly refers to the spirit-filled life of prayer in the Holy Spirit and how it trains a
person to overcome their self-centered temptations.279
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Seemingly influenced by the Spirit-fueled vision of desert monasticism,
Athanasius clarifies the Holy Spirit’s sanctifying role in creation in his Letters to
Serapion on the Holy Spirit. He says: “It is in the Spirit that the Word glorifies creation
(τὴν κτίσιν) and presents it to the Father by divining (θεοποιῶν) it and granting it
adoption. But the one who binds creation (τὴν κτίσιν) to the Word could not be among
the creatures (τῶν κτισµάτων) and the one who bestows sonship upon creation (τὴν
κτίσιν) could not be foreign to the Son.”280 Strikingly, Athanasius speaks of the Holy
Spirit divinizing creation as a whole. What we can see in this renewed interest in the
Spirit is a view of the Incarnation that becomes more fully Trinitarian than Athanasius
had been in his On the Incarnation. What the Word became and did was through the
power of the Holy Spirit, uniting the Son to the Father in a kind of embrace that was wide
enough to include every part of creation.
For Athanasius, Saint Antony’s life is “an adequate guide in asceticism” that
others should earnestly desire to imitate.281 Simply reading about Saint Antony’s life will
help nonChristians to believe that Jesus is God and help Christians to more fully imitate
Christ in this life.282
Part of Antony’s discipline involved what Danielle Nussberger calls “a spiritually
germinated vegetarianism” that trained a person to control “selfish human appetites that
wage violence against the peaceable kingdom by halting its all-inclusive solidarity and
thereby impeding union with God in Christ.”283 In Nussberger’s reading, Saint Antony
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embarked on a spiritual path of self-emptying that allowed others to be God’s beloved
creatures rather than objects for Antony’s desires and plans. How Antony treated other
animals—letting them be, not using them for his own passions and lusts (as food or
entertainment, for example), and refusing to harm them even when they threatened him—
was an integral part of the monastic discipline of imitating Christ’s kenosis.
As part of his Spirit-filled Christocentric life, Antony eschewed using other
animals for food. Athanasius states that it was unthinkable that Antony would eat an
animal. Instead he lived on a frugal plant-based diet consisting of mostly bread and water,
but also vegetables and fruits. “His food was bread and salt; his drink, water only. Of
meat and wine there is no need to even speak, since nothing of the sort was found among
the other holy men.”284 But even in this plant-based diet, Antony did not demonstrate a
tendency to lavishness. After all, it is possible to live on a vegetarian diet and eat
extremely well with a wide variety of fruits, vegetables and nuts to combine. As
Nussberger tells it, part of Antony’s discipline was to purge himself of the common
temptation to see another as here for his purposes rather than having goodness in its own
right as created by God. This certainly applied to nonhuman animals. But the ascetic diet
extended even to his vegetarian diet. He refused, it seems, to satisfy his desires for newer
and greater tastes and lived a contented life on what he could either grow in his own
garden or on the bread and vegetables that people brought to him. (There is no hint in
Antony that he would eat a dead animal if somebody brought it out of hospitality).
Creation is filled with God’s good beings. Antony, it seems, felt he had no right to
take “possession” of anyone or anything. This included the land upon which he lived. At
one point in Athanasius’s narrative, Antony plants a garden in the wilderness where he
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had gone to live. He raised his own vegetables because he noticed that people were going
to great lengths and hardship to bring him food and he did not want to use them in this
way.285 Instead, he grew vegetables for himself and to feed people who came to him, not
using them for his own purposes but giving to them instead.
Because he had settled near water, wild animals would come and drink the water
and occasionally they would eat or trample the vegetables that Antony had planted for his
own sustenance. So Antony caught one of the wild creatures. The narrative lumps all of
them together and does not differentiate kinds. Was it a rabbit that Antony caught? A
woodchuck? A deer? A bear? The narrative does not say. He caught one of the wild
creatures and said to it and its companions: “Why do you harm me when I do you no
harm?”286 Just as he did not want to harm his human companions, so too Antony sought
to do no harm to the nonhuman animals that surrounded him. He did not seek to own
other human and nonhuman animal creatures. Antony’s only weapon against even the
more threatening wild animals was prayer: “at night they saw that hill filled with wild
beasts, and they saw him fighting as with invisible foes, and praying against them.”287
In telling Antony’s story, Athanasius recounts Antony’s daily habits with
particular care and detail. Unlike his musings on the Incarnation, which do not really
delve into the narratives as told in the Gospels and where Athanasius speaks in broadly
philosophical and theological terms, here Athanasius speaks about a particular habit
designed to purge the believer of self-centered behavior toward others so that they might
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hear and experience God more fully. And this habit, Athanasius argues, is extremely
worthy of imitation because it conforms to Christ’s life, lived in the Spirit in communion
with the Father.
Athanasius was aware that Jesus did not live in the desert as a hermit. Antony
exhibited “a patient disposition” and was “humble of heart.”288 We are supposed to look
at Antony’s “virtues” and discern “what kind of man Anthony, the man of God, was.”
Antony did not fall into the trappings of fame and glory, even exhorting the emperors to
remember “the judgment to come, and to know that Christ alone is the true and
everlasting King. He begged them to be lovers of their fellow men, to show concern for
justice, and to care for the poor.”289
For Athanasius, it was the disposition that Antony exhibited toward others and his
prayer life that truly demonstrated his Christ-like life that others should imitate. Antony’s
virtues and habits involved an attitude that eschewed seeing others as his possessions,
there to be exploited for his self-centered pleasures. So Athanasius ends the Life with an
admonition to his readers about believing and worshiping Jesus Christ. Antony’s life
provides a pattern of Christ-like behavior that lead us to contemplate the Incarnation
because the life of the monks continues the attitude and disposition of Jesus.
So Athanasius at first tended to speak of the Incarnation in broad strokes: The
Father sends the Son to take up matter in a human body and lift up the basic “stuff” of
creation so that the good work of God might not fall back into the nothingness from
which it came. The Son becomes a human because humans have sinned and have
therefore fallen to the lowest depths that a creature can fall. In these broad sweeps
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Athanasius speaks grandly, starting from the “stuff” of all creation to the planets that
orbit the skies. Very little about other creatures comes into Athanasius’s sight. The switch
in language from “flesh” to “matter” and “bodies” in On the Incarnation allows
Athanasius to bypass them. In the Life of St. Antony, Athanasius becomes more focused
on the lived experience of God in a person’s life as he or she follows Christ through a
Spirit-filled prayer life. The Incarnation, no longer cut off from the Holy Spirit, leads
directly to an ethic of “letting-be” with regards to other humans and nonhuman
animals.290
However, it is not clear that this “letting-be” is really grounded in a real respect
for nonhuman animals. Sometimes it is hard to tell the difference in the story between the
wild animals and the demons with which Antony supposedly wrestled. Moreover,
Athanasius’s change in language from flesh to matter and bodies signals a fundamental
shift in Christianity more broadly toward an anti-Jewish position. In his Festal letters,
Athanasius repeatedly expressed anti-Jewish sentiments. While these statements were
directed toward Christians, and aimed primarily at Christian who disagreed with
Athanasius, the characterization of “the Jews” in these letters is troubling:
Therefore, my beloved, since we have our souls nourished with divine food, that
is, the Word, according to God’s will, and we are fasting bodily with respect to
external things, let us keep this great and saving feast as is fitting for us. Even the
ignorant Jews received this divine food, through the pattern, when they ate a lamb
in the Passover. But since they do not understand the pattern, they eat the lamb
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even to this day, going astray since they are without the city and without the
truth.291
In this passage, Athanasius draws a distinction between Jewish practice and
Christian practice: Christians no longer eat the flesh of a dead lamb on Passover, but the
“flesh” of Christ in the bread and wine; whereas Jews eat a real lamb. This polemic,
however, did not reflect reality. Many believers in the Messiah Jesus thought that Easter
was a type of Jewish Passover, “suitably interpreted with Jesus as the Lamb of God and
paschal sacrifice.”292 Moreover, in 70 CE the Romans destroyed the temple where the
Passover lamb had to be sacrificed. After this catastrophe, Jewish rabbis reconfigured the
Jewish celebration of the Passover without a lamb. The celebration would go on but
without a lamb: it was the bitter herbs and other elements that would be central going
forward. Athanasius’s polemic, therefore, was not based in a lived experience with real
Jewish celebrations and practices. Instead he characterized “the Jews,” who became a
trope for those who focus on earthly matters rather than the spiritual ones. To be Jewish
was one thing, to be Christian another, for Athanasius.
David Brakke argues that Athanasius depicts the Jews as clinging “to what is
‘fleshly’ (terrestrial, material, temporal) while the Christians look to what is ‘spiritual’
(heavenly, immaterial, eternal). In other words, the Jewish Passover is ‘unseasonable and
parochial’; the Christian, ‘timely and universal (ecumenical).’”293 This anti-Jewish
polemic corresponds in some ways to his change in language from σάρξ to ὕλη. It is a
shift from a deep rootedness in the Jewish story and its particularity to a more universal
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philosophical story that Christians supposedly embody.294 Without embedding the
Incarnation in the Jewish story, there is a strong temptation to lose the particularity of the
Incarnation, and with it the universal as well. Even in the Life of St. Antony, it is not
Jesus’s Torah observance that grounds St. Antony but something less grounded in
Scriptural narrative. If Athanasius were less bent on attacking Jewish laws and practices,
he may have found in them something that pointed to Christ’s redemption of all
creatures. Athanasius does not draw out the radical potential in the Life. Antony follows
Jesus by becoming a hermit in the wilderness and living at peace with the wild animals,
much like Jesus in Mark 1:14, a passage I will examine in chapter 4.
The Word Becomes Matter: Christian Philosophy and Anti-Judaism

While there is much in Athanasius to admire and work from, the problems in his
work only become stronger as subsequent theologians took on some of the ideas that he
developed. In particular the idea that somehow the Incarnation takes up “matter” became
a way for John of Damascus to interpret the Word becoming flesh.
John of Damascus

Not much is known about John. Historians are fairly sure that his grandfather,
Mansur ibn Sarjun, not only negotiated Damascus’s surrender to the Umayyad caliphate
in 635 CE but also was in charge of fiscal administration in Damascus under the new
Muslim rule. John’s father, Sarjun ibn Mansur, succeeded his father in the public office
and John inherited the high public office when his father died. But John retired around
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706 CE to a monastery in Muslim-ruled Palestine, where he finally took the name “John”
instead of his birth name Yanah ibn Mansur ibn Sarjun. John lived out the rest of his days
as a monk and prolific theologian.295
During John’s lifetime an iconoclast controversy began, lasting from 726 to 843
296

CE.

Somewhere between 726 and 730 CE, Emperor Leo III forbade churches from

using icons in worship. “Icons” meant any representation of Jesus, Mary, or the saints
“made from colors, pebbles, or any other material that is fit, set in the holy churches of
God, on holy utensils and vestments, on walls and boards, in houses and in streets.”297
Leo removed and destroyed an image of Christ that hung above a palace gate in
Constantinople. In its place he hung a cross and the following inscription: “The Lord God
does not allow the fashioning of an image of Christ that is lifeless and without breath,
made of earthly matter despised by the sacred writings. Leo, together with his son the
new Constantine, signs the royal portals with the thrice-blessed sign of the cross, the
glory of all believers.”298
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In this inscription Leo outlines three reasons for taking down the icons. First, God
forbids images. Leo clearly has in mind Scriptural injunctions such as Exodus 20:4: “You
shall not make for yourself an idol, whether in the form of anything that is in heaven
above, or that is on the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth.” Second,
icons do not have life. The synod at Heireia (754 CE) elaborated this claim by stating that
lifeless icons tempt believers to replace “depicting in ourselves the virtues of the saints as
told in the writings, and thus becoming living icons.”299 Living humans are icons.
Inanimate handmade icons distract from virtuous living. Finally, Leo III says that icons
are made of “earthly matter” that Scripture “despises.” This reason seems to deny the
goodness of all creation by making “matter,” the stuff people like Athanasius believed
humans are made from, a thing from which humans need to be saved. Perhaps Leo had in
mind older platonic notions that matter imprisons the soul and the goal of life is to escape
from it and return to a more spiritual source. Leo does not say that, but given the history
of the belief in matter as a prison-house for the soul it seems reasonable to infer that
something like this lies behind the statement about matter.300 Shortly after Leo II banned
the icons, John wrote Three Treatises on the Divine Images to articulate a defense of
icons.
The Three Treatises are really three different versions of the same defense. The
second and third treatises lift word for word from his first treatise. The second treatise is
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a simplified version of the first treatise, and the third is more of a systematic treatment of
the issue than the first and second. Yet there are important differences.
First Treatise

John begins his first treatise by discussing prohibitions in the Hebrew Bible
concerning idolatry and citing several New Testament passages that distinguish Christ’s
revelation from that of the prophets in the Hebrew Bible. He then confesses that by
worshiping the Incarnate Son of God, he worships the one true God who reveals love for
creation in the Incarnation. Then John asserts the orthodox position that although it is
impossible to make an image of God in Godself, it is possible and necessary to depict
God as incarnate. After this, John begins to answer the iconoclast objections to images,
which were largely based in Jewish prohibitions against idolatry. John’s first reply is to
note that the Hebrew Bible was concerned with idolatry, not with images as such. The
Hebrew Bible prohibited the people of God from worshiping creation rather than the
Creator. He briefly mentions that this prohibition was necessary because Jews as a whole
were prone to idolatry. He develops this argument at length in the second and third
treatises, and it is one to which I will return. But it shows up even in his first treatise.
John claims that Christians show respect and honor for certain special created
things by bowing down (προσκυνέω [v.] and προσκυνητής [n.]). This veneration is not
the total worship (λατρεία) due to God alone, and has a basis in Jewish veneration for the
tabernacle and respect for other people. The old covenant allowed material images such
as the tabernacle, the mercy seat, the utensils, the altar and its basin and other artistic
elements for worship. All of these were acceptable though they were made of what
iconoclasts like Leo called “contemptible matter.” In doing so, John said that his
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opponents “abuse matter and call it worthless.”301 In response to the objection about
matter, he cited Genesis 1:31, in which God declares everything very good.302 In addition
to icon-like items in the Hebrew Bible such as the ark, the staff, and the mercy-seat,
which all came from matter, John pointed to Exodus 31:1–10, in which God told Moses
that Bezalel and Oholiab had been gifted with skills “to devise artistic designs, to work in
gold, silver, and bronze, in cutting stones for setting, and in carving wood, in every kind
of craft.” They would make the Ark of the Covenant and the other worship
instruments.303 John also cited Exodus 35, in which Moses asks the Israelites to give their
precious metals and jewels so the artistic elements could be made.304 John goes on to
proclaim that if such lowly elements as color—made then from what we today call “earth
pigments” because they were found in common and not-so-common minerals305—were to
be part of the cherubim in the temple, then matter could not be “detestable.”306
But John’s central argument that matter is an acceptable vehicle for seeing the
divine is the Incarnation:
Of old, God the incorporeal and formless was never depicted, but now that God
has been seen in the flesh and has associated with human kind, I depict what I
have seen of God. I do not venerate matter, I venerate the fashioner of matter,
who became matter for my sake and accepted to dwell in matter and through
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matter worked my salvation, and I will not cease from reverencing matter,
through which my salvation was worked.307
If people wanted to take matter out of worship, they would have to take down their
crosses, shun the holy places, throw out their Bibles, pitch their Eucharist tables and
elements, and deny the body and blood of Jesus itself. “Either do away with reverence
and veneration for all these or submit to the tradition of the Church and allow the
veneration of images of God and friends of God, sanctified by name and therefore
overshadowed by the grace of the divine Spirit.”308 According to John, the Christian
gospel cannot be separated from matter because the Son became matter and his entire
ministry was in and through the material world. Scripture repeatedly attests to matter
being good and useful for gaining knowledge about the spiritual world.
The Incarnation, which bridges the ontological divide between the Creator and
creature, is for John a crucial aspect of venerating icons. In Jesus, the created world has
been united with God via Christ’s humanity. Therefore the material world is due respect
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and honor because it is through this material world, says John, “that my salvation
came.”309
In other places, John speaks about the nonhuman world as having a great
significance for our knowledge of God. For instance, in his greatest theological
achievement, The Fount of Knowledge—consisting of three different books: the
Dialectica, On Heresies, and On the Orthodox Faith310— John quotes Wisdom 13:5, “for
by the beauty of his own creatures the creator is by analogy discovered” and Romans
1:20, “the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being
understood by the things that are made.”311 Though God is completely other than
creation, God created all things out of an overflowing love and imprinted beauty, truth,
and goodness in all things. As such, it is possible to see hints of the divine in created
beings.
Indeed, through the act of creation, God has made all things in such a way that by
existing they participate in God’s goodness. There is no such thing as creation apart from
God’s activity. John says, “All things participate in his goodness by the fact that they
have being. For he is being to them all, since ‘in him are all things,’ not only because he
has brought them from nothing into being, but because it is by his operation that all
things he made are kept in existence and held together.” 312 God has created out of the
sheer overflowing love within God’s own inner life. Because of this abundant goodness,
God “was not content to contemplate himself, but by a superabundance of goodness saw
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fit that there should be some things to benefit by a participation in his goodness. He
brings all things from nothing into being and creates them both, both visible and
invisible, and man, who is made up of both.”313
The goodness of created things and the distinction between God and creation is
the bedrock for John’s view of the Incarnation. If created material were “detestable,” as
the iconoclasts have said, then the Incarnation itself would be impossible. God would not
be Creator. God would not have fellowship with creation because it would be a type of
second evil god rather than an expression of God’s goodness and love.
Moreover, for God to become incarnate, God had to become a particular creature.
God could not become creation in general or a species in general. In his Dialectica, the
primary term with which John was concerned was ὑπόστασις.314 John says that there are
two distinct uses of ὑπόστασις, which he draws from earlier Christian theologians. The
first use means οὐσία (being), the second use means “the individual and the distinct
person.”315 Greek philosophers, according to John fought about the difference between
οὐσία and φύσις, but the church Fathers ignored the philosophers and simply
distinguished between the common and the particular. The common they called οὐσία
(substance or being), φύσις (nature), µορφή (form), and εἶδος (species). They called the
particular ἴδιος (individual), πρόσωπον (person), or ὑπόστασις.316 John goes on to say
that “substance which is devoid of form does not subsist of itself, nor does an essential
difference, nor a species, nor an accident. It is only the hypostasis, the individuals, that is,
313
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that subsist of themselves, and in them are found both substance and the essential
differences, the species and the accidents.”317 In other words, the primary ontological
reality for John and the Greek fathers was in the particular individual, not in the abstract
universals like “being” and “species.” Species exist because there are individuals that
share some common characteristics. In other words, universals like species only exist in
specific creatures (ὑποστάσεις).318
The Incarnation, therefore, has to be particular. God could not become a “species”
in general or “creation” in general because these abstract universals do not exist apart fro
individual ὑποστάσεις. For John, reality is fundamentally hypostatic; everything exists in
relationship to a ὑπόστασις. When John defended use of icons this philosophical
commitment was in the background: we do not start from universals and work our way to
the particular. We start from the particular and see how the individual instantiates more
universal and common things like species and such. John does not restrict the term
ὑπόστασις to humans. He applies it across the board to all individual creatures.
Second Treatise

Though John used large parts of his first treatise to complete the second, there are
some significant differences between the two. John stated that he wished to simplify his
arguments. But he does more than this. In the first ten chapters, John argued that Satan
invented idolatry, which had special power over Jewish people. John points to Exodus 32
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and 33, where a Jewish crowd melted down their precious metals and made idols for
themselves as Moses met God on Mount Sinai.319 Because Jews were prone to idolatry,
John argued, Moses had to legislate against making any images. Jewish people were “still
infants and ill with a diseased inclination to idolatry.”320 With the advent of Christ,
however, things change. Christians know that it is impossible to make an image of the
invisible God and also know that the Creator alone is due worship.
John goes on to accuse the emperor and iconoclasts of Manichaeism. “You abuse
matter and call it worthless. So do the Manichees, but the divine Scripture proclaims that
it is good.”321 Scripture proclaims everything that God has created to be good. Since
“matter is something made by God” matter is also good, according to John.322 If the
emperor wants to call matter evil, he would need to say that God did not create it, or else
say that God creates evil. Even Moses knew that matter was good and could be honored
when he took up a free-will offering of “gold, silver, bronze, aquamarine, porphyry,
scarlet twill and twisted flax and goat’s hair and rams’ skin dyed red and spices for
incense and carnelians and precious stones for engraving and for the shoulder-piece and
the robe.”323 Therefore, John said, Christians can honor matter by veneration.
But John once again brings the Incarnation into the argument as the most
powerful example. Quoting John 1:14—“For the Word became flesh and dwelt among
us”—John states, “It is clear to all, that flesh is matter and is a creature.”324 Because the
Son took on a body of flesh, which is matter and created, John says he reverences matter.
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Moreover, the cross, the holy places, the “ink and parchment” of the Gospels, the
Eucharist table, and the bread and wine of the Eucharist are all matter. The Law was for
the Jews. The Incarnation changed things.
Yet in the Tanak, according to John, God made an image and showed images.
God made humans in the image of God. But God also used images to reveal Godself.
“Abraham and Moses and Isaias and all the prophets saw images of God and not the very
being of God. The [burning] bush is an image of the Divine Mother, and God said to
Moses when he was about to approach it, ‘Loose the sandals of your feet, for the ground,
on which you stand, is holy ground.’ If, therefore, the ground on which the image of the
Mother of God was seen by Moses is holy ground, how much more is the image
itself?”325
Yet John once again falls into an anti-Jewish polemic, stating that Moses forbade
Jews to make images. “Moses, on account of the hardness of heart of the sons of Israel,
ordered them not to make images, for he knew their tendency to slip into idolatry.” But
things have changed since the Incarnation and Christians “stand securely on the rock of
faith enriched by the light of the knowledge of God.”326 In this second treatise defending
icons, John has a much more thoroughgoing anti-Jewish polemic as well as a more
developed anti-Manichaean argument than he did in the first. Even John’s argument from
the Incarnation takes on an anti-Jewish tone in this second treatise.

325
326

Ibid., 2.20, p. 75–76.
Ibid., 2.20, p. 76.

145
Third Treatise

The third treatise differs from the previous two in structure and format. It is a
slightly more “systematic” presentation. In the first ten chapters of this treatise, John
reproduces large sections from his second treatise. These sections vehemently argue that
Christianity superseded Judaism. John then recounts his anthropology: humans, being
body and soul, stand midway between heaven and earth. Based on this anthropology,
John surmises that Christian faith mediates between heaven and earth.327
Repeating from his first Treatise, John says, “We see images in created things
intimating to us dimly reflections of the divine; as when we say that there is an image of
the holy Trinity, which is beyond any beginning, in the sun, its light and ray, or in a
fountain welling up and the stream flowing out and the flood, or in our intellect and
reason and spirit, or a rose, its flower and its fragrance.”328 These statements lead John to
claim that God was the first maker of images. He develops at length his brief statement
from the second treatise that God made and used images in the Tanak.
The Father “begat” the Son, “his living and natural image.”329 Here he grounds
images in the Trinity. From this eternal image, God made humans. God also used images
in the theophanies. Jacob wrestled with God, who appeared like a human. Moses saw
God but only as a “human back.” Isaiah saw God as like a human seated on a throne.
Daniel too saw God in the likeness of a human. But none of these prophets saw God’s
nature. They only saw an image of the Son who would later become incarnate. Daniel
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and Jacob saw an angelic being, and they venerated the angel. But “God did not become
an angel, but in nature and truth God became a human being.”330
Humans partake in the divine nature in ways that angels cannot, according to
John, because humans consume the Eucharist. The bread and wine become the body and
blood of the Son. This hypostatic union allows those who consume the bread and wine to
“share in the two natures, in the body in a bodily manner, and in the divinity spiritually,
or rather in both in both ways, not that we have become identical [with God]
hypostatically (for we first subsisted, and then we were united), but through assimilation
with the Body and Blood.”331 In this way, Christians are “images” of the Son in ways that
are not open to other creatures.
John’s Eschatological Vision

One of John’s most powerful statements has to do with his claim that the Word
became matter and a creature by becoming flesh. In the Incarnation God overcomes the
most fundamental ontological distinction: that between God and all creatures. John uses
this argument to defend the use of images of Jesus, Mary, and the saints in Christians
worship.
However, John does not argue the fuller significance of his own argument at least
partly because he falls into anti-Jewish polemic. In the first treatise John speaks
disparagingly about how Jewish people have adorned their temples and synagogues with
“cherubim and phoenixes both inside and out . . . and also oxen and lions and
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pomegranates.”332 But Christian churches have “much more valuable” images because
Christian churches are “adorned with the forms and images of saints, rather than animals
and trees.”333
What John misses is the Jewish eschatological vision that might undergird such
images in Jewish worship. For example, a synagogue in Meroth (in Galilee) had a mosaic
installed on its hall floor in the early seventh century. The central panel depicts a scene
with a wolf and a lamb along with a quotation in Hebrew of Isaiah 65:25: “The wolf and
the lamb shall graze together.”334
In addition to the creation-wide peace vision from the Isaiah 11 and 65, Jews
sometimes depicted peace between and with nonhuman animals in other ways that were
equally messianic and eschatological. For instance, a synagogue in Gaza-Maiumas
installed a floor mosaic between 508–509 CE that depicts a huge lion bowing its head
before the King David playing his harp. Nearby, a cobra peaks up its head to watch the
psalmist.335 Next to the lion and cobra stands a giraffe. Giraffes, according to Moshe
Barasch, were widely seen as “particularly tame and peaceful” and highlight the
peaceableness of the scene as it stands next to an otherwise carnivorous lion and
venomous snake.336 In the original mosaic there were likely other animals listening to
David play the lyre, but the damaged mosaic now only shows these three.

332

Ibid., 1.20, p. 33.
Ibid.
334
Rachel Hachlili, Ancient Synagogues—Archaeology and Art: New Discoveries and Current
Research (Boston: Brill, 2013), 421.
335
The date is firmly fixed by an inscription in the mosaic that dates the piece. See Paul Corby
Finney, “Orpheus-David: A Connection in Iconography between Greco-Roman Judaism and Early
Christianity,” Journal of Jewish Art 5 (1978): 6.
336
Moshe Barasch, “Animal Metaphors of the Messianic Age: Some Ancient Jewish Imagery,” in
Visible Religion, Vol. 4–5 (Leiden: Brill, 1985–86), 242. A good image of the mosaic can be seen in
Hachlili, Ancient Synagogues, 416.
333

148
Likewise, Jews at Dura Europos, a city destroyed in 256 CE, depicted King David
as bringing a creation-wide peace to the world. In the middle of the synagogue, the
congregation installed a mosaic that depicts King David playing a harp. Again, in the
surviving mosaic nonhuman animals surround him and listen to the music. A lion and a
dove are the only two that scholars can surely identify, but that is enough to see the role
that nonhuman animals played in Jewish art and imagination sometimes.337 The scholarly
consensus is that Jews had recast King David as an Orpheus-like character who could
tame wild creatures by playing music. In the background to the art is the Jewish
messianic and eschatological hope for a creation-wide restoration and peace.338
Jews not only depicted nonhuman animals as part of an eschatological vision but
also painted nonhuman animals to tell biblical stories. Noah’s ark and Daniel in the lion’s
den are stories that require nonhuman animals to tell the biblical stories in images.
Nonhuman animals also often appear next to depictions of the Torah in panels, which
may also reflect some eschatological hope that when the Torah is fulfilled the earth will
be transformed.
Though John of Damascus derides Jews for depicting nonhuman creatures in their
places of worship, such images were in fact not uncommon in Christian churches either.
For example, the Church of the Acropolis at Ma’in, Jordan, installed a floor mosaic
around 719–720 CE. Though only portions of the original scene now survive, the mosaic
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depicted a lion and a zebu (a type of ox) near a tree. Inscribed in Greek above the scene is
Isaiah 11:7: καὶ λέων καὶ βοῦς ἅµα φάγονται ἄχυρα (“And the lion shall eat straw like the
ox”). Michele Piccirillo maintains that this scene depicts “the messianic reign of peace as
foretold by Isaiah and thought to have been realized by Christ.”339 At least four other
mosaics on church floors survive that explicitly depict Isaiah 11:6–8 and its creation-wide
peace vision where predator and prey gather in harmony, leading archaeologist Rachel
Hachlili to the conclusion that “This group of mosaics shows episodes in which pairs of
animals that are acknowledged enemies are peacefully portrayed; they are depicted facing
each other, accompanied by the inscribed verses of Isaiah 11:6 or Isaiah 65:25; the scene
apparently illustrates biblical verses relating and emphasizing peace on earth. This is an
unusual rendition, expressing a conceptual perception of a messianic vision of peace
rather than a biblical story.”340
Likewise, Christians depicted biblical stories such as Jonah and the whale, Noah’s
ark, Daniel in the lion’s den, and Adam naming the animals in Genesis 2. Jonah and the
whale is by far the most popular early Christian story for images, followed by the story of
Noah’s ark.341Adam naming the animals, for example, is depicted in the North Church in
Haouarté, Syria, which installed a mosaic somewhere between 486 and 502 CE. The
mosaic is mostly destroyed but what survives depicts Adam surrounded by birds, snakes,
a lion, a phoenix, and a griffon all of whom he gives names (Gen 2:19–20).342 Adam
naming the animals is also beautifully depicted on an early fifth-century Christian
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diptych. Lions, a leopard, a wild boar, an elephant, a donkey, a mountain goat, a stag, a
doe, a bull, a snake, a lizard, a grasshopper, a fox, an eagle, and a small bird surround
Adam, whose right hand gestures in such a way as to indicate naming them. At the
bottom of the frame, four rivers flow through the garden.343
In addition, two persons of the Trinity—the Son and Holy Spirit—have often
been depicted as or with nonhuman animals. The single most popular way to depict the
Holy Spirit was as a dove. This image appears in numerous Christian images ranging
from early catacombs to later carvings of Jesus’s baptism.344 Moreover, Jesus was often
depicted in ways that required other animals. In the catacombs and in later art Jesus was
often depicted as the Good Shepherd, bringing home a lamb that was lost and carrying
her on his shoulders.345 Another popular image for Jesus was to depict him as Orpheus, as
Jews did with King David. In these depictions, Jesus plays music to nonhuman animals,
pleasing and taming them.346 Yet another widely popular and very ancient way to depict
Jesus was to substitute an image of a lamb for the human Jesus. This way of depicting
Jesus drew directly from the Gospel of John, where John the Baptist declares Jesus to be
“the Lamb of God” (John 1:29, 36; see also Rev 5:6, 12; 12:11; and 22:1).347
John of Damascus missed these ways of depicting nonhuman animals not only to
tell a biblical story but also to depict an eschatological hope for the renewal of all
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creatures, including nonhuman animals, and even to depict the Incarnation and the Holy
Spirit. To be sure, the Damascene thought it was acceptable to depict any creature: “we
can make images of everything with a visible shape.” Only the divine nature is unable to
be rendered into an image.348 Yet it is the realm of the saints and images of Jesus that he
thought are the high and proper form of iconography. Depicting nonhuman creatures is a
“Jewish” and “infantile” thing.349
For John, God could not become creation in general. God became a particular
hypostasis. God became a human. But John did not emphasize the particular enough. God
became a male, Jewish human, and, as I will argue in the following chapters, these have
special importance for how we interpret Jesus’s humanity. Just as God could not become
creation in general, so too God could not become “humanity” in general but had to
instantiate a particular hypostasis within a particular time and place and amongst a
particular people. John does mention that Jesus came from the “tribe of Judah,” but this is
within a discussion of his being born from Mary and having fully human and fully divine
natures hypostatically united into one person.350 He gave no attention at all to the
significance of Jesus’s Jewishness. He used the fact of his birth to show his full humanity
and to defend a Chalcedonian Christology. But Jesus was a Jewish person within a
tradition that looked toward a time when peace will run so deep that even lions, bears,
wolves, and other predators will experience a transformation in their bodies to be able to
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eat the lush vegetation God provides. Deer and lambs will no longer fear being killed and
eaten. Humans and nonhuman animals will be able to live at peace with and unafraid of
one another.
Nonhuman Animals and Rationality

However, John excluded nonhuman animals from eschatological renewal by
denying that they could experience resurrection because they do not have “rational
souls.”351 Human beings are rational mortal animals who die when their souls separate
from their bodies. Nonhuman animals are irrational and simply die without the hope of
resurrection. For this reason, humans who lack knowledge and who act contrary to reason
are worse off than nonhuman animals because they will burn in hell forever rather than
simply dying like the irrational animals.352 But nonhuman animals do not share in the
resurrection because they do not have rational souls; they simply die without hope for a
new life in God.
The purpose of nonhuman animals on this earth is to serve humans in various
capacities. Because humans are rational and are microcosms of the created order who
image God on earth, humans should “rule like kings” over other creatures. According to
the Damascene, God created everything for human use: “At the Creator’s command there
came forth every sort of animal: creeping things, and wild beasts, and cattle. Everything
was for the suitable use of man. Of the animals, some were food, such as deer, sheep,

351
352

Ibid., 4.27.
Ibid.

153
horses, asses, and the like; still others for diversion, such as monkeys and such birds as
magpies, parrots, and the like.”353
For John of Damascus, nonhuman animals are good because they participate in
the Creator’s goodness: “all things participate in His goodness by the fact that they have
being.”354 In the Damascene’s view, the Christian doctrine of creation also includes
God’s continued providential care. By God’s activity “all things are sustained and held
together by the power of the Creator.”355 Following John’s logic about creation and
providence, if nonhuman animals have inherent goodness by the mere fact that they exist
and participate in God’s goodness and sustaining care, then it follows that God is also
concerned for their continued well-being as Scripture repeatedly attests (for example, Ps
104; Job 38–39; and Matt 6:26). God cares about these creatures who even in John of
Damascus’s view can feel physical and emotional pain and suffering. It follows from
John’s own view of creation, providence, and his limited view of what other animals are
capable of (sentience), that a loving God would want them to flourish and lead joyous
lives rather than to suffer. Therefore, even if John of Damascus were right that animals
simply die without hope for resurrection and eschatological renewal, then it would seem
all the more prudent for humans to make their short and hopeless lives as good as
possible in our “kingly” rule. It would seem that Genesis 1:29–30, where God tells
humans to eat a plant-based diet ,would be the best way to ensure this. Ignoring the
Genesis passage does not really do justice to God’s good creatures.
John of Damascus’s argument seems to be that because nonhuman animals lack
rationality this proves that they do not have souls, which is the basis for the kind of
353

Ibid., 2.10.
John of Damascus, Orthodox Faith, 4.13
355
Ibid., 2.10.
354

154
immortality necessary to participate in eschatological renewal and resurrection. But if
eschatological renewal is a gift from God every bit as much as creation itself, then Jesus’s
reconciling and redeeming work is the deciding factor of resurrection, not any natural
human possession or attribute.
Moreover, the Damascene unjustly denies souls to nonhuman animals. Even on
the basis of Aristotle, upon whom John draws heavily, nonhuman animals have irrational
souls, but souls nonetheless. The kind of soul a creature has does not necessarily dictate
whether they participate in the resurrection and eschatological renewal. There is plenty in
the Jewish and Christian traditions to argue for nonhuman animal souls. 2 Enoch 58, for
example, claims that not only do nonhuman animals have souls, but also on Judgment
Day they will accuse humans for the things we have done to them. Furthermore,
Ecclesiastes 3:19–21 says, “For the fate of humans and the fate of animals is the same; as
one dies, so dies the other. They all have the same breath, and humans have no advantage
over the animals; for all is vanity. All go to one place; all are from the dust, and all turn to
dust again. Who knows whether the human spirit goes upward and the spirit of animals
goes downward to the earth?”356
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John of Damascus certainly understood that Jesus’s particularity matters. But he
abstracted the Incarnation from Jesus’s actual particularity. His Jesus was not Jewish.
Because of this the Damascene does not emphasize the particular enough. His anti-Jewish
polemics reflect a lack of understanding of just how important particularity is. His
particularity is against some people and creatures rather than being for them. His Jesus is
less of a light for the nations (Isa 49:6) and more of a polemic against the nations: nations
here including human and nonhuman creatures.
Conclusion

In this chapter I have looked at some patristic uses of the notion of the Word
becoming flesh. Many patristic authors, I argued, used this notion within an apologetic
polemic. Their purpose was to demonstrate that Jesus’s humanity was real. He had a
physical body and was not a mere phantom. Nor was Jesus a “ghost in a machine” in that
his divinity somehow filled his body like air fills a balloon. While these apologetics were
necessary to defend the goodness of creation as a whole, these uses seem to have
impeded more constructive theological ideas that could expand the idea of “flesh” to
more than just humans. Yet the kernel for this move is already present in these authors as
they argue for the goodness of creation based on Jesus’s physical body.
Athanasius and John of Damascus are the theologians who began to take John
1:14 in new and creative directions beyond apologetics. Their use of the Incarnation can
broaden our understanding of the doctrine so as to include other creatures. I chose them
because they explicitly speak about the Incarnation in its particularity as having creationwide implications and provide a way to speak that draws upon John 1:14.
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For Athanasius, the Incarnation is best seen within an ontological divide between
the Creator and creation. The first significance, then, is that the Son overcomes this
ontological divide in order to deify all creatures and renew all to its intended purpose of
communion with God. So he speaks about the Word becoming “matter” and the Son
taking on a “body” well before he speaks about the Word becoming human.
Giving priority to the rest of creation is a crucial move in Athanasius because the
Word becomes human specifically because humans sinned. Our disobedience has left us
far from God moving in the direction of nothingness, which is not fitting for God’s good
creatures. Our sin has wreaked havoc on the rest of creation, and coming to humans is a
way to restore humanity to its rightful place in communion with God. Through Jesus all
creation will be restored. Jesus Christ, in this view, had universal significance by
becoming the basic building blocks of all creation.
Yet Athanasius largely ignored what this might mean for nonhuman animals. He
focused on Christ’s redemption of humanity from the bondage of sin. He never really
looked at what this might mean in terms of eschatological renewal for all creation, but
given his debt to Irenaeus, who explicitly taught that creation as we know it would be
renewed rather than recreated, and a great sign of this renewal would be peace between
nonhuman animals, it would not be a stretch to say that he probably envisioned Isaiah’s
peaceable kingdom in a similar way. Humans would be the first fruits of this creationwide peace, but the Incarnation is not limited to humans. Precisely in the Word becoming
a particular creature to restore us from our lostness to communion with God, the Word
takes up all the rest.
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We begin to see this view come forward when he encountered the desert fathers
and mothers in his later years. In his later writings Athanasius comes to a more
Trinitarian account of the Incarnation, where he could advocate a specific discipline and
attitude toward all other animal creatures based on a prayerful life of learning about one’s
own self-centeredness and turning toward the other.
Yet his anti-Jewish polemics abstract Jesus from the particularity within which he
moved and breathed. By switching from the biblical language of the Word became
“flesh” to statements about the Word becoming “matter” Athanasius abstracted the
Incarnation out of its deep connections to nonhuman animals and the Jewish story
connecting all creatures. Instead he opts to speak about large “bodies” like planets and
stars, and does not indicate that humans and other creatures are interdependent in the way
Hebrew Scripture does. By ignoring Jesus’s Jewishness, Athanasius impoverished his
Christology and theology of the Incarnation, making it less helpful than it might
otherwise have been for modern theologians.
John of Damascus, likewise, speaks eloquently about creation participating in
God’s goodness. He developed the idea of God becoming matter in some helpful ways
when it came to defending the goodness of creation for pointing people toward God.
Icons are literally made of the earthy “stuff” that so many iconoclasts explicitly despised,
and that very “stuff” made up the body of Jesus Christ as it does every other creature.
But John did not see how this view might translate into a more robust account of
other creatures. Instead, he mimics his critics at times by dismissing depictions of other
animals as “Jewish” infantile behavior, ignoring contemporary Christian practices and
robust Jewish eschatology. The Incarnation, for the Damascene was largely cut off from
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the Gospel stories and from Jewish eschatology. Once again, an early Christian
theologian stands as a warning to all of us who would develop a theology for creation and
nonhuman animals more specifically: we ignore Jesus’s Jewish particularity at our own
peril.
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CHAPTER 3
THE WORD BECAME JEWISH

In the first chapter I examined the idea stressed by Andrew Linzey, David
Clough, Elizabeth Johnson, Niels Gregersen, and others (each in his or her own way),
that the “flesh” the Word becomes has roots in the Tanak, connecting the Incarnation to
nonhuman animals in particular. Throughout the New Testament, when statements are
made about the Word becoming flesh there is a larger-than-human purview that connects
to a long story within Jewish tradition. So taking on human flesh is not necessarily an act
that privileges humanity over other creatures.
In the second chapter I looked at two prominent patristic theologians who took up
the idea of the Word becoming flesh. Athanasius and John of Damascus took the idea
from the Gospel of John and used it in more philosophical ways, often disconnected from
the rich Jewish tradition. They spoke of the Word becoming “matter.” But flesh is not
matter. The switch in terminology reflected a shift away from human connection to other
animals at the same time that it reflected a de-Judaizing of the Incarnation. It is possible
the two shifts are connected given how Jewish people have historically been depicted as
“beastly.” The second chapter, therefore, stands as a kind of historical warning to
theologians to work through the Incarnation’s particularities rather than pass them by
quickly or outright dismiss them as unimportant.
The Incarnation is specific. The Son became a Jewish, male human who lived in
first-century Palestine. Do any of these specific aspects mean that we must limit the
Incarnation’s significance to only specific groups? The scandal of particularity—
especially the Son’s humanity—seems to preclude including nonhuman creatures as
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important for Christian faith. But my argument is that the Incarnation’s particularity
opens up room for nonhuman creatures. This claim seems so counterintuitive that most
theologians working on the issue have emphasized Christ’s cosmic lordship over Christ’s
humanity.
What significance for Christian life and doctrine, for example, does the fact that
Jesus was Jewish have for Christian life? Did Jesus only come to save Jewish people or,
at best, those who undergo conversion into the Jewish life and rituals (Matt 15:21–28)? In
his monumental, two-book theological anthropology, Eccentric Existence, David Kelsey
has no major reflection on Jesus’s Jewishness. One of Kelsey’s concerns in the work is to
counter a tendency in Christian theology to view humans as superior to other creatures.357
Yet Jesus’s Jewishness seems to have no role to play in Kelsey’s admirable endeavor.
Likewise, David Clough, concerned to expand our view of the Incarnation in
relation to nonhuman animals, claims: “even within the New Testament canon, the
church argued about the significance of the Jewishness of Jesus Christ and of his
disciples, but it eventually came to the conclusion that the religious identity of the
incarnate God should not be construed as defining a boundary of salvation.”358 With this
one statement on Jewishness, Clough moves on to broader concerns. Clough states his
case negatively: “the religious identity of the incarnate God should not be construed as
defining a boundary of salvation.” However, the New Testament Church, including the
apostle Paul, concluded that it is precisely through the Jews and through Jesus’s
Jewishness that non-Jews can be part of God’s salvation. Gentiles are “grafted” onto the
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vine already growing, according to Paul (Rom 11:17).359 While the New Testament
church did eventually conclude that Jesus’s Jewishness does not exclude non-Jews,
Clough may overlook ways in which Jewish particularity helps to make the case for
expanding our view of the Incarnation in a positive manner.
The Fluid Boundaries of Jewish/Christian Identity

The first thing modern readers have to wrestle with in the question about whether
Jesus’s Jewishness offers a positive impact on a theology of the Incarnation in
relationship to nonhuman animals, however, is the notion that the boundaries between
Jew and Christian in the first three centuries were fluid. They were not a binary
opposition. Daniel Boyarin writes, for example, that “the evidence that we have for the
presence of Christians and other sectarians in the synagogue and the efforts of the Rabbis
to detect them and prevent them from serving as precentors suggests that the problem of
‘Who is a Jew?’ was as fraught for the Rabbis as the question of ‘Who is orthodox?’ was
for the Christians. Jerome’s important notice that the sect of Nazarenes are to be found
‘in all of the synagogues of the East among the Jews’ and that they consider themselves
‘neither Christians nor Jews,’ is highly revealing.”360 Boyarin notes that the
Jewish/Christian schism was a later split read back into early Jewish history in the first
centuries CE. For the first several hundred years (or more) a person did not necessarily
359
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have to leave the synagogue if he or she believed that Jesus was the Messiah. Boyarin
quotes Jerome in full noting that Jerome acknowledged that the Nazarenes who were
neither Jew nor Christian in Jerome’s mind could confess the Nicene Creed sincerely. But
the mere fact that they worshiped in synagogues disqualified them from Christianity in
this post-Nicene faith.361 The question about Jesus’s particularity, therefore, is not about a
binary between Judaism and Christianity, which are later constructions. Jesus’s particular
faith and culture relate to the relationship between Jews and Gentiles. The question of
how Jesus’s Jewishness may expand or constrict our understanding of the Incarnation
relates to the particular way in which Jewish-Christian faith envisioned the good life and
embodied that vision within the context of an ever-expanding Gospel from Jewish people
to Gentiles. This particular vision may point us toward ways we can include nonhuman
animals in our theological reflections.
A further preliminary caution relates to how we conceptualize Jewishness. It is
important not to homogenize Jewish people. Of the many expressions of Jewish faith,
Jesus seems to have embodied some particular ways and not others. Scholars do not agree
about what kind of Jew Jesus was. Second Temple Judaism had at least twenty different
types, including baptist groups (e.g., John the Baptist); Essenes; Pharisees; Qumranites;
scribes; various armed revolutionary movements; and many other groups.362 And, of
course, each of these groupings had still further differences within themselves in beliefs
and behaviors. Scholars still debate whether Jesus had more or less affinities with some
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of these groups. Perhaps Jesus and his disciples represented their own particular brand of
Jewish life and adopted ideas and practices from a variety of Jewish people as they saw
fit rather than fitting into any preconceived mold.363
Jesus’s Eschatological Messianism

The particular strand of Jewish faith and life that Jesus embodied may have more
to do with a trajectory than a particular sect within Jewish faith. John Howard Yoder
thought that Jesus lived out a particular vision of Jewish life that had large ramifications
for interfaith dialogue as well as our ethical vision for the faithful life.364
It was the Jewishness of Jesus, the rootage of His message in the particular
heritage of Abraham, Moses, and Jeremiah, which as we have seen made it good
news for the whole world. There were other peace philosophers and peace
prophets in the Ancient Near East. Only the Jewish world vision, effective in
Jochanan and the entire stream of nonZealot rabbinism which he catalyzed, could
make of accepting powerlessness not only a viable compromise but an identity, to
make Jewry, beyond the collapse of the Jerusalem polity, into a new kind of
culture viable without a state. Only the Jew Jesus, by announcing and
accomplishing the fulfillment of God’s promises to the Jews, could send out into
the world a people of peace open to the Gentiles. Only the Jewish claim that the
one true God, known to Abraham’s children through their history, was also the
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Creator and sustainer of the other peoples as well, could enable mission without
provincialism, cosmopolitan vision without empire.365
For Yoder, because Jesus was enmeshed in the Hebrew Scriptures and Jewish
tradition—out of all the other possibilities through time and space—his life, death, and
resurrection have universal relevance; the Jewish trajectory he embodied expands to
include everyone. Yoder wanted to avoid a supercessionist understanding of Christianity
vis-à-vis Judaism and did not want to use Jesus’s particularity to exclude categories of
people.366 We are unable to dismiss Jews as irrelevant after Jesus. For Yoder, the Hebrew
Bible includes many different voices that generally point in a particular direction: trust
God for leadership; do not put trust in any single human ruler; avoid the nations’ ideas of
power and responsibility, which leads God’s people to unfaithfulness; embrace humble
service as a posture of global witness; and accept diasporic existence as God’s missional
stance toward the world.367 This particular vision for God’s people culminates with
Jesus’s ministry and the Holy Spirit scattering the disciples.368 The New Testament starts
with a particular story rooted in God’s relationship to a particular people.
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This particular people has a particular task according to this vision: to be a “light
to the nations” (Isa 49:6). At first this mission was passive: the prophets and even the
early church in Acts expected the Gentile nations to come to Jerusalem to learn how to
make peace and to follow the Torah. The nations would learn justice from Israel by
coming to Israel. Johannes Blauw has deemed this view a “centripetal” view of missions
because of the expectation that non-Jewish people would come to Israel.369 By their
peaceful way of life in which everybody prospered and treated each other as equals
(nobody ruled over anybody else like the Gentile kings), Israel would attract attention.
They would be a lighthouse in a dark and stormy night so that people could find their
way safely. By simply following God’s law, Israel would be an attractive example that
other nations could follow and in this way other nations could learn what it means to be
God’s creatures.
From early on, therefore, Jewish Scripture narrates Jewish particularity and
mission as related to the Gentiles. The Jewish mission was to tell the Gentiles who they
are: God’s creatures, created in God’s image to love and serve others, not to dominate
them. Jews would communicate this divine love by their very existence, first and
foremost. Once their lifestyle and politics attracted attention, people would come to learn
more. At that point, so it seems, Jews could speak about the God who led them out of
slavery and set up this just and peaceable society.
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According to Yoder’s reading, the first-century community had this centripetal
view of missions as well. Acts consistently narrates the early Jewish messianic believers
as refusing to go beyond their borders, expecting an in-gathering instead. They never
planned to go out to the nations. They did not set up missionary organizations. They did
not have missionary strategy meetings on how to reach the whole world. Instead, the
Holy Spirit pushed the early messianic Jews out of their comfort zones, despite their own
resistance. It is at this point that the Jewish messianic mission to be a “light to the
nations” takes on its full implications where Jewish believers would live amongst
Gentiles as communities of peace and justice that followed God’s way in Jesus, attracting
their neighbors by their lives. They were to live in the messianic age that Jesus had
inaugurated, as colonies of peace in a world of violence. These early followers knew that
their community was imperfect and that conflicts and other such things would arise. But
they chose not to handle the conflicts with violence. Paul gave up violence as a way to
resolve inner Jewish disputes and became one of the leading advocates for the new
community. The community would be imperfect, but it would be a sign of the fuller
manifestation that they expected when Jesus would return. The community, therefore,
was marked by an eschatological character that moves from Jesus’s particularity to God’s
presence to and with other humans. This is how Yoder describes Jesus’s eschatological
messianism and the political community that witnesses to it.370
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By focusing exclusively on human-on-human violence, however, Yoder ignored
the way in which the Jewish eschatological vision has far more significance than political
peace amongst humans who are in conflict with each other. Limiting the Incarnation to
one particular creature is just as provincial as limiting it to Jews. God is not only the God
of “other peoples as well,” as Yoder states, but as Job and many Scriptural passages make
clear, God is God of other animals and ultimately of all creation. Yoder uses Isaiah’s
peaceable kingdom vision from Isaiah 2:2–4, which speaks of nations beating their
“swords into plowshares” and refusing to study war any longer.
Nowhere in his published writings does Yoder use Isaiah’s more expansive,
creation-wide vision in Isaiah 11, which says “The wolf shall live with the lamb, the
leopard shall lie down with the kid, the calf and the lion and the fatling together, and a
little child shall lead them. The cow and the bear shall graze, their young shall lie down
together; and the lion shall eat straw like the ox. The nursing child shall play over the
hole of the asp, and the weaned child shall put its hand on the adder’s den. They will not
hurt or destroy on all my holy mountain; for the earth will be full of the knowledge of the
Lord as the waters cover the sea” (Isa 11:6–9). Nor does Yoder use the shorter creationwide statement in Isaiah 65:25: “The wolf and the lamb shall feed together, the lion shall
eat straw like the ox; but the serpent—its food shall be dust! They shall not hurt or
destroy on all my holy mountain, says the Lord.”371 For Yoder, Jesus’s expansive peace-
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vision only includes our relationship with other humans. He completely ignores biblical
and extra-canonical precedents for peaceableness with other creatures.
But Isaiah’s expansive vision for peace has been important for some Jewish
people. In chapter 2 I noted several congregations that had decorated their synagogues
with imagery from Isaiah’s peaceable kingdom vision. Additionally, the Jewish Targum
adds a new clause to the beginning of Isaiah 11:6, which reads, “In the days of the
messiah of Israel peace shall be multiplied in the land,” clearly connecting the creationwide peaceable kingdom vision to messianic hopes.372 The Septuagint translates the
Hebrew in 11:6, which claims that the wolf will “live” with the lamb, as the wolf will
“graze” with the lamb. The image of a wolf having a vegetarian diet clearly hearkens
back to Genesis 1, in which God’s intention for creation was peaceable existence among
all animals. But the Greek is in the future tense; clearly looking forward to a time when
the Messiah will bring increased peace across the entire creation.
Isaiah’s vision inspired other such peace visions in which nonhuman animals
lived in a state of peaceableness. For example, the Third Book of the Sibylline Oracles
(163–45 BCE) states, “Wolves and lambs will eat grass together in the mountains.
Leopards will feed together with kids. Roving bears will spend the night with calves. The
flesh-eating lion will eat husks at the manger like an ox, and mere infant children will
lead them with ropes. For he will make the beasts on earth harmless. Serpents and asps
will sleep with babies and will not harm them, for the hand of God will be upon them.”373
Philo, writing in the first century CE, also depicted a peaceable kingdom vision in which
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nonhuman animals would live at peace with one another, and humans would give up war
and domination of other animals. Philo describes a future where
bears, and lions, and leopards, and those beasts which are found only in India,
elephants and tigers, and all other animals whose courage and strength are
invincible, will change from their solitary and unsociable habits, and adopt a more
gregarious life, and, by a gradual imitation of those animals which live in troops,
will become softened and accustomed to the sight of men, being no longer in a
constant state of excitement and fury against him, but rather feeling awe of him as
their ruler and natural master, and will behave with proper respect to him; and
some of them, with an exceeding greatness of tameness and affection for their
master, like Maltese dogs, will even fawn upon them and wag their tails with a
cheerful motion. Then the species of scorpions, and serpents, and other reptiles
will keep their venom inoperative; and the Egyptian river will produce those
animals, which are at present carnivorous and which feed on man, called
crocodiles and hippopotami, in a tame and gentle condition; and the sea too will
produce innumerable kinds of animals, among all of which the virtuous man will
be sacred and unhurt, since God honours virtue and has given it immunity from
all designs against it as a proper reward.374
Likewise, 2 Baruch, written in the first century CE after Jerusalem was destroyed,
imagined a time when there would be “eternal peace” that would entail not only the
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demise of disease and death, but peaceableness amongst people and with people and
nonhuman animals (2 Bar. 73).
Yoder clearly saw how the Jewish vision of the end should change human
relationships with one another into peaceable living. But he completely ignored a long
Jewish tradition in which the messianic age brought about a much wider peaceableness
that includes other animals. But the trajectories and patterns Yoder sees for an everwidening mission apply to a more expansive viewpoint that can include other animals.
The long tradition of interpreting Isaiah 11 in terms of eschatological peace
carried forward from early times through the Middle Ages to the modern era. Some
interpreters have seen the verses are purely figurative. Ibn Ezra (1089–1164 CE), for
example, commenting on Isaiah 11:6 states that “This is a metaphor for peace that will
reign in his time.”375 Likewise, Moses Maimonides (1138–1204 CE) interpreted the
passage as an allegory for the world peace that would reign in the messianic era. The
lions and other dangerous animals represented wicked people who would no longer harm
other people.376 However, Maimonides allegorizes the animals by making them human.
This allegorizing is part of a process of animal erasure that comes into Judaism and
Christianity over time. The same applies to Ibna Ezra. By contrast, Saadia Gaon (882–
942 CE) interpreted Isaiah 11 in such a way as to deny that the messianic age had come
since not only do nations still war against each other but predators still kill other animals
to survive: there has been no change in their nature as the messianic age promises.377
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Rabbi Nahmanides (1194–1270 CE) and Isaac Abravanel (1437–1508 CE) also interpreted
Isaiah 11 as indicating that predators would be transformed into peaceable animals. So
the idea of a messianic creation-wide peaceable kingdom has a long and venerable
history in Jewish thought, though it weakens somewhat with some major medieval
figures. Nevertheless, God is the Creator and Redeemer of all creatures.
So one of the primary reasons that Jesus’s Jewishness matters is because the
particular Jewish view that God is Creator and Lord of all that exists—and that all that
exists is good—serves as the bedrock for considering ways to include nonhuman animals
and the rest of creation in the reconciling work that Jesus did in his life, death, and
resurrection. This view of God as Lord of “all flesh” fueled the Jewish sense of identity
as a “light to the nations” and is the particular vision that Jesus upheld, expanded, and
will ultimately bring to fulfillment. This particular vision always had a larger-than-human
purview and in particular saw peace amongst nonhuman animals and between humans
and nonhuman animals as a central aspect of the messianic age. The place of nonhuman
animals is therefore an important part of theological reflection. If we move too quickly
past Jesus’s particularity we miss how the eschatological character of Jesus’s particular
Jewish vision opens the door to creation-wide renewal, particularly amongst animal
creatures.
This eschatological peace is largely missing from deep Incarnation literature. And
when it is there, it is not there as a particularly Jewish stance. It is important to note that
this is Jesus’s specifically Jewish heritage because it is from this particular Jewish
vantage that we move to the more “cosmic” notions. If we take the position of a deep
Incarnation but start from Jesus of Nazareth’s particularity as a Jew, peace comes to the
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foreground. If we start with Stoicism, by contrast, an anti-animal view comes forward
very quickly. It is the Jewish community’s witness to the eschatological peace of the
Messiah that allows the rest of the world to see the universal in the particular.378
Jewish Visions of an Original Peace

Eschatological peaceableness is not the only aspect of Jewishness that we miss by
ignoring Jesus’s Jewishness. Jewish vision also pointed backward to the opening chapters
of Genesis. In the first chapter we find a depiction of a God who created all of creaturely
existence in an ordered fashion and does so by merely speaking. Biblical scholars
routinely point to the Babylonian context within which Genesis 1 arose. The text of
Genesis stands in stark contrast to the violent creation narratives Jews would have
encountered at that time. For instance, the Babylonian myth Enuma Elish depicts a
struggle amongst the gods, who are the offspring of Apsu and Tiamat. The divine
children are too noisy for Apsu so he tries to kill all of them. But Apsu’s divine children
kill him first. Tiamat, upon learning of Apsu’s death, wages her own war against her
children. Finally, Marduk kills his mother Tiamat and uses her body to create the sky and
the earth. He caused the Euphrates and Tigris rivers to flow out of her body. He created
the mountains and established the bounds of creation. He goes on to create the sun, the
stars, and the moon from one half of her corpse and sets them in motion. Once Marduk is
enthroned as king of the gods, he kills Tiamat’s husband Kingu, and creates humans out
of Kingu’s blood: “Blood I will mass and cause bones to be. I will establish a savage,
378
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‘man’ shall be his name. Truly, savage-man I will create. He shall be charged with
service of the gods that they may be at ease.”379 Clearly there are direct parallels between
Genesis 1 and the Enuma Elish that strongly suggest the author of Genesis 1 used the
Enuma Elish.
The contrast, however, between Genesis 1 and the Enuma Elish creation myth
could hardly be starker. The gods of the Enuma Elish wage war on each other in a
competition of the strongest, whereas the God of Genesis has no rival with whom to wage
war. In the Babylonian tale, the universe results from war and violence, whereas all of
creaturely existence comes about by the mere word from God in Genesis. In the Enuma
Elish, humans come about as a result of divine violence for the purpose of working as
slaves for the gods. In Genesis, God creates humanity in God’s own image and lets them
be free. In short, the violence and oppression of the Enuma Elish is entirely absent from
Genesis. To the extent that the Hebrew Bible uses the struggle against chaos themes from
Babylonian culture, Jewish Scripture does so by depicting God as overcoming human
military might rather than struggling with creation per se.380 So God’s peaceable
relationship to the world is prior to and more fundamental than violence. In fact, the very
creatures that are often associated in Ancient Near Eastern creation myths with chaos and
violence such as dragons are, in the Genesis story, according to J. Richard Middleton,
“part of God’s peaceable kingdom.”381
This Jewish vision of an original peace, according to Middleton, has significant
implications for how we think about human actions within creation. There are
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implications for theological anthropology that I will develop in another chapter. But for
now, the vision of original peace is what I want to emphasize. This original peace is
perhaps most explicitly stated in Genesis 1:29–30: “God said, ‘See, I have given you
every plant yielding seed that is upon the face of all the earth, and every tree with seed in
its fruit; you shall have them for food. And to every beast of the earth, and to every bird
of the air, and to everything that creeps on the earth, everything that has the breath of life,
I have given every green plant for food.’ And it was so.” Carol J. Adams has noted that
the parallel structure of creation in Genesis culminates with these verses. That the parallel
ends with this peaceable intent reveals God’s intention for all animals to live at peace
with one another rather than in competition and violence.382
Jewish commentary on Genesis largely supports this interpretation of original
peace. The Babylonian Talmud reports that Rabbi Judah (d. 217 CE) said:
As to the first man, he was not permitted to eat meat. For it is written, “Therefore
I have given you all the herbs, to you it shall be for food and to all the beasts of
the earth” (Gen 1:29–30) — [herbs], and the beasts of the earth shall not be for
you [to eat]. And when the children of Noah came, [God] permitted [meat] to
them. For it is said, “[Every moving thing that lives shall be meat for you;] even
as the green herbs [now] have I given you all things” (Gen 9:3).383
Genesis Rabbah 34:13 claims something similar:

382

Carol J. Adams, “What about Dominion in Genesis?,” in A Faith Embracing All Creatures:
Addressing Commonly Asked Questions about Christian Care for Animals ed. Andy Alexis-Baker and
Tripp York (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2012), 4.
383
Bavli Sanhedrin, 59B. The edition I have worked from is The Talmud of Babylonia: An
American Translation XXIIIB: Tractate Sanhedrin Chapters 4–8, trans. Jacob Neusner (Chico, CA:
Scholars Press, 1984), 171.

175
“Every moving thing that lives shall be food for you. . . . Only you shall not eat
flesh with its life, that is, its blood” (Gen 9:3f). R. Yose b. R. Avin said in R.
Yohanan’s name: Adam, to whom flesh to satisfy his appetite was not permitted,
was not admonished against a limb torn from the living animal. But the children
of Noah, to whom flesh to satisfy their appetite was permitted, were admonished
against eating a limb torn from the living animal.384
While these passages support the idea of an original vision of peace that included
nonhuman animals, there are Midrashim that suggest an original peace in a different way.
In the Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 59B, one objection to the idea that Adam
was a vegetarian was the claim that the angels tossed meat down for him to consume: “R.
Judah b. Tema said: ‘The first man reclined in the Garden of Eden, and the ministering
angels roasted meat for him and strained wine for him.’”385 The text even suggests that
carnivorous animals like snakes and lions learned to eat flesh from watching all of this
because they were jealous. As long as Adam ate meat that came down from heaven and
not flesh from an animal he had killed, the consumption was acceptable. He had not
broken the peace.386
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Later commentators suggested that Adam was allowed to eat the flesh of
nonhuman animals as long as they died a natural death. Adam was not allowed to kill
nonhuman animals. Some later commentators even denied that nonhuman animals died
before humans sinned; therefore, Adam could not have eaten flesh. Even after the Fall
Adam was not permitted to eat animal flesh because that would have “rewarded” Adam
for his sin.
In most of these peace visions God did not create nonhuman animals for human
consumption. Most Jewish commentators believed that God created nonhuman animals to
serve humans. Genesis gives humans dominion over all nonhuman animals. “Were they
not created for naught else but to serve me?” opines Rabbi Simeon ben Eleazar.387 Rabbi
ben Eleazar’s comment comes within a larger discussion of what kind of work is
appropriate for a human, suggesting that his view was in line with others who thought
nonhuman animals were created to help humans with their work, but not necessarily for
food. Sanhedrin 59B relates an objection to the idea that Adam was a vegetarian, citing
Genesis 1:28 and the mandate to “rule over the fish of the sea.” The objector asks, “Is this
not for the purposes of eating?” The Rabbis reply, to the contrary, that dominion has to
do with labor and goes on to give some rather implausible example of how even fish
work for humans.388 But there were other views as well. For example, one sixteenthcentury commentator, Rabbi Judah Löw, wrote that God created nonhuman animals for
their own sake:
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Everything, like grasses and fruits, were created for the sake of animals, which are
flesh, for He gave them everything to eat, as the verse states, “I give you” etc.
From this you see that everything else was created for the animals, while the
animals were created in the world for their own sake. Even though animals serve
as food for human beings, this was not the case when the world was created, for
human beings were not permitted to kill an animal and eat it until the time of
Noah.389
The Babylonian Talmud tells a remarkable story about Rabbi Judah the Prince (d.
217 CE), a highly revered rabbi who edited the Mishnah. A calf that was being led to
slaughter ran to Rabbi Judah and hid under his robes, to which he responded, “Go your
way, for this is why you were created.” Because of his compassionless response to the
calf, heaven decreed that he should suffer bodily pain. He appealed to God’s mercy to
release him from the afflictions, which he suffered for thirteen years. The Prince of Judah
was only released from these sufferings when he prevented his housekeeper from
harming and evicting a few weasel kits she found hidden away.390 Because he showed
compassion for these helpless nonhuman animals he was shown mercy from heaven. This
story does not teach vegetarianism, but it does show a general teaching toward being
compassionate and not doing harm to other animals. Nothing could release this revered
rabbi from his afflictions—which resulted from action rooted in a theological view that
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nonhuman animals are created for humans—except an act of compassion toward
nonhuman animals.391
This vision of original and primal peace is integral to the Jewish notion of God.
From the depictions of the origins and intentions of God for creation to the prophetic
visions of creation’s telos, therefore, peaceable relationships among all animals is the
ideal and that peaceableness precludes devouring one another. This peaceableness was
already established as humanity comes on the scene according to Jewish Midrash on
Genesis 1. God in fact consulted with all the nonhuman animals to create humanity: “the
Creator therefore turned to the animals and said, ‘cooperate with me in forming a higher
being to whom each of you shall donate a desirable characteristic. . . . the tiger, courage;
the lion, bravery; the eagle, diligence, and so forth. Thus will man not only be akin to you
but will also represent the finest in you.’”392 This deep kinship with other animals meant
not only that other animals were invested in the flourishing of humanity, but also that
humanity was responsible for treating its nonhuman animal kin with respect and dignity,
which the Torah seeks to establish. If humanity were to be come “too pompous and
proud,” according to the Talmud, “he may be reminded that even the gnats preceded him
in the order of creation.”393
Jesus stands in this peaceable vision of origins. Nonhuman animals even helped to
create humanity as a reminder of their own best telos, according to some versions of the
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vision. Humanity is not to dominate but to live in harmony with other creatures. Without
a focus on his Jewishness and the particular way this ideal functions in Jewish life, which
I will detail in the next section, we miss important aspects of the Incarnation as they
relate to how we think about the Incarnation in relationship to creaturely life.
Deep Incarnation theologians focus on the ontology of the Incarnation: Jesus’s
body takes up all that “flesh” would signify and in the resurrection and ascension raises it
all up to the inner life of the Trinity. This is good. But the ontological focus is not always
well grounded in Scripture or a larger Jewish vision for peaceableness in creation. The
Word takes up a story, and that story, from beginning to the end, is about God’s peace.
The Incarnation, therefore, is a story of peaceableness primarily. When this relates to
nonhuman animals we see an eschatological renewal and an original intent of peaceable
action. By focusing squarely on an ontology divorced from the story, deep Incarnation
theologians can largely bypass the way this story points toward peaceable action and
living. It allows, in other words, a separation of ethics and theology.394 But the Jewish
story does not make this separation the way modern deep Incarnational theology seems to
do. The first chief rabbi of Palestine, Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook (1865–1935), says,
“Peace in all realms of being is the concern of the heritage of the Jewish people.”395 The
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commandments, Kook argues, helped people to bridle their lust for blood and
consumption and teach more positively respect for all life, with an ultimate vision of
peace between all animal creatures, starting with humans refusing to consume their
nonhuman animal kin.
Law and Sacrifice of Nonhuman Animals in Jewish Tradition

One of the greatest tragedies of Christianity is the way in which Christians have
dismissed Jewish laws as legalistic hindrances to the Gospel. In particular, Jewish laws
concerning human relationships to nonhuman animals of all sorts had vast ramifications
for how Jews lived in relationship to other creatures and these laws relate specifically to
the Jewish vision of foundational peaceableness. In the Talmud, Bava Mesia 32A–32B,
the principle of not causing animals to suffer is explicitly promoted (in Hebrew the
phrase is  ַצעַר ַבּ ֲעלֵי ַחיּ ִים, translated literally as “pain of living beings”). The law preventing
cruelty to nonhuman animals, moreover, is not simply an optional rabbinic law. Rather,
this law against causing animal suffering is based on the “authority of the Torah.” Laws
commanding Sabbath rest for nonhuman animals (Exod 20:10, 23:12; Deut 5–12) and
Proverbs exhorting the virtues of compassion toward animals (Prov 12:10) form the basis
for the rabbinic teaching. Moreover, Rebekah was chosen to be Isaac’s wife because she
showed kindness to camels (Gen 24:14–27). Jewish tradition holds that Moses was
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words, what characterizes Jewish habits is not he particular foods they eat but the ethical considerations
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chosen to lead God’s people from Egypt after helping women water their flocks in the
desert and later being compassionate to sheep (Exod 2:16–17):
When Moses our teacher was tending the flocks of Jethro in the wilderness, a
lamb scampered off, and Moses ran after it, until it approached a shelter under a
rock. As the lamb reached the shelter, it came upon a pool of water and stopped to
drink. When Moses caught up with it, he said, “I did not know you ran away
because you were thirsty. Now you must be tired.” So, he hoisted the lamb on his
shoulder and started walking back with it. The Holy One then said, “Because you
showed compassion in tending the flock of mortals, as you live, you shall become
shepherd of Israel, the flock that is Mine.”396
The rabbis go on to conclude that the law of not causing suffering to nonhuman animals
is so important that Jews are allowed to break other laws in order to avoid it, including
the Sabbath laws and ones governing the festivals (Yom Tov).397
What avoiding causing pain to animals means is that faithful Jews are obligated to
be concerned about the welfare of nonhuman animals; it is not an added “extra” to Jewish
life. In fact, one must be just as concerned with the well-being of their own animals as
those of Gentiles: “One must get involved with the condition of a beast belonging to a
gentile as much as one belonging to a Jew,” declares the Talmud.398 The rabbis claim that
even if the nonhuman animal belongs to an enemy and one sees it in distress, a faithful
Jew must relieve the nonhuman animal of its burdens and help her (based on Exod
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23:33–34). The well-being of a nonhuman animal takes precedence over human
animosities toward one another. This suggests nonhuman animals have intrinsic value
apart from humanity. Indeed, based on Deuteronomy 1:15, the Babylonian Talmud
claims that Jews are obligated to feed their animals before they feed themselves.399
Concern for the well-being of and avoiding cruelty and pain to nonhuman animals
is such a well-known aspect of Jewish thought that Noah Cohen has said that for the
classical rabbis mercy and compassion for nonhuman animals was “categorical and
undeniable . . . not a proposition to be proved; it was a postulate, it was axiomatic and
part of daily living.”400 The Jewish tradition does not mandate vegetarianism, but it does
mandate concern for their well-being in life and death. The break-away Christian
tradition, by contrast, has far less concern and sometimes even sets up practices based on
animal death that are specifically organized in opposition to Jewish practices, such as
eating pigs on Easter Sunday.
It is also well known that priests sacrificed cows, lambs, birds, and a few other
nonhuman animals in the temple, as commanded in the Torah. This is an important aspect
to note for the Incarnation because the particularity of the Incarnation has traditionally
included the notion that Jesus was killed in some sense as a sacrifice. If his death is a
sacrifice—which is one way to view it, but not the only way—then it is in a long line of
nonhuman animal sacrifice, a depiction that Christian tradition has readily used and
depicted.
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In general, scholars usually write about sacrifice as a universal religious
phenomenon.401 But for the purposes of this chapter and argument, I will focus on the
ontological status that nonhuman animals generally have within Jewish scriptural rituals
with an eye toward the Incarnation. If Jesus’s death is a sacrifice, then Jesus’s human
death is within the tradition of nonhuman animal sacrifice.
Ancient Jewish writers bound up the notion of sacrifice with a sense that humans
and nonhuman animals share a deep common life. Behind the Levitical laws about clean
and unclean animals as well as which ones were suitable for sacrifice lies the notion of
covenant. In Genesis 9, God made a covenant with Noah and his descendants “and with
every living creature that is with you, the birds, the domestic animals, and every animal
of the earth with you, as many as came out of the ark” (Gen 9:10). God emphasizes that
this covenant is also one with other animals, repeating what was said in verse 10 four
more times: “This is the sign of the covenant that I make between me and you and every
living creature that is with you, for all future generations” (Gen 9:12); “I will remember
my covenant that is between me and you and every living creature of all flesh” (Gen
9:15); “the everlasting covenant between God and every living creature of all flesh that is

401

I have questions about this focus on “religious” sacrifice as opposed to what? Why is it
“religious” sacrifice to kill an animal at an altar and then consume it but not religious killing in a modern
industrial slaughterhouse? Catherine Bell maintains that rituals are not actions separate from ordinary
routines. Rituals are just ordinary actions that take on a kind of “ritual” involving formalism, traditionalism,
disciplined invariance, rule governance, sacral symbolism, and performance. Modern killing and
consumption of nonhuman animals is not something we normally thing of as ritualized religious activity.
Yet a close look at the routinized killing in a slaughterhouse would reveal that the killing is formalized, part
of a tradition of factory work, rule-governed and invariable (anybody can do these tasks if they follow the
rules). It also has its own sense of the sacred. While modern Westerners denounce animal sacrifice to a god,
it is not much of a stretch to see how nonhuman animals are “sacrificed” in an all-encompassing economic
system that gives meaning to life every bit as much as the old gods. While a good sacrifice in Leviticus had
very specific rules, a good sacrifice in the modern world is one that is the cheapest. Money governs killing.
See Catherine Bell, Ritual: Perspectives and Dimensions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). For
a detailed look at how modern killing compares to ancient Jewish sacrifice see Wesley Bergen, “Animal
Sacrifice Today,” in Reading Ritual: Leviticus in Postmodern Culture (New York: T & T Clark, 2005), 13–
26.

184
on the earth” (Gen 9:16); and “This is the sign of the covenant that I have established
between me and all flesh that is on the earth” (Gen 9:17). Five times the text emphasizes
that the scope of the covenant extends to both human and nonhuman animals.
Earlier in the chapter God has given at least a provisional permission for Noah
and his family to eat other animals. However, God forbade them from eating an animal’s
blood, the sign of God’s animating providence in creation (Gen 9:1–6). Scholars
generally consider this section of Genesis 9 to be from the P source.402 These verses
struggle to depict nonhuman animals and humans as having deep connection while at the
same time setting humans apart. Both humans and nonhuman animals share the blood
that signifies God’s life-giving presence and care, which puts “every living creature” or
“all flesh” under God’s protection. The ontological distinction between humans and other
animals is quite blurred in Genesis 9.
The P source continues to link humans and nonhuman animals throughout the
Levitical laws regulating which nonhuman animals that humans are allowed to consume
and sacrifice. Leviticus 3:17 and 7:26–27 reiterate the prohibition against consuming an
animal’s blood. The Levitical laws regulating diet leave no room for unbridled human
exploitation of nonhuman animals.
Leviticus even forbids touching dead nonhuman animals that have not been
properly sacrificed in the temple. Such regulations have nothing to do with
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squeamishness about death or fear of contagions as some scholars surmise.403 Rather, as
Mary Douglas states:
In effect the rule against touching a dead animal protects it in its lifetime. Since its
carcass cannot be skinned or dismembered, most of the ways in which it could be
exploited are ruled out, so it is not worth breeding, hunting, or trapping. These
unclean animals are safe from the secular as also from the sacred kitchen. The
rule is a comprehensive command to respect the dead body of every land
animal.404
These animals are not to be used for fur and leather. Their bones cannot be made into
combs and jewelry. Their inner organs cannot be turned into strings for instruments or
purses. These laws stringently protect the lives of nonhuman animals declared unclean.
Moreover, these laws protect the overwhelming majority of land animals from human
killing and consumption. Douglas puts it succinctly: “To be classified unclean ought to be
an advantage for the survival of the species.”405
While the Israelites were wandering in the desert, to kill or consume an animal
outside of the sacrificial system, according to Leviticus 17, was a capital crime: “If
anyone of the house of Israel slaughters an ox or a lamb or a goat in the camp, or
slaughters it outside the camp, and does not bring it to the entrance of the tent of meeting,
to present it as an offering to the LORD before the tabernacle of the LORD, he shall be held
guilty of bloodshed; he has shed blood, and he shall be cut off from the people” (Lev
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17:3–4).406 The majority of rabbis interpreted this as meaning that the Jews wandering the
desert were not allowed to consume the flesh of any animal unless it had been sacrificed,
which limited their consumption severely.407 Jacob Milgrom argues that the passage
certainly prohibited all nonsacrificial consumption of nonhuman animal flesh.408
Leviticus 17:7 states that the laws in Leviticus are a permanent statute to be with
them “forever.” This material from the P source probably did not last long, however.
Deuteronomy 12:13–16 and 20–28 allow Jews settled in Palestine to consume animal
flesh that was not sacrificed: “Yet whenever you desire you may slaughter and eat meat
within any of your towns, according to the blessing that the Lord your God has given
you; the unclean and the clean may eat of it, as they would of gazelle or deer” (Deut
12:15). Deuteronomy 12:20–22 elaborates further: “When the Lord your God enlarges
your territory, as he has promised you, and you say, ‘I am going to eat some meat,’
because you wish to eat meat, you may eat meat whenever you have the desire. If the
place where the Lord your God will choose to put his name is too far from you, and you
slaughter as I have commanded you any of your herd or flock that the Lord has given
you, then you may eat within your towns whenever you desire. Indeed, just as gazelle or
deer is eaten, so you may eat it; the unclean and the clean alike may eat it.” According to
Milgrom, evidence suggests that the Deuteronomist relaxed the priestly law of Leviticus
406
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17:3–4. Yet this relaxation does not give Jews free reign. They must still maintain the
distinction between permissible and forbidden animals, and later rabbis strictly regulated
this nonsacrificial slaughter.409
Scholars regularly recognize the ontological connection that the Levitical laws
make between humans and nonhuman animals by declaring that for an Israelite to kill a
nonhuman animal outside the sacrificial system was simply murder: “In P’s view, until
the time of the flood it was a capital crime to shed the blood of any animal; thereafter it
was permissible as long as the blood was not ingested. Now that the Tabernacle has been
erected, Israelites may slay sheep and cattle for food only as well-being offerings; if they
fail to present the animal as an offering, it is as if they had slain an animal in the
antediluvian period when such an act was considered murder.”410 Jacob Milgrom also
argues that this legal pronouncement points Jews back to the “primordial law” in which
humans were not to kill nonhuman animals.411 Likewise, Karl Barth extrapolates that
killing any animal even in modern times is very close to murder. Barth says that a person
is “already on his way to homicide if he sins in the killing of animals, if he murders an
animal. He must not murder an animal.”412 This idea that we can illegitimately kill
nonhuman animals that are not killed within the strictly regulated system of sacrifice
explains why the laws even against touching an unclean animal are within a moral code
in Leviticus that demands atonement (see Lev 5:5–6). Killing a nonhuman animal outside
of the sacrificial system, for the priestly source of Leviticus 17, is as serious a moral sin
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as any other. The Deuteronomist’s prohibition on consuming blood and later regulation
on nonsacrificial slaughter also point in the direction of taking seriously the killing of any
nonhuman animal.413
These are not simply ethical issues but doctrinal ones on the ontological status of
humans and nonhuman animals before God.414 In fact, the doctrinal and the ethical are
hard to distinguish here. Douglas chronicles the way in which modern English
translations reflect biases against the purity and sacrificial laws of Leviticus as well as a
view of nonhuman animals that is less than the good creatures they are. For example,
many translations of Leviticus 11:41 use the English word “swarm” to describe a class of
unclean creatures that “swarm upon the earth.” The connotations here are of creatures
that menace and threaten.
But Douglas brilliantly demonstrates that the underlying Hebrew word connects
fertility and “bringing forth.” In Genesis, God “brings forth” creatures that “swarm.” God
tells the creatures to be fruitful and multiply, using the same root term under “swarm”
and “brings forth.” Unfortunately, as Douglas points out, commentators typically opt for
413
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a far more sinister interpretation that ignores its connection to fertility and abundance.
Likewise, English translations that speak about some creatures that “creep” upon the
earth have negative connotations in that the word connotes secretive actions like stalking
and avoidance. But the Hebrew term has a much broader application. Even the ground
can “creep.” In general the term simply means “moving” as a sign of life. Instead of
“swarming” Douglas recommends “teeming” and instead of “creeping” she recommends
simply “moving.”415
With these far more positive words in English, we can recover the more positive
Levitical sense in the prohibitions to touching a dead animal carcass. These translations
connect with the signs of life that are so important in Genesis. “Tracing the idea through
the classifications of Leviticus, teeming is fulfilling God’s command to multiply, it is
fertility exemplified; the rule that teeming things cannot be presented on the altar derives
from this fact. . . . Remember that the holy of holies is traditionally a place of fertility.
There can be protection for, but no covenant with, teeming things. If they cannot be
offered to God, it is that they are his already: ‘All that moves is mine’ (Psalm 50:11),
which is: ‘All that has life in it is mine.’”416 The regulations in Leviticus are meant to
foster respect for all life because God gives it.417
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Douglas also argues that the translation “abominable” in the purity codes
regarding nonhuman animals is unfortunate. The English term “abominable” does not
capture the positive connotations in the Levitical laws. This word connotes that some of
God’s creatures are somehow inherently bad. She wisely recommends “to be shunned”
because “contact with these creatures is not against purity, harming them is against
holiness.”418 Killing and eating these extremely fertile creatures offends God’s concern
for fertility. The emphasis in Leviticus is on God’s love and mercy toward creatures by
telling humans to avoid teeming creatures. These are important insights into the status of
forbidden animals as good and protected by God’s law. Unclean animals are not
ontologically evil or abominable.
Permissible animals have an even more interesting ontological status, however.
The distinction between permissible and forbidden animals is not between morally good
and evil creatures or ontologically detestable creatures and animals deemed “good.”
Permissible animals are the ones that humans must bring to the temple and offer as
sacrifices. Permissible animals are very limited. Cattle, sheep, and goats as well as a few
species of domesticated birds make up the potentially clean animals for sacrifice. All
other domestic and wild animals are forbidden. Jonathan Klawans points out that
“Israel’s sacrificial offerings involved animals that are by nature docile, defenseless, and
communal (living and reproducing in flocks and herds).”419 If Jesus’s death is in
continuity with the ancient Jewish notion of sacrifice, then his death is as one of the
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“docile, defenseless, and communal” nonhuman animals that the Tanak sees fit for
sacrifice.
Klawans also argues that Tanak animal sacrifices functioned within a theological
drama in which Israel was to the sacrificial animals as God was to Israel. That is, Israel
imitated God in its sacrificial system. The shepherd creates a bond with his flock and
knows them extremely well. Only a few animals out of flock would be without blemish,
and the good shepherd would try to keep blemishes (wounds, becoming lame, etc.) from
occurring. Moreover, since a mother and her child could not be sacrificed together, the
shepherd would have to pay close attention to the familial relationships in his flock,
knowing the sheep and lambs intimately.420 Moreover, Klawans argues, the shepherd
himself must be ritually pure. Though some scholars have argued that this is a function of
“death avoidance,” Klawans argues that the ritual purity is better understood as a
heightened sense of the divine: the offerer must be ritually pure because God is pure.421
Klawans points to ancient Jewish language of God as a shepherd and Israel as
God’s flock.422 Psalm 23, for example, provides a good example of a pervasive idea in
the Tanak:
The Lord is my shepherd, I shall not want.
He makes me lie down in green pastures;
he leads me beside still waters;
he restores my soul.
He leads me in right paths
for his name’s sake.
420
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Even though I walk through the darkest valley,
I fear no evil;
for you are with me; your rod and your staff—
they comfort me. (Ps 23:1-4)423
The intimate relationship between a shepherd and each individual sheep is here depicted
as a relationship between God, the divine shepherd, and Jewish people, God’s sheep. The
Psalmist here imagines himself as a sheep in a flock. Is he a sheep without blemish who
will end up on the altar? Some Psalms admit sin and therefore blemish. But more
significantly, as a nation Israel was to be “docile, defenseless, and communal” trusting in
God alone for their security.424 To characterize the sacrificial animals as docile,
defenseless, and communal is to describe their way of living, not their manner of death
by itself.425
Jesus’s Death as an Animal Sacrifice

Understanding Jesus’s death within the framework of a sacrificial lamb is a very
fruitful task for those of us concerned about how Christian theology views nonhuman
animals. The Gospel of John in particular depicts Jesus’s death as an animal sacrifice.
Jesus’s bones remained intact as Exodus 12 required (Exod 12:46; John 19:33, 36).
Jesus’s body was taken away before the next day (Exod 12:10; John 19:31). Jesus was
offered liquid on a branch of hyssop, the same plant used to smear the lamb’s blood over
the door at Passover (Exod 12:22; John 19:29). David Clough notes, “Jesus’s body is
pierced with a spear (John 19:34) just as the body of the Passover lamb would have been
423
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pierced to be roasted over the fire (Exod 12:9).”426 Many biblical scholars argue that
Jesus died at the exact time that lambs would have been killed in the Temple.427
Seeing the Incarnation in this way has a number of implications for theology. First
of all, Mary Douglas has pointed us to the fact that the sacrificial system of ancient Israel
actually protected the vast majority of species from human (and largely male) aggression
and exploitation. Only a few species were fit for sacrifice and only a few individuals
within those species could ever be offered.428
In light of these severe restrictions, several biblical scholars have claimed that one
function of the sacrificial system may very well be that it pointed Israel back to the
peaceable vision found in Genesis 2, where humans and animals live in relative harmony
and to Genesis 1:28, where all humans and nonhuman animals are given plants for their
diet. Walter Houston claims that “Between the utopian vegetarianism of the original
creation intention . . . and the unrestrained violence of the Flood period, the restricted diet
laid down for Israel in the Torah can be seen as a mediating line accepting the human
craving for flesh but restraining it sufficiently to enable God to dwell in the midst of his
people.”429 Likewise, Jacob Milgrom argues that the dietary laws in Leviticus were
specifically meant to remind Israel of the vegetarian ideal. Milgrom interprets the
prohibition against consuming a nonhuman animal’s blood in Leviticus 17 in the context
426

Clough, On Animals, 128.
See Dorothy Lee, “Paschal Imagery in the Gospel of John: A Narrative and Symbolic
Reading,” Pacifica 24, no. 1 (2011): 25.
428
The vast majority of Jews living away from Judea would have experienced animal sacrifice
only upon a visit to Jerusalem, and for most people that, as one scholar notes, “would no doubt have been a
once-in-a-lifetime event . . . something that even the wealthy would not have done frequently.” Rives,
“Animal Sacrifice and Political Identity in Rome ad Judaea,” 113.
429
Walter Houston, “What Was the Meaning of Classifying Animals as Clean or Unclean?,” in
Animals on the Agenda, ed. Andrew Linzey and Dorothy Yamamoto (London: SCM, 1998), 24. See also
his statement in another essay: “the dietary laws mediate the contradiction between the ideal of a nonviolent world and the fact of unrestrained violence against animals.” Walter Houston, Purity and
Monotheism: Clean and Unclean Animals in Biblical Law (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993), 77.
427

194
of the original vegetarian ideal and the subsequent “concession” after the flood to
consuming animal flesh. The concession is in the form of a law that no human should
consume an animal’s blood (Gen 9:3-4). In the case of Israel, there is further restriction
than this, according to Milgrom. Animals must be brought to the sanctuary for sacrifice.
If this is not done, “Leviticus contains the clear, unambiguous statement that whoever
slaughters an ox, sheep, or goat anywhere except at the authorized sanctuary is guilty of
murder (17:3–4.)”430 Only by pouring out the blood and giving the life back to God can a
human be acquitted of illicitly killing a nonhuman animal according to Leviticus 17 (and
Deuteronomy 12 also prohibits consuming blood), which, according to Milgrom, reminds
Israel that flesh-eating is not God’s intention for human or nonhuman animal creation.
If the sacrificial system protected most nonhuman animals from human (and
again, largely male) violence, and if the sacrifices themselves were reminders of the
peaceable kingdom ideal in Genesis 1, then understanding Jesus’s sacrifice within this
framework becomes crucial. Christians have long interpreted Jesus’s death as an animal
sacrifice. Paul calls Jesus’s death τὸ πάσχα (1 Cor 5:7). The Gospel of John, as noted,
repeatedly compares Jesus’s passion with the slaughter of lambs at the Passover. In
Christian art, Christians have routinely depicted aspects of the passion as directly
comparable to the slaughter of nonhuman animals at the temple. For example, in the
twelfth-century Mosan Floreffe Bible, an illuminated manuscript, Jesus’s crucifixion is
depicted above the sacrifice of a calf directly below with the inscription: “For the blemish
of sin a calf is given, worship’s sacrifice; this inscription teaches that Christ is the
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calf.”431 In these and other renditions Jesus is pulled and pushed over a “rough and stony
way” as a sacrificial animal (Deut 21:3–4). Jesus is dragged, pushed, and kicked. He is
led by ropes. Morrow notes that in one twelfth-century tract from the Netherlands Jesus is
depicted as being pushed so hard that his feet did not even touch the ground on the way to
the cross, a reference to Jeremiah 11:19 in the Vulgate: Ego quasi agnus mansuetus qui
portatur ad victimam (I was like a gentle lamb that is carried to be a victim).432
So understanding Jesus’s death as an animal sacrifice of sorts is not unheard of in
Christian tradition. But what I want to highlight is that if the sacrifices spared most
species and pointed Jewish people back to God’s peaceable kingdom intentions, then
Jesus’s crucifixion within that system of animal sacrifice does something similar. The
Epistle to the Hebrews maintains that Jesus’s death ends all animal sacrifice and cleanses
those who believe from sin (Heb. 10:1–18). Jesus’s death does not just end the need for
sacrifices to cover human sin but spares the lives of other creatures, pointing humans, by
means of this single sacrifice, back to the original vegetarian vision of Genesis and
forward to the peaceable kingdom of Isaiah 11 and 65 in Jewish eschatology.
I will return to Jesus’s death and the notion of sacrifice in another chapter dealing
with Jesus’s maleness and humanity, but in this chapter Jesus’s death functions in a
particular Jewish trajectory and tradition in which sacrifice reminds Jewish people of the
original peaceableness and severely limits any human violence toward them. Indeed, it is
far easier to follow many of the dietary restrictions from the Torah and subsequent kosher
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regulations in Judaism when one is a vegetarian. Jewish dietary laws, which Jesus kept—
Jesus was kosher—certainly point in this direction.433 In modern Judaism, some Jewish
thinkers have pointed out:
All of the holidays in the Jewish year are (or can be) vegetarian occassions. For
instance, every one of the obligatory foods and beverages at the Pesah seder is
vegetarian (in fact, vegan). Many Jewish communities around the world follow
the custom of eating dairy foods for Shavuot. Dishes comtaining oil, as well as
cheese or milk (such as latkes with sour cream), are traditional for Hanukkah. The
“Good luck” foods eaten (with special ‘wishes’ for the year) by many on the first
night of Rosh HaShanah, including apples dipped in honey, are vegetarian (except
for those who eat the head of a fish or goat). Even the prescribed menu of the
Seudah Mafseket meal immediately before the fast of Tisha B’av, a hard boiled
egg (which some dipp in ashes), is vegetarian fare, if hardly a feast. . . . there is no
food made from meat which is currently required on any occasion, nor even one
which is widely associated with a particular day. And in the absence of a Holy
Temple in Jerusalem and of animal sacrifices (which, by the way, Rav Kook, the
great chief rabbi of pre-state Israel and advocate of vegetarianism, wrote would
not by reinstituted in the rebuilt Third Temple . . . ) there is no obligation that
anyone who finds it objectionable should eat meat of any kind on any holy
occasion—Sabbath or festival.434
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In any case, the Word-became-flesh stands through and through in a Jewish
tradition that is deeply connected to nonhuman animals. Once again, setting aside Jesus’s
Jewishness lets one forget the deeply Jewish vision of respect for life that even their
sacrificial system embodied. Jesus’s death as a sacrificial lamb points back, like animal
sacrifice in the Torah, to Genesis 1 and the peaceable vision narrated there. His death is
not just any sacrifice. It is not a “religious” sacrifice broadly speaking but a very
particular death connected to a very particular system meant to reduce human avarice and
gluttony and thereby help to protect nonhuman animals. Jesus’s death simply fulfills the
intention of animal sacrifice in the Tanak by bringing an end to the killing entirely.
Conclusion

In this chapter I have looked at a number of ways that Jesus’s Jewish identity
plays an important role in thinking about the Incarnation in relationship to nonhuman
animals. In the first place, there is a particular eschatological trajectory envisioned in the
prophets that places Jesus in a messianic peaceable kingdom motif. This Jewish
eschatology is essential for understanding the Incarnation. It is not simply an
eschatology; it is a Jewish vision. Jesus embodied a particular way of being Jewish in this
regard in that he seems to have rejected all violence in favor of a diasporic existence. But
beyond the particular eschatological vision that Jesus seems to embody, he also stood in
line with a particular Jewish vision of original peaceableness that stood in stark contrast
to the foundational creation myths of the Ancient Near East, in which violence was more
primary than peace. The priestly author of Genesis 1 directly counters these violent
assumptions with a vision of a world in which creatures do not live off the backs of each
other and competition for resources does not have the first or last word.
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While those working on issues related to nonhuman animals and Christian
theology routinely point to Isaiah’s peaceable kingdom and Genesis’s mandate for a
vegetarian diet, they have not really connected these areas with Jesus’s Jewish roots.
Instead they have stood apart as big ideas that we can take up quite apart from the
particular identity that Jesus had as a Jewish person. But the Incarnation was rooted in
Jewish faith and could not happen apart from it. Peace begins the vision and ends the
vision that Jesus embodied as a Jewish, male human. Without specifically pointing out
Jesus’s Jewishness in these regards we run the risk of abstracting the Incarnation away
from Jesus of Nazareth, whom Athanasius and John of Damascus very much wish to
uphold, and who at first glance seem to be helpful for my purposes. Yet in chapter two
these authors turned out to be largely negative examples primarily because they
abstracted Jesus from his Jewishness. By doing so they could bypass the issue of other
animals, indeed, of human animality as well. In this chapter I have sought to show a few
ways that the Incarnation connects to nonhuman animals.
The Incarnation also stands in a line of sacrifice whose intent was to curb human
violence toward nonhuman animals. Jesus’s death is explicitly compared to an animal’s
death in the New Testament, connecting his death to the Jewish story of humannonhuman relationships. The Jewish vision of original peace stands firmly at the center of
these sacrificial rituals and laws regulating human-nonhuman animal relationships
according to some biblical scholars. If this is so, then Jesus’s death is far more connected
to nonhuman animals than modern theology has depicted.
Moreover, the Incarnation itself stands in a long line of divine self-revelation in
the Jewish tradition in which God reveals Godself by means of other than human
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creation. Jewish people were not afraid to speak about God in terms of nonhuman
creation. Any theology that wants to include nonhuman animals in any deep sense would
be wise not to do so at the expense of grappling with its Jewish roots. As Oliver
O’Donovan asks: “How can the church be clothed with Israel’s name and vocation if the
possessor of that vocation is remote from it?”435 Jesus was close to Jewish visions of
peaceableness with other animals.436
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Peter goes up on a rooftop to pray and is hungry. He then sees a vision of a “sheet” with “all kinds of fourfooted creatures and reptiles and birds of the air.” A voice then tell Peter, “Get up, Peter; kill and eat.” Peter
replied, “By no means, Lord; for I have never eaten anything that is profane or unclean.” The voice replied,
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Most likely Cornelius was a Jewish proselyte who would not have eaten unclean animals. Peter is
not said to have broken his dietary restrictions, only that the vision uses this imagery to make the point that
Gentiles are not “unclean” and can be “saved.” Indeed, when the Jerusalem council gave Paul instructions
Peter again appealed to his experience in support of Paul (Acts 15:7–11). The council sent a letter to the
Gentile believers telling them to “abstain from what has been sacrificed to idols and from blood and from
what is strangled and from fornication” (Acts 15:29). These are dietary restrictions about eating nonhuman
animals that seem to place their eating within Jewish restrictions for the most part. Paul later seems to mock
these restrictions saying that are for “weak” brethren but should be followed for the sake of not causing
anybody to be offended (1 Cor 8).
It seems to me that there is nothing in this passage that actually contradicts Jewish teaching. As
noted in this chapter Genesis Rabbah 34:13 claims something similar to the Jerusalem Council in Acts 15
when it quotes Genesis: “Every moving thing that lives shall be food for you. . . . Only you shall not eat
flesh with its life, that is, its blood.” This general Noahic law, according to Jewish teaching, is for all
humans. The more specific dietary restrictions are for the people of God in Israel to witness to the more
profound peaceableness toward which all creation is moving. The Noahic law is not more basic; Jewish
Torah is more basic.
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CHAPTER 4
THE WORD BECAME A JEWISH MALE

In the previous chapter I argued that Jesus’s Jewishness is essential for thinking
about how the Incarnation incorporates and is related to human and nonhuman animal
life. But Jesus was a Jewish male. At first glance it would seem that Jesus’s maleness has
little do with developing a theology capable of underpinning human peaceableness with
nonhuman animals. After all, theologians have used Jesus’s maleness as a particularity to
exclude women from ministerial roles and to underwrite a variety of patriarchal values.
Focusing on Jesus’s maleness in the name of “animal theology” would then seem to be a
step backward in the quest for gender equality within Christian churches. Here ethics and
theology come together in a way that suggests a conflict between feminist theology and a
new focus on peaceableness with nonhuman animals.437
While I am sympathetic with theologians who continue to critique patriarchal
theologies and practices, I argue that Jesus’s maleness is important for a theology about
the Incarnation and nonhuman animals. I am convinced, along with many other
theologians, that Jesus’s maleness can critique patriarchal theologies and worldviews
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rather than underwrite them. Likewise, Jesus’s particular gender might actually help
rather than hinder expanding our theological vision toward nonhuman animals.438
In the first section of this chapter I will look at some prominent ways theologians
in the last few decades have argued that Jesus’s maleness is of no theological
consequence. For some, Jesus’s maleness is an irredeemable aspect of the Incarnation
that must be quickly bypassed. For others, however, Jesus’s maleness signals a
potentially positive impact for all people. Indeed, his maleness may not be a fixed
“essence” to reject in an either/or dichotomy at all.
In the second part of this chapter, building on trajectories from the first section, I
will look at Jesus’s maleness as a Jew in the context of the Roman Empire. Jews were
subject to an imperial government that defined masculinity in particular ways that
included domination over animals. Jewish people from the Tanak onward have resisted
these ways of being male. But the Romans also connected circumcision with a certain
“beastliness,” which I will argue that Jesus appropriates in resistance to Roman imperial
colonization. In all of these ways, Jesus’s Jewish maleness has some bearing on how to
think about the Incarnation and nonhuman animals.
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Most theologians who are concerned about the issue of animals and theology do not deal with
the particularity of the Incarnation as a Jewish male. To the extent that gender comes up it is as a concept in
discussing less “down-to-earth” issues than Jesus’s concrete cultural identity as a male born in Nazareth.
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Christ’s divinity and issues of gender in that discussion rather than discussing Jesus’s actual biological and
cultural identity as “male.”
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Jesus’s Destabilizing Maleness

For nearly thirty years, feminist theologians have critiqued the idea that Jesus’s
maleness has any ultimate significance. Rosemary Radford Ruether, for example, asks,
“Can a male savior save women?” 439 Sort of, answers Ruether. Because Jesus, as a
savior, recognized that his maleness came with power and privileges that he should
renounce, he can participate in women’s salvation. Jesus critiqued oppressive structures
and embodied liberation, which demonstrates a redeemed male and female humanity.
Jesus upturned patriarchal, racist, class-based societal norms. By doing so he brought a
new way of living and a new regime of power into the world that liberates the oppressed
and helps heal the environment.
However, human existence is always particular and limited, so this male savior
Jesus is not enough. There has to be a female savior as well. Only God is transcendent
and universal. Our particulars relate dialectically to the universal God. So we need many
saviors, including a female Christ to reveal how women can find a “redemptive
personhood” from their own experiences.440 Jesus is a Christ-symbol and a paradigm.
There are others. Women need other Christ-symbols. Jesus’s maleness is important as a
“kenosis of patriarchy,” which frees men from their violence and women from the system
of patriarchy. But this is a very limited model of salvation, according to Ruether. Jesus’s
maleness limits redemption to only one aspect of life. Particularity, according to Ruether,
means we need many Christs. One has to ask why Jesus really needs to be like us in
every detail to be relevant. This is exactly how humans treat other animals: if they are not
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“like us” by having “reason” and “language,” for example, many argue that they
therefore do not deserve any consideration at all.
Other theologians have likewise tried to push aside Jesus’s maleness. Jacquelyn
Grant, for example, sought to displace Jesus’s historical whiteness in Christian history by
imaging Jesus as a black woman.441 What is important for these theologians is Jesus’s
message of redemption. His maleness is incidental to that message. Jesus’s message,
including what he said and did, is something that women can follow, unlike his maleness.
Jesus’s liberating practices speak into the circumstances of contemporary women. Susan
Ross sums up the general consensus while commenting on Elizabeth Schüssler
Fiorenza’s Christology: “The fact that this incarnation was in a particular person who was
male is simply indicative of historical particularity, not of lasting significance.”442 Given
that women continue to experience less power in decision-making and leadership within
Christian churches broadly speaking, and such things as unequal pay within society as a
whole, these efforts at refocusing on other aspects of the Incarnation are understandable.
Another strategy has been to focus on the various women in the Bible and recover a sense
of positive models for women.
More recently, however, New Testament scholarship has shifted away from
focusing on biological sex differences to examining the broader concept of gender. Yet
“masculinity” has only recently became a focus for Christian biblical scholarship.
Beverly Gaventa and Susan Eastman, for example, have written about masculinity and
Paul, focusing on ways that Paul uses female imagery for himself, undermining
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masculinity stereotypes in his day and ours.443 Other scholars have recently begun a
reexamination of Jesus’s masculinity.444 In general, the studies of Jesus’s maleness tend
to perpetuate earlier feminist readings of Jesus’s maleness as a body of oppression
against women: the Gospels depict Jesus, they argue, as an ideal male in order to
persuade people to join the Jesus movement. In what follows I will offer a different
account with a view toward seeing Jesus’s maleness as helpful in thinking about theology
and nonhuman animals.
Jesus’s Theological Body: Neither Male nor Female in Jesus’s Body

In one of the most enlightening pieces on Jesus’s body in terms of sexual
differentiation and gender roles—“The Displaced Body of Jesus Christ”—Graham Ward
notes that Jesus’s body and maleness has many peculiar aspects that undermine attempts
to use his gender for purposes that would make Jesus’s “maleness” a determining factor
for differentiating male and female roles in church and society. From the outset, Jesus’s
male body differs from other male bodies because his body does not issue forth from
another human, male father. In modern parlance, Jesus must have had one X and one Y
chromosome like any other male. More specifically, he must have had the SRY gene that
the Y chromosome normally carries. But human males get their Y chromosomes and the
resultant SRY male-making gene from their human fathers, which Jesus did not have
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according to the Gospels of Matthew and Luke. The female egg can only provide an X
chromosome.445
Did God create the Y chromosome and the SRY gene for Jesus “out of nothing”?
Or, even more drastically, did God create Jesus’s entire DNA structure out of nothing,
making Mary a mere vessel? Such de novo creation would arguably make Jesus a mere
copy of humanity, the first clone. Jesus would be a creature that resembles a human but
who does not share in our evolved humanity. Docetism lurks in this idea of Jesus’s
maleness, especially if we follow the nativity stories in Matthew and Luke. For Karl
Barth, the virgin birth narratives draw a kind of boundary around Jesus that forbid us to
explain him in generally accessible principles. These narratives, then, point to Jesus as a
spiritual mystery not an intellectual puzzle we can solve through DNA analysis.446
Somehow, in a way we do not know, God’s Word has a bearing upon our physical
reality, and Jesus’s Y chromosome, his maleness, becomes charged with a spiritual
meaning that makes his maleness an important particularity with which to wrestle.
Luke 2:21 marks Jesus as biologically male by narrating that he was circumcised
as any male Jewish child would have been. Yet Jesus’s circumcision has a decidedly
eschatological character, according to Ward, who points to a long historical trajectory of
such interpretation. Theologians have long interpreted this event as the beginning of the
passion, when Jesus first shed his blood.447 But the circumcision also prefigures the
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resurrection by taking place on the eighth day. Jesus’s maleness, even as a little boy, has
weighty theological significance in that it carries the cross, the resurrection, and even
new creation as his body becomes “transfigured” theologically.
Ward speaks about the mystery of the Incarnation in relation to Jesus’s maleness
by pointing out that Jesus’s identity becomes increasingly unstable in the Gospels. From
the birth narratives, in which Jesus’s maleness becomes a mystery, through the Last
Supper, when Jesus’s body crosses a species divide, to the Resurrection where his body
becomes unstable so that he can walk through walls and conceal his identity from close
friends, shows us that it is in the mystery that we find revelation: “The appearance /
disappearance structure of Christ’s resurrected body serves to emphasize the mediation of
that body – its inability to be fully present, to be an object to be grasped, catalogued,
atomized, comprehended. The appearance / disappearance serves as a focus for what has
been evident throughout – the body as a mystery, as a materiality which can never fully
reveal, must always conceal, something of the profundity of its existence.”448 Jesus’s
maleness, therefore, cannot be all determining because that very maleness, lacking in
Ward’s account a Y chromosome at all, is unstable and hard to pin down. Said more
positively, Jesus’s maleness becomes theologically significant to the extent that his
maleness explodes our preconceived notions of what it means to be a male.
Jesus’s male body subverts our ways of thinking about maleness. In the
crucifixion, a soldier pierces Jesus’s body with a spear and blood and water gush forth. In
John’s Gospel, this description seems to carry a theological weight by deliberately
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comparing this event with a mother’s birthing. A male soldier pierces Jesus’s male body.
Jesus’s body then becomes feminine, giving birth through blood and water to the
ecclesial community (John 19:31–37). John sees water as a sign of birth. In John 3:5,
Jesus says that a person must be “born of water and the Spirit” to enter God’s kingdom.
Jesus’s male body gives birth like that of a female. But, I would add, this female body is
more like that of a nonhuman animal in producing multiple offspring. His body is like a
cat, birthing many offspring: to a large litter called the church. Jesus’s male body
therefore transgresses the male/female divide that we normally think demarcates what it
means to be gendered.
If this portrait of Jesus’s maleness is compelling, then Jesus’s maleness is every
bit as problematic for modern males as it is for women. Those of us men who have grown
up in cultures where our masculine identities are tied to various social constructions of
what it means to be male—men do not show fear or sadness, for example, or that men are
characterized by certain types of aggression and sexual proclivities—comes sharply into
question. Jesus’s theologically transgendered body falsifies the notion that men simply
“are” a certain way. These questions, as I will argue, have direct bearing on how to think
of the Incarnation in relationship to nonhuman animals in which not only is the
male/female binary far more fluid in Jesus’s body but also the human/nonhuman. Jesus’s
body challenges these divisions. Ward’s analysis opens up the discussion away from an
exclusive focus on Jesus’s gender in relationship to women alone and begins to focus on
Jesus’s gender in relation to men as well.449 Likewise, the same thing happens at the
species divide, an issue rarely, if ever, touched upon in feminist and gay theologies.450
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Maleness in a Hyper-Masculine Roman Empire

What I find missing in most of the discussion of Jesus’s maleness, either from
early feminist discussions about whether a male Jesus could really be the savior of
women or from more up-to-date post-colonialist readings that challenge the male/female
binary and essentialism of much previous scholarship, is that these discussions ignore
that Jesus was a Jewish male.451 Even Ward treats Jesus’s body as if it were ahistorically
transgendered. Jesus’s body, in Graham Ward’s reading, moves fluidly between the
binary of male/female in ways that challenge our conceptions of what it means to be a
man or a woman in society. Yet Ward does not connect this theologically-transgendered
Jesus to his Jewishness. There is no “male,” “female,” or even “body” as such but only
very particular instantiations of embodiment. Jesus was embodied as a Jewish male,
whose maleness challenges patriarchal structures of his own time and ours. This becomes

and such things. In other words, Christian theology needs to take into account the new discipline of critical
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more popular Christian men’s movement seen in such groups as Promise Keepers or in the hyper-masculine
ministries of people like Mark Driscoll. Much of what critical men’s studies does is a subset of feminist
theology rather than a new push for men to take their “rightful” places at the head of the table as Promise
Keepers imagines.
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important for those of us who want to think theologically about how nonhuman animals
can enter into the theological scene by way of the Incarnation. Before reflecting on how
Jesus’s Jewish maleness helps in that endeavor, however, I need to look at Jesus’s
maleness in its particular historical context: Jesus was a Jewish male in the context of
hyper-masculine ideologies.
Scholars have published many works on gender identity in the Greco-Roman
context.452 Generally, these scholars have maintained that masculine identity was a social
construction in which one’s biological sex played less of a role than how a biologicallysexed person fulfilled cultural and societal expectations of the ideal male. Even if a
person had the right genitals, if that person failed to “act like a man” according to the
social norms of the time, he would lose status and social benefits. Masculinity was not a
fixed matter of birthright based on biology, but a matter of social discernment and
observation. Jennifer Larson states, “Masculinity was viewed as an attribute only
partially related to an individual’s anatomical sex.”453
Elite males knew that slaves, clients, and women were subject to their sexual
demands. That elite males had the right to penetrate their inferiors was a mark of their
political and social power over others. Elite men who allowed other males to penetrate
them sexually were ridiculed as slave-like or lowborn, willingly giving up their social
dominance and becoming effeminate.
Since a male’s gendered identity was culturally unstable, men had to defend their
masculinity and exhibit it publicly. A social hierarchy in which freeborn elite men ranked
452
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above everybody else related to their ability to dominate, sexually and otherwise,
anybody below them. Larson again describes the situation:
Because masculinity was all but identified with social and political dominance,
there was no assumption that all males must be masculine. The masculinity of
slaves, for example, was by definition impaired. Personal dignity, bodily integrity,
and specific details of one’s appearance were all factors in individual selfassessment and in men’s evaluation of one another’s masculinity. Elite men of the
day were constantly concerned with the maintenance of their masculinity, because
it both displayed and justified their positions of power. Unlike noble birth, which
was immutable, masculinity was a matter of perception. While elites always
represented their masculinity to outsiders as innate, among insiders it was
implicitly recognized that masculinity was a performance requiring constant
practice and vigilance.454
Beyond this sexuality, men also showed their manliness by other displays of
dominance, often connected to self-discipline. What constituted a true man (vir)—in
distinction from mere homines, the generic term for males—had to do with a person’s
manner of displaying courage, influence, and self-control, which society uses to evaluate
whether a man is a “true man” or an “ideal male” quite separate from having correct
anatomical parts (and again, the biological issues are theologically complicated by
Jesus’s fluid body, as Ward notes). Manliness consisted in acting rationally and
controlling one’s emotional responses that were generally considered effeminate.
This self-mastery exhibited itself in mastery over nonhuman animals lives as well.
Warfare and hunting were male activities par excellence in which a male could
454
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demonstrate the virtues. Xenophon (ca. 430–354 BCE), for instance, repeatedly connected
warfare to hunting, in his book Cyropaedia: hunting is a preparation for war (1.2.9–11),
Cyrus told his general about a battle, “Think of it like hunting” (2.4.25–26), and Cyrus
promoted men to higher military rank who were also good hunters (8.1.34–39).
Xenophon said that Cyrus had been trained in the art of hunting from an early age, which
helped him become such a great warrior and ruler (1.4.7–15).455
In the Roman world Livy (64 BCE–17 CE) believed that hunting trained young
men in the virtues and skills they would need to engage in warfare. He claimed that
Rome’s founding fathers, Romulus and Remus, began to “confront wild beasts” from an
early age and from these hunts learned how to attack thieves and robbers as well.
Through these early hunts they became mighty warriors.456 Likewise, Horace (65–8 BCE)
believed that hunting was training for the Roman military, a male occupation.457 Cicero
(106–43 BCE) claimed that wild animals provide not only food but also an occasion to
“mimic warfare” as humans chase and kill them.458
The virtues, inextricably tied to manliness, were armed: armed against nonhuman
animals and other humans.459 First hunting and then war were the crucibles in which the
manly virtues were honed. Courage—that quintessentially Greco-Roman military
virtue—was first nurtured in killing relatively defenseless animals, overcoming the
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emotional recoil at bloodshed, and then later honed on the battlefield. The Greco-Roman
hero-warrior was the ideal male. As Myles McDonnell argues, virtue derived from killing
one’s enemies and winning a war “was a powerful political slogan, not the virtus of
Cicero the new man, nor that of popular philosophy, but virtus imperators, virtus militia,
the martial virtus of Roman tradition.”460 To penetrate bodies sexually or with weapons
was the right and sport of elite Romans (indeed, the difference between a “weapon” and
the male penis disappears).
Jesus’s Unmanly Maleness

David Clines argues that the Gospels depict Jesus as “a man’s man, by any
standard, ancient or modern.”461 Commenting on the Gospel of Luke’s portrayal of Jesus,
Mary Rose D’Angelo claims, “Jesus is depicted as ἀνήρ after God's own heart, a heroic
prophet, cast in the mold of Elijah and Moses. A worthy heir to David’s royalty, he is
shown to have achieved, indeed excelled in, all the steps toward public manhood in his
own nation, but in terms that are comprehensible to an imperial public. He shows himself
to be a learned reader and interpreter, a skilled and powerful speaker.”462
Yet Brittany Wilson has argued that Jesus performed his maleness in ways that
simply did not live up to Greco-Roman standards of manliness.463 “Jesus’s masculinity,”
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agrees Maud Gleason, “was a problem.”464 Even though Jesus spoke well and could
gather a crowd as “real men” were able to do, the kind of crowd he held were country
people, whom the Roman elite despised. According to Gleason, the Roman elite “were
actually suspicious of speakers who were excessively popular with audiences of low
degree, stigmatizing them as illegitimate players at the game of words.”465 So in the
minds of the Greco-Roman elite males, that Jesus could captivate an uneducated crowd of
rural people did not make him masculine. Jesus used his masculinity in ways that Roman
elite males would have deemed effeminate.
The Gospels mark Jesus as a male. Jesus is an ἀνήρ, for example (Luke 24:19 and
John 1:30). The New Testament uses male titles for Jesus like υἱός and κύριος, which
were exclusively used for men. Nevertheless, there are some strikingly “effeminate”
images of Jesus in the Gospels that not only undermine his authority as a “manly man”
but also relate specifically to nonhuman animals.
Jesus in the Temple: The Doves

Colleen Conway argues for a way of reading Jesus as a “manly man” by using his
action in the temple. She claims that in general Jesus displayed the kind of self-mastery
over his emotions that would be expected of a “manly man” in the ancient Greco-Roman
world. The one place where he lets his passions guide him is in the temple, when Jesus
makes a whip that he uses on “unsuspecting cows and sheep. He makes a big mess of
coins and tables.”466 Jesus lost his temper, Conway argues, which was perfectly in line
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with some strands of Roman thought that saw anger as one of the only acceptable male
emotions for men to display. A long history of Christian interpretation would seem to
agree with Conway. From just war to Crusades to executing heretics, Jesus’s action in the
temple has provided fuel for righteous male violence and killing.467
In response, the first thing to point out about Jesus’s temple action is that he did
not angrily beat the animals in the temple with a “whip” as Conway and many other
suggest.468 Borrowed from the Latin term flagellum, the φραγέλλιον that Jesus used could
indeed refer to an instrument “consisting of a thong or thongs, frequently with metal tips
to increase the severity of the punishment.”469 As an instrument of torture, its primary use
can be seen in its verb form φραγελλόω, which appears in the passion narratives (Mark
15:15; Matt 27:26), and was “a punishment inflicted on slaves and provincials after a
sentence of death had been pronounced on them.”470 It is unlikely, however, that Jesus
had this kind of weapon or inflicted that kind of punishment on those in the temple. First,
weapons were forbidden in the temple area. The Mishnah, though it is a later document
than the Second Temple, states that, “One should not enter the Temple mount with his
walking stick, his overshoes, his money bag, or with dust on his feet.”471 Jesus did not
bring the instrument into the temple; he fashioned an ad hoc instrument from whatever
467
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materials were available, which was not likely to include metal shards or leather for
thongs. Thus, the narrative depicts him fashioning the tool ἐκ σχοινίων (from reeds), a
word Josephus used to describe some of the garb used when mourning with sackcloth and
ashes.472 The type of material available would have been animal bedding473 or fodder and
ropes with which animals were tied up. An ad hoc “whip” of this sort hardly rises to the
level of a Roman instrument of torture.474 It hardly constitutes doing violence to the
sheep and cattle.
The image many Christians have painted of Jesus, however, is one where Jesus is
so angry in the temple that he uses this makeshift instrument to drive human and other
animals out of the temple. Jesus, as Conway claims, “loses his temper.”475 The proper
display for this masculine anger is controlled violence. David Brakke puts it, in the
Greco-Roman context, “Because anger motivated a man to action in righting wrongs to
himself and others, because its opposite appeared to be passivity in the face of challenges
from other males, because—to put it simply—it raised the body’s temperature, anger
appeared to be a characteristic of masculinity, a sign that a man was indeed a manly
man.”476 David Clines argues that Jesus is not only strong like a man was expected to be
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but also violent. One piece of evidence he gives for this masculine violence is that Jesus
“overturns the tables of the changers of money and the seats of the pigeon sellers (Mt.
21.12; Mk 11.15). In John, he makes a whip to drive the merchants and the animals out. It
may be a good cause, but it certainly uses violence.”477 Yet this use of the temple action
does not square well with a close reading of the text. Jesus did not use a “weapon” on any
human or nonhuman animal.
However, the strongest challenge to the idea that Jesus threw an unrestrained
tantrum is how he treats the doves. The Gospel of John says that after fashioning his
broom to get the animals moving out the door, Jesus began turning over tables and
pouring out the vendor’s money purses. But suddenly Jesus stopped and told the dovesellers to take their caged birds out of the temple. A person who was blind with rage and
who did not much care for nonhuman creatures would have knocked the caged birds over
like the tables and money jars. If these birds did not matter any more than metal coins or
wooden tables, then Jesus would have overturned their cages, sending them fluttering in
panic while banging against a falling cage. However Jesus took deliberate care not to
overturn the birdcages. He did not put them through any further distress. Rather he
protected them. He paused in the middle of his nonviolent demonstration to act
graciously toward these little creatures.478
Careful examination, therefore, of how Jesus treated the doves in the temple as
well as the supposed “whip” he used reveals that his supposed masculine anger, strength,
and violence would be pretty pathetic by Roman standards. When the Romans “cleaned”
to right wrongs, which is appropriate expression. The violence should be controlled, but it is an expression
of male superiority.
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the Jewish temple, Josephus tells us the Romans crucified so many people in the Jewish
revolt of 70 CE they could hardly make room for them all outside the city walls.479 That is
Roman male strength. Jesus telling a merchant to take his little doves out of the temple
after shooing the cattle and sheep out is more like an old lady with a broom by
comparison. This is not, we will see in a later section, how the ideal Roman male
behaved toward nonhuman animals.
Jesus the Mother Hen

In the Gospels of Matthew and Luke Jesus compares himself to a “mother hen”
(Matt 23:37–39 and Luke 13:31–35). In Luke’s story some Pharisees tell Jesus he should
flee because Herod wanted to kill him. He then speaks in the first person, but as a mother:
“Jerusalem, Jerusalem, the city that kills the prophets and stones those who are sent to it
(αὐτήν)! How often have I desired to gather your children (τὰ τέκνα σου) together as a
hen (ὄρνις) gathers her brood (τὴν ἑαυτῆς νοσσιάν) under her wings, and you were not
willing!” (Luke 13:34). Matthew’s version of this saying is almost identical. The
reflexive pronoun ἑαυτῆς in Luke intensifies the personal intimacy of Jesus’s words.
Jesus wants to gather “her own” chicks.480
The avian image that Jesus’s uses to describe himself has deep roots in Scripture.
The Psalms repeatedly depict God with the wings of a bird. In Psalm 17:8–9, the Psalmist
implores God to “hide me in the shadow of your wings, from the wicked who despoil me,
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my deadly enemies who surround me.”481 In Psalm 57, the psalmist declares that he takes
refuge with God, “in the shadow of your wings.” Psalms 36:8 and 61:5 also depict God as
protecting others under the “shadow” or “shelter” “of your wings.” Psalm 61 refrains
from any anthropomorphic imagery for God. The only reference to God’s form is to the
wings. This Psalm highlights God’s protective role, not God’s power to fight enemies. In
Psalm 63, the psalmist once again refers to God’s wings, under which he “shouts for joy”
(Ps 63:7). The Psalmist “looks for” God (v. 1) and “sees” God in the sanctuary.
According to some commentators, these verbs connote theophany.482 Finally, Psalm
91:1–4 invokes God’s wings:
You who live in the shelter of the Most High,
who abide in the shadow of the Almighty,
will say to the Lord, “My refuge and my fortress;
my God, in whom I trust.”
For he will deliver you from the snare of the fowler
and from the deadly pestilence;
he will cover you with his pinions,
and under his wings you will find refuge;
his faithfulness is a shield and buckler.
481
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This is the most developed imagery about God and wings. The word behind
“Almighty” is “ ֵאל ַשׁדַּ יGod of the Mountain Wilderness.”483 This name occurs 48 times in
the Hebrew Bible (Gen 17:1; 28:3; 35:11; 43:14; 48:3; 49:25; Exod 6:3; Num 24:4,16;
Ruth 1:20,21; Isa 13:6; Ezek 1:24; 10:5; Ps 68:15; 91:1, and 31 times throughout Job). So
while the imagery is of a God on high,  ֵאל ַשׁדַּ יalso signals something about the nonhuman
world. God is God of the nonhuman parts of the world. Parallels in the Ancient Near East
include a “goddess of animals” who was also called the “goddess of the wilderness.”484
Ostriches in particular became associated with this goddess. So behind the English word
“Almighty” in Psalm 91 stands a rich tradition of associating God with nonhuman
animals, appropriated to Yahweh.
Yet Jesus’s avian image for himself is feminine, unlike the avian images in
Hebrew Scriptures.485 While ὄρνις is a neuter case, the pronouns Jesus used for himself
(and his “brood”) are all feminine. By using female imagery of a hen rather than a male
image, Jesus shows little regard for the masculine gender norms for males.
Jesus the Hunted; Herod the Hunter

Moreover, in addition to Jesus depicting himself and his followers as female
chickens, Jesus depicts himself as hunted. When the Pharisees tell Jesus he should flee
because Herod wants to kill him, Jesus answers: “Go tell that fox (τῇ ἀλώπεκι) for me . .
483
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.” (Luke 13:31). John Darr argues that in Luke’s Gospel Herod is a dangerous predator.
Herod arrested and killed John the Baptist (Luke 3:20; 9:9). Now Herod was threatening
to kill Jesus. Jesus’s answer acknowledges the danger by pitting Herod “the fox” against
Jesus “the mother hen” (Luke 13:34).486 Jesus portrays himself as one of the weakest prey
animals that a middle-chain predator could attack. Jesus is not even a rooster, who might
fight back, but a mother hen. The feminine imagery combined with the idea that Jesus is
the hunted one, not the hunter, serves to undermine the ideal male image for Jesus in
Greco-Roman culture. Real men are not prey. Real men hunt.
Josephus tells us that Herod was an excellent hunter (κυνηγέτης).487 Josephus
describes how Herod supposedly was so skilled at bow hunting, javelin throwing, and
horsemanship that he supposedly once killed “forty wild beasts” in a single day. Josephus
connects these hunting skills to Herod’s skill in war: “seldom was he defeated in war.”488
Josephus portrays Herod as a manly man, whose virtues in violence and physical prowess
demonstrate his superiority. According to Josephus, Herod’s sons were taught to hunt and
were skilled in the art as well (and one of them even plotted to have his father killed
while hunting). Herod and his sons enacted an idealized masculinity within the Roman
imperial context.
Herod’s treatment of nonhuman animals ran against the customs and sensibilities
of his fellows Jews at the time. Again, Josephus relates a story: “There was also a supply
of wild beasts, a great many lions and other animals having been brought together for
486
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him, such as were of extraordinary strength or of very rare kinds. When the practice
began of involving them in combat with one another or setting condemned men to fight
against them, foreigners were astonished at the expense and at the same time entertained
by the dangerous spectacle, but to the natives [Jews] it meant an open break with the
customs held in honour by them.”489 Around his theater Herod had inscribed the great
war feats of Emperor Augustus, Josephus tells us.
The New Testament, of course, has a different but similar portrait of Herod, the
mighty warrior and hunter, than does Josephus. Herod wanted to kill Jesus in his infancy
and in his effort to do so killed “all the children in and around Bethlehem who were two
years old or under” (Matt 2:16). Herod was a bloodthirsty and ruthless tyrant. If Herod is
an example of Roman maleness it is one of unfettered rejection in the New Testament.
Luke’s depiction of Jesus taking up the position of a feminine prey bird in
relationship to a masculine predatory puppet-king signals also that Jesus stands in a long
line of Jewish rejection of hunting. Herod seemed to relish in killing nonhuman animals.
We see nothing like that in the patriarchs and prophets of Jewish Scripture. Before
examining this idea, however, I will look at evidence from Scripture that permits hunting
for Jewish people.
Hunting in the Jewish Tradition

Leviticus 17:13 permits some hunting amongst Jewish people: “anyone of the
people of Israel, or of the aliens who reside among them, who hunts down an animal or
bird that may be eaten shall pour out its blood and cover it with earth.” Jews were not
489
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allowed to hunt just any nonhuman animal, however. Deer, gazelle, roebuck, wild goats,
antelopes, mountain sheep, and the ibex are permitted, according to Deuteronomy 14:4–
5.
When we read the histories of the great kings and emperors of the ancient world
there are often accounts of their hunting feats (as Josephus records for Herod). There is
evidence that the royal courts engaged in hunting. Josephus recorded Herod’s hunting
obsessions. 1 Kings states that Solomon’s daily provisions included deer, gazelles, and
roebucks (1 Kgs 4:23). These are nonhuman animals that could have been hunted
lawfully according to Leviticus 17:13. Yet this list comes in an account of Solomon’s
extravagant reign and how Solomon’s opulence came about: Solomon militarized
Hebrew society and enslaved Israelites to build the temple, fulfilling a prophecy from 1
Samuel 8 in which God warned the Israelites that having a king over them would mean
rejecting God and becoming the king’s slaves. Given that at the end of his reign Solomon
was a hunted man himself, since God, according to the text, ripped the kingdom from him
due to his greed, it is not clear that 1 Kings 4 praises Solomon for his ostentatious reign.
As Barth says, “in Solomon’s glory as such we are not really dealing with beauty but
rather its preconditions: riches, brilliance, magnificence, inexhaustible possessions and
the lavish development of material means for it. There is such a thing as cold
magnificence, and, if we are not wholly deceived, Solomon’s glory appears to have
possessed more of the nature of this cold magnificence than true beauty.”490 For the most
part, the accounts of the kings—even King David and his son Solomon—are tragic
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stories of how the kings become ensnared in the trappings of power and prodigal
living.491
These depictions stand in stark contrast to the triumphalist narratives of nonJewish rulers. The royal Assyrian court went out on annual campaigns to conquer other
lands. Likewise, they developed an annual royal hunt, which was so important to the
Assyrian rulers that it was the basis of the royal seal for two centuries.492 During the reign
of Ashurbanipal (668–627 BCE), the annual lion hunt was particularly important, as it was
staged so that the population could watch the king kill lion after lion. The reliefs
displayed at the British Museum show lions in various stages of dying, pierced with
arrows. The lions did not die quickly. Ancient Greek hunting was also associated with the
elite “and not necessity.”493 Later Roman imagery featured the emperor hunting. A statue
of Domitian on horseback lancing a lion may be the earliest imperial hunting imagery,
reinforcing Domitian’s status as the ideal Roman male.494
All of the rulers surrounding Palestine from Assyrian days to the Roman era
depicted their rulers as great warriors, and these kings and emperors relished the idea of
their hunting prowess. By contrast, Jewish Scripture never depicts its kings as great
hunters.495 Some of them were great warriors like David, but they are not depicted as
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being trained in the art of hunting.496 David, in fact, grew up as a shepherd. The only hint
that the Jewish royalty engaged in hunting is from 1 Kings 4, which lists Solomon’s daily
provisions. But this does not seem like a story that simply brags about Solomon’s wealth.
Moreover, Jacob Milgrom argues that hunting was not an important part of the
Israelite economy and life in the monarchical period because most Jews had become
farmers at this point. Because of this, “hunting changed from a necessity to a sport, one
that could be indulged in only by a leisure class, namely the royal aristocracy.
Nevertheless, this law and the one specifying permitted game . . . demonstrate that since
hunting continued to be practiced—even by the relatively few—it had to be controlled by
legislation.”497 I would add that later rabbinical abhorrence of hunting for “sport”—which
I will examine in a later section—reflects Milgrom’s view as well. The fact that an elite
group of men could hunt down and kill nonhuman animals for pleasure was and remains
anathema in Jewish circles. Once Jewish people settled into a society in which they did
not need to hunt, to continue to do so was a sign of bad character and bloodlust. Solomon
is no exception to this rule.
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Anti-Hunting in the Tanak

Jewish Scriptures mention hunting in a few other significant places outside of
Leviticus 17. The two great hunters in Scripture are Nimrod and Esau.498 Nimrod is said
to have been a “mighty hunter” who started a kingdom beginning with the rebellious city
Babel (Gen 10:8–12). Nimrod’s family lineage stretches back to Cain through a series of
warriors and kingdom-makers to Babel. This heritage does not paint Nimrod in a good
light. Being a “mighty hunter” in the genealogy from Cain, the first murderer, is not a
badge of honor. The label is a mark of shame in this context.
The second great hunter in the Hebrew Bible, Esau, was Jacob’s twin and was a
“skillful hunter.” Isaac, their father, favored Esau because of his hunting skills. Esau’s
name itself denotes his masculinity: hairy-man. Jacob is said to have preferred to stay at
home rather than enjoying the manly hunt. Jacob even coaxed Esau into selling his
inheritance to Jacob for a bowl of stew that Jacob had prepared (Gen 25:29–34). Jacob
clearly enjoyed the more “female” activities of homemaking rather than the “manly”
activities of killing animals.499 The boys’ mother, Rebekah, favored Isaac as a result. She
tells Jacob to follow her instructions, dresses him in clothes so that Isaac will think Jacob
is Esau, and Jacob receives Isaac’s blessing meant for Esau. While Esau was out hunting
and killing nonhuman animals, being a “mighty hunter,” Jacob was home with his mother
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engaging in stereotypical women’s activities of trickery and cunning rather than violence
to get something done.500 Esau, the mighty hunter, turns his stalking and killing skills
toward his brother to kill Jacob when he learned of the deception. Jacob, however,
escaped due to his mother’s cunning, once again (Gen 27).501 In the story of Jacob and
Esau, the masculine hunter, is portrayed as dim-witted and troublesome, while the male
who stayed home with his mother and learned to cook and get his way nonviolently
(through words, costumes, etc.) finds himself blessed by God.502 So while all hunting is
not explicitly forbidden in the Hebrew Bible, it is not an activity associated with men of
good character. The masculinity involved is not heralded as praiseworthy but depicted as
bloodthirsty and stupid.
Moreover, the story of Jacob and Esau demonstrates that hunting was more about
status and masculinity than subsistence. In the story, Isaac asks Esau to hunt and kill
some game and make Isaac some “savory food, such as I like” (Gen 27:4). From the story
it is clear that Isaac and his family already had enough of food. They did not need to hunt.
So Isaac’s request does not arise from necessity but a vice of his own. Moreover, Isaac is
depicted as foolishly caught up in his meat-eating in this passage. He is so concerned
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with the flavor of his stew that he cannot discern that he is about to bless Jacob rather
than Esau.503
Furthermore, since Jacob slaughters two goats and cooks them for Isaac, and Isaac
accepts the food without noticing the difference, we can discern yet again that the issue is
status, not the actual food. The story of hunting is not about providing food for the
family, which is more easily done through more domestic activities, but about the risk
and danger associated with hunting, thereby giving the hunter a higher social status
(courageous, etc.). But Jacob subverts this social status through domestication: hunting as
a sign of one’s masculinity and worth becomes subservient to the cunning arts of the
domestic household where females are skilled (in that culture).504
In Exodus, as the Israelites wandered the desert for forty years, the story says that
God provided them with a heavenly vegetarian meal each day of manna (Exod 16). The
story mentions quail, but they are entirely eclipsed by the manna. Numbers 11 retells the
story in parallel, perhaps trying to explain the presence of quail in the Exodus account. In
this account the people had been eating manna for some time and started to complain:
“The rabble among them had a strong craving; and the Israelites also wept again, and
said, ‘If only we had meat to eat! We remember the fish we used to eat in Egypt for
nothing, the cucumbers, the melons, the leeks, the onions, and the garlic; but now our
strength is dried up, and there is nothing at all but this manna to look at’” (Num 11:4–
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6).505 Moses told them that God would grant their disobedient request but it would not be
fun: “You shall eat not only one day, or two days, or five days, or ten days, or twenty
days, but for a whole month—until it comes out of your nostrils and becomes loathsome
to you—because you have rejected the Lord who is among you, and have wailed before
him, saying, ‘Why did we ever leave Egypt?’” (Num 11:19–20). The text goes on to say
that as soon as the people tasted the flesh of the quail, “while the meat was still between
their teeth, before it was consumed,” God sent a plague upon them (Num 11:33). So in
this tale, hunting quail in the desert rather than eating God’s provision of vegetarian food
was seen as disobedient and liable to judgment. God even says there would not be enough
sheep or cattle to satisfy the gluttony (Num 11:22), connecting meat-eating to vice.
Hunting and consumption of animal flesh in Numbers is connected subtly to
masculinity as well. Moses complains to the Lord that he is being made to look womanly
to the people: “Did I conceive all this people? Did I give birth to them, that you should
say to me, ‘Carry them in your bosom, as a nurse carries a sucking child,’ to the land that
you promised on oath to their ancestors? Where am I to get meat to give to all these
people? For they come weeping to me and say, ‘Give us meat to eat!’” (Num 11:12–13).
This is a subtle complaint, in which Moses complains of being seen as feminine because
of the vegetarian food he provides. It is a deep story connecting consumption, hunting,
and gender in ways that denounce typical masculinity connected to hunting and
consuming other animals.506
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The biblical depictions of hunting, in which Nimrod, Esau and the “rabble” come
across negatively, are part of a general pattern of rejecting wanton violence toward
nonhuman animals in the Tanak. In the previous chapter I noted how some biblical
scholars see the Levitical laws about touching or consuming nonhuman animals actually
protects them from human avarice and points people back to a more peaceable vision in
Genesis 1. The negative portrayals of Esau and Nimrod in Genesis stand in contrast to the
attitude toward nonhuman animals in other cultures in which hunting and killing those
creatures is a rite of passage to manhood or in which rulers demonstrate their power and
might through wanton killing of nonhuman creatures. The symbolic nature of hunting as
a form of status and privilege comes to the foreground in the Hebrew Scriptures and the
Jews rejected that mode of status: the ideal Jewish male would become one who studies
Torah, not one who kills human and nonhuman animals.
Anti-Hunting in Rabbinic Tradition

Jewish literature through the ages simply does not praise hunting. Outside of the
Scriptures, as far back as the first century, Philo depicted hunting unfavorably.
Commenting on Nimrod, Philo says that his skill as a hunter should be condemned
because “hunting is as far removed as possible from the rational nature.”507 According to
Philo, hunting is “a sort of prelude to and representation of the wars and dangers that
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have to be encountered against the enemy.”508 He claims that Gentiles who kill
nonhuman animals even with a skill and precision that does not make them suffer should
be ashamed of themselves because God even “forbade the enjoyment of bodies which
died a natural death or were torn by wild beasts.”509 Killing other creatures is not
something to celebrate or that one does for enjoyment and leisure, according to Philo.
Philo also says that Jews should not even touch the carcasses of nonhuman
animals killed in a hunt, “thus learning from his dealing with irrational animals what he
should feel with regard to human enemies” who are only killed in self-defense and for no
other reason.510 Philo clearly had a very low view of (male) hunting. For him, the ideal
male is a citizen of the city and can read and write (presumably to study Torah). Again,
the only kind of hunting Philo would really know is that of hunting for pleasure. Esau and
Isaac were engaged in the sport for pleasure, not because they had to do it. Alexandrian
Jews would not have been skilled at hunting, either. So Philo’s comments really attack an
entire culture of hunting dominated by men seeking to prove themselves.
Later rabbinic literature has a generally low view of hunting as well. On the one
hand, Tractate Shabbat (106B–107A) in the Babylonian Talmud analyzes in detail what
is acceptable in terms of “hunting” on the Sabbath and what is not. The means of
capturing different animals matters. In general, the rabbis forbade any kind of “hunting”
on the Sabbath, including hunting predators like lions and snakes (presumably because
they are menacing one’s lands, because these are not kosher animals).511
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On the other hand, the Talmud Tractate Avodah Zarah comments on Psalm 1:1—
“Happy is the man who has not walked in the counsel of the wicked . . . nor sat in the seat
of scoffers”—by interpreting it as referring to Jews who refuse to attend the amphitheater
games in which nonhuman animals and humans kill one another or participate in hunting.
The rabbis condemned even the act of attending such spectacles. Indeed, they said that a
Jew who attends the amphitheater or hunts is “guilty of bloodshed.”512 The only way a
Jew was permitted to attend these events is if they went with the explicit intention to save
life: to shout for the life of the loser. Tractate Avodah Zarah pronounces a severe
judgment on hunters: “He who is a clever hunter will not live or have the length of days.”
The rabbis move quickly though to spiritualize “hunting” by transforming the male
hunter into one who studies Torah. These rabbis have a generally low view of killing
nonhuman animals in hunting, and replace such violence with a vision of masculinity that
searches out the Torah. “Real men” they seem to say, hunt for wisdom in the Torah. This
is a radical transformation of maleness.
An eighteenth-century rabbi may express the traditional view of hunting best. A
man once asked Rabbi Ezekiel Landau (1713-1793) if he could hunt on the rabbi’s large
lands, which included forests and fields. In response Rabbi Landau said: “In the Torah
the sport of hunting is imputed only to fierce characters like Nimrod and Esau, never to
any of the patriarchs and their descendants . . . . I cannot comprehend how a Jew could
even dream of killing animals merely for the pleasure of hunting. . . . When the act of
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killing is prompted by that of sport, it is downright cruelty.”513 In his Code of Jewish
Ethics, Rabbi Joseph Telushkin claims that although hunting is a popular sport in the
United States and other Western countries, hunting “is rarely practiced among Jews. I
have never seen a statement in Jewish religious literature that speaks of hunting for sport
in a positive manner.”514 The article on hunting in the Encyclopedia Judaica details a
long history, from antiquity through the Middle Ages to modern times, of rabbinic
opposition to hunting per se as cruel. One early eighteenth century figure, for instance,
said that those who engage in hunting “have taken hold of the occupation of Esau the
wicked, and are guilty of cruelty in putting to death God’s creatures for no reason. It is a
doubled and redoubled duty upon man to engage in matters which make for civilization,
and not in the destruction of creation for sport and entertainment.”515 The authors
conclude with a concise statement: “The rabbis looked askance at hunting as a sport and
strongly disapproved of it.”516 The idea, however, that most Jews could engage in hunting
without it being a sport (that is, it being about necessity) was and is a myth. The hunting
described in the Bible and Jewish literature is done with a net to capture the animal
before killing it. A bow and arrow was considered cruel because it could wound the
animal without killing it, which actually renders it unusable by giving the animal a defect
or blemish.517
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Jesus’s masculine identity is, therefore, wrapped up in a tradition that largely
rejected notions of maleness conditioned on hunting down nonhuman animals. Jesus,
rather, identified with a female chicken who would protect her brood from a cunning fox.
Jesus identified with a prey animal, and in line with a long and venerable tradition
rejected the position of the hunter.
Jesus with the Wild Animals

There is another passage that suggests a positive relationship between Jesus and
nonhuman animals. The Gospel of Mark records that Jesus began his ministry by
retreating to the “wilderness,” where Satan tempted him. While in the wilderness, Mark
states, Jesus “was with the wild animals; and the angels waited on him” (Mark 1:13).518
Scholars have interpreted the statement that Jesus was “with the wild animals” (καὶ ἦν
µετὰ τῶν θηρίων) in one of three ways. First, some have thought that the animals are
simply part of the wilderness setting.519 The wild animals stress Jesus’s separation from
human society. Second, some scholars see the wild animals as a threat and associate them
with the satanic temptations Mark mentions.520 The wild animals and Satan tempt and
threaten on the one side, while the angels stand with Jesus on the other side. But the
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angels are not mentioned as protecting Jesus, but simply providing for him. Moreover,
Mark does not portray the animals as hostile to Jesus. Indeed, the Gospel seems to put
them in a light of companionship with the phrase “with the animals.” Mark uses the same
phrase to denote association and agreement several places:
•

And he appointed twelve, whom he also named apostles, to be with him (ἵνα
ὦσιν µετʼ αὐτοῦ), and to be sent out to proclaim the message (3:14);

•

As he was getting into the boat, the man who had been possessed by demons
begged him that he might be with him (ἵνα µετʼ αὐτοῦ ᾖ — 5:18);

•

When she saw Peter warming himself, she stared at him and said, “You also
were with Jesus, the man from Nazareth (καὶ σὺ µετὰ τοῦ Ναζαρηνοῦ ἦσθα
τοῦ Ἰησοῦ)” (14:67).

So in Mark’s use, the phrase “and he was with the wild animals” (καὶ ἦν µετὰ τῶν
θηρίων) seems to connote a positive association or relationship and not a hostile threat in
this case. While the term θηρία certainly includes predatory animals that pose a threat to
humans, such as lions, leopards, snakes and other carnivorous creatures, θηρία can also
include nonhuman creatures that are not a threat such as mountain goats, gazelles, wild
donkeys, rabbits, and other creatures. The θηρία are simply nonhuman creatures over
which humans usually have no control.521
The third interpretation, which many scholars now follow, sees Jesus as
inaugurating the peaceable kingdom that Isaiah 11:6–9 and 65:25 depict.522 According to
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Richard Bauckham, Mark’s prologue, within which the statement about being with the
wild animals occurs, immediately sets Jesus as the messianic son who inaugurates God’s
kingdom. The wilderness is the nonhuman sphere where humans do not control the land
or its creatures. It is a place that humans do not inhabit. So the Spirit send Jesus intot he
wilderness where he encounters the nonhuman world and recapitulates Israel’s desert
wanderings: “He must establish his messianic relationship to these before he can preach
and practice the kingdom of God in the human world.”523 Mark’s text does not say that
Jesus dominated or in any way harmed them. He did not hunt them. He did not cry out for
“meat” in the desert as the Hebrew people did in Numbers.
According to Bauckham, the phrasing that Jesus was “with” the wild animals
suggests he went there to make peace and inaugurate the kingdom of God. He does this
first among the nonhuman world, then he comes back to civilization and Satan, wild
animals, and the angels, are no longer part of the story.524 Nevertheless, as Robert Murray
pointed out before Bauckham: “If the phrase is pregnant with implications, it must be
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admitted that Mark does not make them clear; a stronger clue would certainly be
desirable.”525
Bauckham’s interpretation might seem novel but there is at least one precedent in
Christian history. Saint Ephrem (c. 306–373 CE) preached that “He went about with the
animals which knelt and worshiped him; and the angels praised him on earth as in
heaven.”526 Christian poets and artists have also seen a peaceable symbolism of Christ in
the desert “with” the animals. Murray cites Stanley Spencer’s series of paintings in the
Art Gallery of Western Australia in which Jesus reclines near a fox den as the kids play
around him and another in which Jesus holds a scorpion in his hands as he sits alone in
the desert. In his poem “In the Wilderness,” Robert Graves also depicts Jesus at peace
with wild creatures.
He held communion
With the she-pelican
Of lonely piety.527
Graves continues depicting flocks of birds coming to Jesus to listen to his sermons. The
sick, the blind, and the ugly animals came to Jesus to find comfort. But his greatest
companion in the desert was the scapegoat:
And ever with Him went,
Of all His wanderings
Comrade, with ragged coat,
Gaunt ribs—poor innocent—
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Bleeding foot, burning throat,
The guileless old scape-goat.
Graves’s poem connects Jesus’s desert wandering with the scapegoat of the Leviticus 16,
who is sent out into the wilderness to bear the sins of Israel. The goat is innocent but
chosen by lot to wander the desert. Jesus befriends one of these goats as it struggles for
survival. This is not an image of masculine dominance but of human compassion and
fellow creatureliness.
In line with Bauckham we can also read Jesus being “with the wild animals” as a
recapitulation of the Edenic story. Jesus is the second Adam (1 Cor 15:45). In Genesis 2
Adam is set within a garden in which the trees were pleasant to view and were “good for
food” (Gen 2:9). Adam was to act like a gardner by tilling and keeping the garden, being
able to eat from any tree except the tree of knowledge of good and evil. Because God
wanted Adam to have companions, God formed all of the land animals and birds from the
dust of the ground, just like God had done with Adam. Then God “brought them to the
man to see what he would call them” (Gen 2:19).
Some interpreters see this passage as a violent act of dominion. For example,
Jean-Luc Marion states:
Adam gives a name, and thus a definition to the animals, which thus become
subject to him, because in general all knowledge by concept reduces what is
known to the rank of object. Adam thus names in the manner by which the I
knows—by concepts of objects. However, Adam has the power thus to name only
that which can legitimately become for him an object: the animals (and the rest of
the world), and perhaps the angels, but not God, and not himself. If, moreover, he
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claimed to name them, either this name would have no validity, or, if it had
validity, what he named would not be man as such (as the unrivaled thinker) but
merely a thought-object like all others.528
For Marion, the practice of naming objectifies the other into an object under one’s power
to dominate: “Man has the power to name, to understand, and thus to dominate.”529
According to his interpretation, that is why humans do not name themselves or God, but
do have a divine permission to name (dominate) all other creatures. Language defines us
as human beings, but it is dangerous when we turn it on ourselves.
If Marion is correct, Jesus does not rename the wild animals who he is “with” in
the wilderness in the Gospel of Mark. One way to read that passage within Marion’s
interpretation is that Jesus does not exercise such dominion.Yet it is far from clear that
Marion’s analysis of naming is the violent domination he claims.
The naming-story in Genesis 2 does not suggest that Adam somehow
“objectified” other creatures. In fact, God brought them to Adam because God considered
them to be suitable companions. The story does not indicate that Adam’s naming
ceremony began a slippery slope toward killing and eating the animals, which would
violate God’s mandate of a vegetarian diet (Gen. 1:29–31; 2:9, 16).
Equally important, interpreting the act of naming as inherently violent and
domineering seems misguided for several reasons. First, naming serves many different
purposes in Scripture, including dominion, and we cannot reduce every instance of

528

Jean-Luc Marion, "Mihi magna quaestio factus sum: The Privilege of Unknowing," Journal of
Religion 85, no. 1 (2005): 10. Marion cites Hegel, who wrote, “The first act, by which Adam established
his lordship over the animals, is this, that he gave them a name, i.e., he nullified them as beings on their
own account, and made them into ideal [entities]. . . . In the name the self-subsisting reality of the sign is
nullified.” Ibid., 10n19.
529
Ibid., 15.

239
naming to any one purpose. While kings sometimes gave subjects new names, thereby
signaling royal authority over the persons (for example, Gen. 41:45 and 2 Kgs. 23:34;
24:17), we cannot generalize from these instances to all instances of naming.
In Genesis 16, Hagar fled from Sarah. Finding her in the wilderness, God
comforted her with a promise of descendants. So Sarah “named the LORD who spoke to
her, ‘You are El-roi’” (Gen. 16:13). We can hardly imagine the author of Genesis
envisioning that Hagar has exercised dominion—understood as domination— in naming
God. Moreover, Hagar’s naming of God directly contradicts Marion’s claim that humans
cannot name God just as much as Adam’s naming of Eve contradicts his claim that
humans cannot name humans (and the absent sea creatures also challenge his thesis that
nonhuman creation is under dominion through the act of naming). In his detailed study of
naming in the Old Testament, George Ramsey concludes: “Taken all together, the
evidence indicates that, instead of thinking of name-giving as a determiner of an entity’s
essence, the Hebrews regarded naming as commonly determined by circumstances. The
naming results from events which have occurred. This is a generalization which has more
basis in the actual naming-passages of the OT.”530
Judith Barad suggests that rather than domination, naming creates relationships.
Commenting on the naming ceremony in Genesis 2, Barad observes: “we do not name
the animals we eat, for in doing so, they become more personal to us.”531 Rather than
naming, namelessness sometimes signals a broken relationship between creatures created
to be companions. On the other hand, Tripp York maintains that “If Christians and non530
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Christians are to see a world that is intelligible in light of our claims, then we must speak,
and perform, a very particular kind of language. For instance, as a thought experiment,
what if we ceased using descriptions that label animals as products, cosmetics, food,
clothing, entertainment, and pets and decided to call them, first and foremost, ‘our
covenant partners’? Wouldn’t that be profoundly more biblical than the previous
alternatives?”532 In other words, how we name or do not name other creatures either
establishes relationships or dominance.
Rather than diminishing the creatures and relationships already established, God
completes the circle began with Adam, continued with the land, sea, and air creatures,
and completed with the woman. So the naming ceremony simply causes God to create yet
another creature: woman. Therefore, the Genesis story is about a circle of relationships,
not about which creatures are inferior and superior to others, and which has the right to
dominate another.
John Eaton suggests that Adam and Eve form a “protective envelope around” the
nonhuman creatures, who “have a companionship to offer, and in their own way are
necessary to human happiness.”533 Likewise, Bauckham states that the naming ceremony
in Genesis 2 is about Adam acknowledging the other animals’ place in the world, in
which naming is a “presupposition for relationship. Parents naming children are
recognizing them as persons in their own right and giving them the wherewithal to be
identified as persons by other persons and thus to enter interpersonal relationships.”534
Naming does not result in alienation from other animals, as Marion suggests (following
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Hegel). Rather, Bauckham claims, “alienation from wild animals is the consequence of
the loss of Eden.”535 Moreover, animal otherness is a good that humans should “take
pleasure and delight in.”536
While the animals not suitable “helpers,” a word the text does not explain, God
did not fill that role either. Yet we do not assert human superiority over God because
Adam needed a female human to fill an undefined helper role. So why assert human
superiority over nonhuman animals on that basis? The text does not make that leap.
If we can read Jesus as recapitulating the story of Adam in the garden of Eden,
then how Jesus interacts with the other creatures is important. The Gospel of Mark does
not say that Jesus named the other animals. But, with Bauckham, it does suggest a
relationship of peaceableness rather than violence. But even if we imagine Jesus to give
names to other creatures, in a way reminscent of Adam, this type of activity does not
seem to be to be one of domination but one of respect.
Circumcision as a Jewish Identity Marker

Jesus’s maleness can be a lens through which to begin rethinking
human/nonhuman relationships and their place in Christian theology. That Jesus, as a
male, identifies with a female prey bird and stands with rather than against nonhuman
animals, rejecting hunting with his tradition, tells us something about the Incarnation:
God is not one who “lords it over” others. But there is more to Jesus’s maleness. In the
Greco-Roman world, beauty was highly valued. Dale Martin claims, “In popular
Greco-Roman culture, bodies were direct expressions of status, usually pictured as a
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vertical spectrum stretching from inhuman or barbaric ugliness to divine beauty. The
gods, of course, were beautiful; and people of aristocratic birth or upper-class origins
were expected to manifest their proximity to the divine by possessing a natural beauty
and nobility.”537 The Greek ideal of male beauty can be seen in their statues. Polycleitos
of Argos (5th century BCE) set the standard for male beauty in his treatise “Canon” and a
statue known as the “spear-bearer” or doryphoros, sculpted to illustrate the ideal
principles. Polycleitos discussed the ideal proportions of the body, seeing it as a
mathematical balance of relaxed and tense body parts in a symmetry. Balance, rhythm,
proportion, harmony, and symmetry characterize the ideal body. His sculptures depicted
“a heavily muscled sharply articulated scheme of the naked male body.”538 Each element
of Polycleitos’s statue was “constructed according to a set of precise set of measurements
calculated to represent perfection.”539 A later statue, “The Hunter” (300–100 BCE),
depicts a naked youth in motion as he is about to spear an animal, again representing the
ideal male body in action.540 The naked male body in action is beautiful.
We do not know what Jesus looked like. The Gospels are silent as to his actual
appearance. This stands in contrast to how ideal males of Greco-Roman culture are
depicted in literature and art. They are always beautiful. The first-century rhetorician,
Aelius Theon, for example, taught that a good rhetorician would detail the “health,
strength, beauty, [and] quick sensibility” of noble men in their encomiums.541 Depictions
of Jesus do not follow this advice. Drawing on Isaiah 53:2—“he had no form or majesty
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that we should look at him, nothing in his appearance that we should desire him”—
Christian theologians through the ages have not seen Jesus as a handsome male.
Tertullian went so far as to claim that Roman soldiers would not have spit on Jesus if he
had not been so ugly.542 Jesus’s masculinity, therefore, would not have come from his
attractiveness. His body in action, with precise proportions, balance, and harmony did not
define his beauty as a male. Indeed, the ugliness of his crucified body would have been
off-putting to those seeking an ideal male. His already ugly body now disfigured from
torture would in no way inspire masculine ideals. His maleness is the opposite of the
hunter/warrior.
For the Romans and Jews themselves, one of the primary markers of Jewish
identity was circumcision.543 Horace and Persius sarcastically referred to the “clipped
Jews.”544 Martial jealously chided a Roman woman for preferring Jewish men to Roman
ones.545 Circumcision signifies Jews. Roman authorities could even require a man to
display their genitals in order to determine whether the person was subject to the Jewish
tax the Romans imposed on all Jewish people to pay for the Jewish War (64–73 CE).546
“The rite of circumcision was central to the creation of visible Jewish difference in
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antiquity, a form of ‘otherness’ physically inscribed in the flesh.”547 Sometime between
120 and 132 CE, Hadrian forbade Jews from circumcising anybody, including their male
infants. In the 150s Antonius Pius relaxed Hadrian’s prohibition stating that Jews could
circumcise only their own babies, but not non-Jews.548 Male Jewish circumcision,
therefore, was part of a system of signs within the Roman economy of signs to signify
their otherness.
Unlike the Greeks who forced those they conquered to Hellenize, the Romans
prided themselves in their ability to absorb other peoples and their cultures.549 Roman
stereotypes, like all stereotypes, divide others into distinct groups—rather than one big
group called “the other”—so that that dominant group doing the stereotyping can place
different people into distinct groups. Stereotyping, in other words, involves a discourse of
power and knowledge. Stereotyping is one of the most prominent forms of colonial
discourse.550 These stereotypes, according to Homi Bhabha, recognize difference at the
same time that they reinscribe that difference within a discourse of power that subsumes
the colonial subject (in this case Jews) into the dominant system: difference exists but
only on Roman terms that establishes the Romans as superior.
So how did Jewish circumcision as a stereotype in Roman colonial discourse
function to establish Roman superiority in the minds of the Romans? Romans had a
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picture of the “ideal” male penis. Galen speaks about the beautiful ornamentation that
nature provided men with their foreskin.551 A boy’s nurse was to help mold his penis into
a more ideal type by various techniques.552 Foreskin was part of the ideal male in
antiquity.
Jews were often ridiculed in Roman literature for circumcision. Romans ridiculed
Jews because cutting off the foreskin of the male penis made Jewish men less masculine.
It made them ugly as well, more akin to nonhuman animals. Even the Greeks believed
this. In a fifth-century BCE painting, a Greek painter depicted Egyptian priests who had
been circumcised. Frederick Hodges describes the scene: “The painter has taken great
pains to depict the priests as having fat, ugly, wrinkled, circumcised penises with a
bulbous externalized glans, which contrast sharply with the neat and attractive penis of
Herakles, with its elegantly long and tapered prepuce. Likewise, the snubbed noses and
monkey-like faces of the Egyptians could hardly be more dissimilar to the heroic Greek
profile of Herakles.”553 That is, if an uncircumcised penis goes with a certain type of face,
long and tapered, and a circumcised penis goes with a hideous nonhuman animal-like
face, then it is clear which type goes with the ideal male.
To be more like a nonhuman animal is to be more like a female in these
stereotypes as well. Men have self-control, are rational, able to dominate their opponents,
and show virtue on the battlefield and the hunt. For the Romans, as for the Greek before
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them, “barbarians” were routinely characterized as effeminate and unmasculine. NonRomans lacked discipline and self-control especially in sexuality, a characteristic that the
Romans thought they shared with all women.554 Non-Romans were effeminate and let
their women rule over them. Romans were masculine and ruled over women. Jews were
often singled out in particular as sexually licentious, which placed them into the
effeminate category, and this had to do with their circumcision.
In the New Testament, Luke describes the setting and situation in which Jesus
was circumcised. He begins his account by noting that Emperor Augustus had declared
an empire-wide census that had consequences for the manner of Jesus’s birth. As a result
of the imperial decree, all the subjects had to travel to their hometowns, even pregnant
women like Mary. As a result, Jesus was born in a manger because there was no room for
them in the houses of Bethlehem (Luke 2:1–7). Luke marks Jesus as part of a people
subjected to Roman government, one that cares little for the lives of individuals.
Luke continues, “After eight days had passed, it was time to circumcise the child;
and he was called Jesus, the name given him by the angel before he was conceived in the
womb” (Luke 2:21). This is the only Gospel that mentions Jesus’s circumcision. Luke
connects it to his official naming. But Jesus, Luke makes clear, was circumcised.555
Jesus was born under a colonial government. That government could displace
people. Jesus was born under a colonial culture. That culture viewed masculinity in very
particular ways as dominant (potentially violently dominant), active, and self-controlled.
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Jewish males like Jesus were effeminate, submissive, and deformed, not at all ideal males
that Romans fetishized.556
The Gospel of Luke is often considered the most Gentile-oriented of the Gospels.
The first two chapters of Luke, however, seem much more focused on Jewish issues and
identities than the rest of the Gospel, leading some redaction-critical scholars to posit that
the opening chapters are part of an originally Jewish setting that is ultimately subsumed
and overcome in the rest of the Gospel. Luke, they claim, opens up the gospel from its
parochial Palestinian setting to a more universal audience of the larger Empire.557
Accordingly, many commentators argue that Luke stresses the naming, not the
circumcision, of Jesus in Luke 2:21. Joseph A. Fitzmyer is typical: “Stress is put here
more on the naming of Jesus than on his circumcision.”558 Yet, beyond the crude
supercessionism involved in these redactionist revisions of Luke, even if Luke had a
Gentile audience in mind, then the mention of circumcision seems all the more
significant.
Jesus’s circumcision is significant in a Gentile setting because Jews were
stereotyped as effeminate, submissive, and passive in contrast to the ideal Roman male
heroes who dominated their enemies and women, Jesus’s circumcision would
immediately mark him off as less than male. In such a cultural milieu Jesus would come
across as submissive and feminine, not a man to emulate at all. Jesus’s Jewish manhood,
marked in his circumcised penis, therefore, functions as a counter-cultural resistance to
556
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the dominant image of maleness in the Empire. Luke’s use of circumcision, then, is
similar to how later rabbis, monks, and nuns were viewed according to Daniel Boyarin.
They were “a category—a third gender—formed by Jewish men whose characteristic or
ideal mode of existence is scholarly-bookish, and therefore nonphallic and unmanly for
Eurochristian performances of gender, and monks for whom the same is largely true.”559
What should have functioned as a sign of Roman dominance of the deformed and
passive Jews by the hyper-masculine Romans is turned upside down. The mark of shame
from a Roman perspective becomes a mark of honor from a Jewish perspective. Luke
specifically mentions a repulsive trait of Jewish males to upturn what his audience should
expect from Jesus. Jesus is not the warrior-hunter ideal of Roman literature and imperial
power. Jesus is the circumcised and crucified Messiah. The first indication of who Jesus
will be is his circumcision: in that context, it is a re-appropriation of a colonial stereotype
into a positive reconfiguration of maleness that rejects male violence associated with the
phallus.
To the extent that circumcision undercuts the ideal of a warrior-hunter man,
Jewish emphasis on the creatureliness of all that exists also places maleness within a
relativized status. Men are creatures, too. Men are no better or worse before God than
women or other animals.560 God created all of them according the Jewish origins sagas.
God creates male and female humans in the divine likeness and image, but this does not
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place the male human in the place of dominator and killer of all that is not human. It
places Adam, the first human male, in the place of intimate relationship with other
creatures so that he can know them and name them.561 His relationship to nonhuman
animals was one of naming not consumption: fruit and seeds were his food, not flesh. The
male, right from the start of the Jewish story, is utterly different than the Greco Roman
male and the typical American male, who typically are taught to desire animal flesh and
leave salads alone as “women’s food.”
The ideal is no longer the male military leader as John the Baptist expected, in
line with so much prevailing culture.562 Instead of a violent male military leader as the
ideal for male humanness, the norm becomes the peaceable human whose identity is not
in competition with other creatures through hunting and warfare. Jesus’s nail- and spearpierced body, bleeding and dying on the cross, reveals a manhood that undercuts the
hegemonic stereotype of typical masculinity.
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Jesus goes to the cross. He dies. He suffers. In the Roman economy of signs this
is the utter defeat of a weak man. Some feminists also reject the cross, but not because it
does not signify a violent male. Alison Jasper sees the cross as glorifying suffering per se
as a type of obedience to God’s will. Moreover, Jasper argues, this crucifixion seems to
shed the body in ways typical of later Christianity that seems to have a low view of this
material world and our bodies in general. The cross glorifies suffering and devalues the
body in this interpretation. I think Jasper is right at one level: to the extent that Jesus’s
cross legitimizes oppression and tells women to just grin and bear it “like Jesus,” the
cross becomes a tool of oppression. To the extent that it tells oppressed men to grin and
bear it is also problematic. But Jesus’s crucifixion undercuts the prevalent portrait of
manhood in his and our culture.563
The trial and crucifixion narratives give no indication that they condone what
happens to Jesus or that the stories are meant to justify sadistic male behavior toward
others, be they human females or nonhuman animals. Yet without the resurrection, these
narratives would seem to trap women, nonhuman animals, and low status males in a cycle
of victimization. It is from the vantage point of the resurrection that we can read back to
the crucifixion and see the suffering endured there absolutely condemned.
Jesus, the subjugated male, with whom there is no reason in principle that women
cannot identify, does not stay dead. Death is what Jesus was supposed to fear the most.
Death is what Roman male dominance could give out as its mirrored other, in which that
which they feared the most is inflicted on others. But the tomb, the place where Jesus is
cast as another victim of male power, becomes a place for life to spring forth yet again.
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Jesus thus offers women hope: hope that despite being cast aside in the patriarchal
system, there will be life. The feminized male flesh of Christ rises from the tomb. How
can this not be a symbol of hope for women and a release for men from their hypermasculine fears masked in domination?
To argue that Christ’s maleness, per se, cannot be a source of hope and life for
women is to have a very peculiar understanding of male and female. It seems to reflect a
static view of biological sex and gender that does not do justice to the way the Gospels
portray Jesus’s body, as Graham Ward notes. Moreover, gender and queer studies in
theology are now recognizing just how problematic the idea of male and female are
biologically speaking anyhow.
This is not to say that the Gospels (much less the New Testament in general)
portray Jesus in such a way that are not troubling in terms of his relationship with
women. There are certainly plenty of instances of Jesus subverting the patriarchal values
of his time in relationship to women and men.564 But feminist readings are right to point
out that these are not always decisive. The male Jesus still often reflects certain ideas
latent in his and our modern culture that keep women in their place.
Nevertheless, essentialism about what it means to be male or female has to be
rejected to the extent that it depicts an either/or situation: either Jesus is male and
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therefore not able to save women, or his maleness is utterly unimportant and he might
have some value for women. Jesus’s maleness is a problem for modern males even more
than his male identity is for women because it does not conform to some of the most
enduring Roman hunter-warrior ideals.
Jesus let himself be crucified rather than wage war and violence. That rubs
directly against dominant ideas of what it means to be a man down through the ages. As
Boyarin notes about Jewish males (as well as Christian monks, nuns, and priests):
“Within the context of a culture in which ‘strength, assertiveness, activity, stoicism,
courage and so forth’ were the essential characteristics of manliness, Jewish men (and
certain classes of Christian men as well) appeared to be not-male or feminized.”565 This
reconfiguration of the ideal male is far from theologically marginal.566
Jesus was not ashamed of his circumcision. We have no indication—as we do in
other sources for some Jewish males—that he tried to hide his circumcision or reverse it
through various techniques of stretching skin. Moreover, I will argue more fully in the
next chapter that Jesus’s circumcision, to the extent that it feminized him in the Roman
economy of signs, an economy that Jewish people resisted and subverted by rejecting
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their ideal male, also dehumanized him in that economy. Roman beauty was pitted
against Jewish beastliness.
Conclusion

My argument in this chapter proceeds from what I argued in the previous chapter
about Jesus’s Jewishness. One of the presuppositions of this chapter is that Jesus’s
maleness inextricably intertwines with his Jewishness. There is no such thing as a “Jew.”
There is no such thing as a “male.” There are only particular embodiments and
performances in which aspect of identity that we might logically separate for the sake of
analysis are actually intertwined so deeply that any sharp division between Jew and male
in the case of Jesus would not do the Incarnation justice. Not only this, but unlike
previous studies, which have glossed over Jesus’s Jewish maleness and argue for a broad
creatureliness, I have tried to face it squarely with the awareness that Jesus’s identity as a
particular person in a particular place and time can speak to a universal audience. It is
precisely through his particularity that we begin to see how Jesus’s identity is salvific for
nonhuman animals and humans.
Gender is a performance. Maleness is a performance. Jewishness is a
performance. Jesus’s biological sex is intertwined with a transgendered performance that
is just as problematic for modern males as it is for modern females. The Gospels, as
Graham Ward has argued, paint a radically transgendered portrait of Jesus’s body in
which his male body does a lot of theological work across the gender divide. Any “men’s
ministry” that wants to pick up some helpful hints from Jesus’s maleness to reinforce
their hunting, killing, and violent tendencies, as some male ministries certainly do, will
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only be able to do so to the extent that they read Jesus in the most shallow manner
possible.
But when it comes to nonhuman animals, Jesus’s transgendered theological body
needs its Jewishness. Scholars have paid far too little attention to this aspect of Jesus’s
maleness to date. But it is precisely as a Jewish male that the Incarnation begins to take
on significance for other than human creatures. The dominant society made the ideal
male into a hunter who kills helpless and relatively defenseless nonhuman animals, and
then turns them into killers of their own kind of who must constantly negotiate their
power in relationship to others. But Jewish tradition can be read as often doing the
opposite. The record is not one of unbroken success. Yet there are trajectories that move
us toward liberation. Jesus’s own life is not one of an utter break with everything modern
theologians and critical theorists might see as patriarchal or speciesist. Yet he sets a
course that if taken to its conclusion will lead to more and more understanding and
critique. It will lead to more attempts to overcome patriarchy and speciesism. His
disciples, as he himself suggested, will do greater things than he.
If we ignore Jesus’s maleness we may also tend to take the Incarnation out of its
Jewish roots, where a creation-wide eschatological vision widens the scope of our
theological vision. Severed from these roots, we may miss the way Jesus’s maleness
transgresses constructed boundaries about what we think it means to be male or female.
We can only deconstruct stereotypical theological renderings of Jesus—which make his
gender something useable for patriarchal purposes as the characters do to Jesus in the
crucifixion—by focusing first on Jesus’s particularity and working through it.
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Theologically speaking, Jesus’s maleness as narrated in the Gospels has a
“transgendered” quality that subverts patriarchal domination and makes it problematic to
use that maleness to speak about “active” and “passive” aspects of life that could
underwrite social gender hierarchies. Jesus was a male Jew, and that Jewishness
influenced how he negotiated life as a man. They are related. The way Jesus crosses the
patriarchal boundary was completely within an interpretation and embodiment of Jewish
history and eschatology.
Jesus stands, I have argued, in a Jewish tradition that rejected the dominant image
of the ideal male as a violent hunter-warrior, a portrait of manhood that has been
prevalent from ancient to modern times. The virulent and violent male warrior, actively
conquering enemies and killing and consuming nonhuman animals, is not the ideal male
in this Jewish vision. Jesus stands in a tradition that undercuts the active violent male and
brings a new vision of peaceable masculinity into the foreground. That does not mean
there is not room for critiques of ways that the Gospels portray Jesus as still within a
system of the dominant. But it does mean we are not in an either/or situation, but a
trajectory set in motion long before Jesus and carried to new heights in the Incarnation.
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CHAPTER 5
THE WORD BECAME A JEWISH, MALE HUMAN

In chapters 3 and 4, I argued that Jesus’s particularity as a Jewish male helps
animal theology. The Jewish origins and eschatological stories frame everything Jesus
said and did. These theological bookends frame Jesus's maleness. His maleness
overturned dominant portraits of the bloodthirsty male hunter and warrior. Jesus’s
theologically-transgendered body challenges our bipolar views of biological sex and
culturally-generated gender. At the same time, his circumcision marked him as radically
different from the ideal Roman male. How Jesus was male matters for how we think
about the Incarnation and nonhuman animals.
Despite these trajectories, Jesus’s humanness may provide an insurmountable
barrier. While we might be able to revise the Nicene Creed from “Who for us men, and
for our salvation, came down from heaven; and was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the
Virgin Mary, and was made man” to less a less masculine-biased translation—“Who for
us human beings, and for our salvation, descended from heaven; and was made incarnate
by the Holy Spirit from the virgin Mary, and became human”—even this genderinclusive translation about the Incarnation could reinforce the assumption that Jesus’s
humanity is the all-decisive particularity for thinking about God and creation. In other
words, Jesus’s humanity could derail reflection on the Incarnation and nonhuman
animals.
Responding to Christian anthropocentricism, many theologians dismiss Jesus’s
humanity as a Christological focal point. As noted in the introduction, Sallie McFague
argues that we must relativize Jesus of Nazareth in Christology but “maximize it
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[Christology] in relation to the cosmos” by seeing the cosmos as God’s body.567 Others,
such as Denis Edwards, Niels Gregersen, and Elizabeth Johnson, take a different
approach. They view humanity as comprised of cosmic elements that began billions of
years ago. So while acknowledging Jesus’s humanity, they connect Jesus’s humanity to a
wider ecology.
I have argued that McFague does not take the Incarnation’s particularity seriously
enough. The “deep Incarnation” approach produces more enlivening results for Christian
theology. Ecological and cosmic forces have shaped humanity. Everything is
interconnected. Nevertheless, this approach may take such a wide view of Jesus’s
humanity loses particularity. Moreover, these theologians' broad viewpoint may
clash with the personalism of the Triune Creator who notices every sparrow. In this
chapter, my approach supplements deep Incarnation theology. I will read Jesus's
humanity as necessary for animal theology.
Jesus’s Humanity as a Problem for Animal Theology

Before constructively reading Jesus’s humanity in relation to nonhuman animals,
a couple of scriptural challenges seem to halt the endeavor. Commentators across the
ages have used the stories of Jesus sending a demon into pigs as exemplifying human
superiority and dominion. Commentators have also used the Gospel of Luke’s fish-eating
Jesus in a similar way. In this section, I will examine these stories and argue that they do
not establish human superiority and violent dominion based in Jesus’s humanity.
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Pigs and Demons: Mark 5:1–20

In a pericope common to all three Synoptic Gospels, Jesus seems to show little
regard for pigs. In Mark’s Gospel, Jesus lands in the vicinity of Gerasenes and encounters
a man who lived in the tombs (Mark 5:1–20, see also Matt 8:28–34 and Luke 8:26–39).
This man had broken shackles and howled at the moon. He also regularly committed
violence against himself (Mark 5:5). Upon seeing Jesus, the man ran toward Jesus, whom
he called “Jesus, Son of the Most High God” (Mark 5:7), imploring Jesus not to
“torment” him. Sensing a demonic presence, Jesus commands the spirit to leave the man,
but then asks what the spirit’s name is. The spirit says, “Legion, for we are many” (Mark
5:9). Then the spirit begged Jesus not to send them away to “torment” (to “the abyss” in
Luke 8:31). They feared Jesus was going to kill them, so they asked to go into a “great
herd of swine” of about two thousand: “Send us into the swine; let us enter them” (Mark
5:12). Legion apparently viewed going to the pigs as a refuge and escape. Jesus “gave
them permission.” The spirits entered the pigs, who then stampeded down a hill and
drowned in the sea (Mark 5:13).
Commenting on this story, Bertrand Russell charged that Jesus “was not very kind
to the pigs to put the devils into them and make them rush down the hill into the sea.”
Jesus, Russell argues, is supposedly God and as such would be omnipotent: “He could
have made the devils simply go away; but He chose to send them into the pigs.”568 Jesus
let the evil spirits kill pigs for no reason: he could have denied the demonic request and
sent the spirits completely away. Indeed, Jesus “made” the pigs drown in Russell’s view,
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disproving his goodness and divinity. Animal rights philosopher Peter Singer also sees
this passage as pointing to Christological flaws. “Jesus himself is described as showing
apparent indifference to the fate of non-humans.”569 Biblical scholar, David Rhoads, lists
this incident as one of the more “egregious examples of disparaging attitudes toward
nature in the New Testament.”570 Stephen D. Moore adds that the pigs are
“natural/supernatural hybrids” and as such represent “the literal demonization of the
animal in Mark.”571 The destruction of the pigs, therefore, according to Moore, violently
establishes human superiority.
By contrast, some interpreters read the story as a political allegory. Ever since
Ched Myer’s groundbreaking work Binding the Strong Man, many scholars have seen
this story as veiling a conflict between Jews and Romans. English translations mask
numerous Greek and Latin terms that signal the Roman military as the story’s target.572 A
Roman legion—with a boar as their ensign—was garrisoned in the vicinity. That Legion
drowns in the sea recalls the parted Red Sea crashing down around Pharaoh’s army.
Drawing on such scholarship, Charlie Camosy writes, “The demon’s name, Legion,
seems to be a dead giveaway here.”573 Annika Spalde and Pelle Strindlund argue that
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such “coded political messages” commonly appears in the Bible and in culture. The Book
of Revelation uses this kind of imagery, for instance.574
Many commentators, by contrast, maintain that Jesus chose a lesser evil. The
demons feared that if they would die without a body to live on parasitically, and since
demons were territorial, they saw the pigs as a suitable substitute for the man. The
demons, these scholars claim, had meant to kill the man, but Jesus sent them into the pigs
as a “lesser evil.”575 According to Bauckham, this story does not teach that nonhuman
animals are valueless. Nevertheless, “the principle that human beings are of more value
than other animals here operates to the detriment of the latter, in a case, unique within the
Gospels, where a choice has to be made.”576 Jesus’s action, therefore, becomes less of a
problem by imposing hierarchies of being and moral quandaries on the story.
Michael Gilmour sees several problems with Bauckham’s way of reading this
story.577 First, if the demons wanted to kill the man, why had they left him alive? Second,
if their plea was for survival, as many scholars argue, why would they drive the pigs into
the ocean to drown, since they needed a body to survive as well, according to the then
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prevailing views of demons? Third, Jesus cast out other demons without such collateral
damage and could have done so here. Fourth, to attribute the wanton destruction of life to
Jesus raises problems of consistency since Jesus indicates that God cares about even a
single sparrow’s death (Matt 10:29–31). Finally, argues Gilmour, the standard
interpretations raise issues about Jesus’s authority. Cannot Jesus save the pigs as well as
the human? If Jesus is lord of all creation, then this limitation seriously challenges the
standard interpretations about the pigs.
Gilmour offers his own reading: the pigs are neither passive victims of demonic
murder nor docile nothings whom Jesus disregarded. Rather than being acted upon
passively, the pigs actively resist the demons. The Bible does not depict nonhuman
animals as Descartean machines. Rather, nonhuman animals cry out to God for food (Job
38:41; Ps 147:9; Ps 104:21; Joel 1:21); actively recognize angels (Num 22:22–35); work
as God’s agents (Jonah); and groan for redemption (Rom 8:18–23). Nonhuman animals
praise God and in the Book of Revelation surround God’s throne (Rev 4:8). Meanwhile,
the demons have an interest in their hosts staying alive. So Jesus’s permission to the
demons to enter the pigs does not mean he permitted the demons to kill the pigs. Rather,
the pigs act against the demonic forces. “The demons do not anticipate creation’s
abhorrence of their evil presence, which through an exercise of self-sacrifice destroys
them. The demons do not plunge the swine into the waters. It is the other way around.
The swine hurl the demons into the ‘sea’ using their own bodies, destroying the devils in
the process.”578 The sea, in biblical literature, is a place of chaos and abyss, exactly where
Luke says the demons wanted to avoid.
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If Gilmour’s interpretation is plausible, then the pigs in this story cooperate with
Jesus in freeing the man from his demonic possession and in liberating the Earth from a
demonic presence. Rather than pitting Jesus against nonhuman creatures in a “lesser evil”
scenario, Gilmour’s interpretation places the pigs and Jesus in a cooperative role more
fitting to Jesus’s role as savior and liberator.579 Rather than violently establishing the
superiority of humanity, as Moore asserts, this story shows pigs working against evil.
Supporting Gilmour’s interpretation is the fact that an active verb describes what the pigs
did: ὥρµησεν ἡ ἀγέλη (the herd rushed—Mark 5:13—third person, singular, active,
aorist, indicative). The herd itself ran. They acted. If the demon had run then we might
expect the subject to be Legion: “Legion rushed.” If Legion caused the pigs to run, we
might expect a passive construction—“the pigs were rushed”—or some kind of causal
statement like “Legion caused the pigs to run into the sea.” Yet the Greek text states that
the pigs stampeded into the water, drowning themselves and depriving the demons of
their bodily hosts.
As a way of comparison, it might even be useful to compare the pigs’ action to a
first-century Jewish protest. Pilate had raised Roman imperial standards in Jerusalem,
offending many Jewish people. When they objected en masse, Pilate had the protesting
Jews surrounded with soldiers. In response, the Jewish demonstrators “flung themselves
579
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in a body on the ground, extended their necks, and exclaimed that they were ready rather
to die than to transgress the law.”580 The readiness to resist evil to the point of death can
also be read in the pigs rushing into the lake.
In response to reading the pigs as having active agency, some would deny that
these creatures have any capacity for agency. Sara Grey and Joe Cleffies , for example,
writing in the left-wing magazine Jacobin, recently argued that nonhuman animals are
“objects of history” because unlike oppressed humans nonhuman animals have never
mounted resistance: “Human beings, whatever their racial identity, possess agency.
Enslaved human beings, even in the most brutal days of the chattel system, were selfdirected beings who not only felt pain and experienced self-perception but who loved,
reasoned, wrote, and above all fought for their own freedom. Other species will never
display that kind of agency.”581 But some evidence suggests otherwise. Nonhuman
animals have resisted captivity and oppression. Take, for example, a story in The
Guardian about a chimpanzee named Santino held in a Swedish zoo. Santino hates it
when humans come to observe him. So he began stockpiling bits of concrete that he had
actively chipped away from a wall. He would wait till visitors showed up and then go to
his ammunition pile and throw them at the visitors.582 That is plotting and resistance.
Moreover, the idea that only humans can act purposefully to resist their oppression has
been used in the past to justify oppression of other humans. For instance, in the
nineteenth century, white Americans sometimes justified slavery by noting that black
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slaves were objects “incapable of deep plots.”583 Yet we know that slaves occasionally
revolted. Likewise, Jewish people mounted some revolts from their ghettoes against Nazi
oppression. Does the fact that there were not more revolts mean that Jews and African
Americans are “objects of history”? There is a circularity to the reasoning that denies
agency to other animals. Moreover, as we shall see, such reasoning is what Giorgio
Agamben calls “the anthropological machine.”
In any case, whether one will allow the pigs in the Gospel account to have their
own agency will often depend on the aprioi assumptions one brings to this text: are other
animals capable of acting on their own or not? If so, then the pigs may have acted to
resist a demonic presence. If, however, a person will not allow for this possibility as a
matter of principle then there is some bias against other animals being brought to the text,
a bias, we shall see, that trades on a violent establishment of human superiority. That
establishment of human superiority, however, is what one brings to the text, not what a
person simply reads off of it. I will return to this, but first, there is another story to
examine.
Jesus and Fish

Jesus’s relationship to fish creatures seems to model something less than a
peaceable co-existence.584 Most of Jesus’s use of fish in the canonical Gospels revolve
around food. He cooks fish for his disciples (John 21:9–13), multiplies fish and bread to
feed a large crowd (Matt 14:13–21; 15:32–39), helps his disciples catch fish in a net
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(Luke 5:4–6; John 21:6–8), and tells Peter to retrieve a coin from a fish’s mouth (Matt
17:24–27). In a single Lukan passage, Jesus even eats a piece of fish after the resurrection
to prove his bodily reality (Luke 24:42–43).
The debate over Luke 24:42–43 has often turned on the passage’s historical
reliability.585 Arguing for the nonhistoricity of all passages about fish and Jesus, Keith
Akers argues that later Christians added Luke 24:42–43 in order to accommodate a
growing influx of flesh-eating pagans, and so these interpolating Christians corrupted an
original Christian vegetarianism.586 Yet no solid evidence supports Akers’s thesis. The
church never condemned vegetarianism per se, only various underlying antimaterialisms. There are also no extant biblical manuscripts that would demonstrate
tampering with the fish passages. Consequently, Akers’s lost vegetarian Jesus seems
implausible. His underlying logic—for modern Christians to be vegetarian Jesus should
have been one too—displaces eschatology for ethics since the end must be fully realized
in the historical Jesus. We must be able to look back for a fully realized eschatology to
imitate.
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At the other extreme, some scholars completely reject concerns around Jesus and
nonhuman animals. I. Howard Marshall, for example, asserts dismissively with regard to
Jesus’s interaction with the demon Legion: “The moral problem can be safely dismissed:
one man is of greater value than many swine.”587 This response does not allow Jesus’s
Jewish context to challenge modern Christians. As Richard Bauckham argues, “Jesus in
his recorded teaching, does not teach compassion for animals, but he places himself
clearly within the Jewish ethical and legal tradition which held that God requires the
people to treat their fellow-creatures, the animals, with compassion and consideration.”588
The creation-wide redemption that the New Testament and the prophets picture of the
messiah calls for a more careful assessment of Jesus’s actions toward some sea creatures.
Moreover, if Jesus’s mission is to address the problem of life’s horrors and not just
human sin, then Jesus’s fish-eating needs careful assessment rather than dismissal as a
nonissue.
A third way that scholars have viewed this passage is to claim that Jesus commits
a “lesser evil” act. In Animal Theology, Andrew Linzey claims, “It can sometimes be
justifiable to kill fish for food in situations of necessity,” such as survival.589 Jesus and
the disciples must have faced such situations. But because there is a presumption in
Christianity for life and against taking it, those who can live without recourse to violence
should do so, even if there are borderline cases where violence and killing are necessary
in a fallen world. Yet the text from Luke in which Jesus eats a piece of broiled fish does
not indicate that Jesus and his disciples faced a situation of necessity. They were never in
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danger of starving. Even when Jesus was hungry and tempted in the wilderness, he did
not hunt the wild animals that were with him.
None of these solutions satisfies me. Instead, I think that a more solid footing
comes by grounding Jesus’s actions in Jewish Torah, which strictly limits the types of
nonhuman animals Jews may consume. The entire system of Jewish rituals, Milgrom
argues, is premised on the idea that “human beings can curb their violent nature through
rituals means, specifically, a dietary discipline that will necessarily drive home the point
that all life, shared by animals, is inviolable, except—in the case of meat—when
conceded by God.”590 Milgrom expounds on the fact that the Hebrew Bible does not
name a single real fish (it only names the mythical Leviathan and a great sea monster, see
Gen 1:21). The Priestly source (H) lists all the forbidden foods—wild animals, birds, and
swarmers—but omits fish (Lev 20:25). The relatively scarce legislation regarding fish
species, therefore, is a consequence of a single fact: “Israelites were not fishermen—at
least until the end of the Second Temple times.”591 Israel did not control very many fresh
water streams, and the Sea of Galilee was part of a contested border that had been
annexed by Assyria when that empire destroyed northern Israel. The Mediterranean was
not accessible to Israelites for much of its history. So Israel “would, at best, have known
only a few species of fresh water fish.”592 Milgrom cites studies demonstrating that until
the modern Suez Canal was built in 1869, the eastern side of the Mediterranean had very
few species of fish living there because all of the nutrients fish species needed to survive
were too deep. So the reason that ancient Hebrews did not list species of fish in the
detailed way they did other animals is “not because they had no contact with the sea, but,
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to the contrary, the sea with which they had contact was virtually devoid of fish.”593 The
fish brought to Jerusalem were from foreign fishermen who could fish the Greek seas.
The “piscatorial dearth” around Israel, however, has a further consequence. The “finsscales” criterion for forbidden and allowed species restricted Israel’s consumption of
“seafood” nearly to the point that they could not consume sea creatures at all. Only a few
species, Milgrom argues, passed the test: “It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that
the very purpose of the criteria for fish, just like the criteria for quadrupeds . . . was to
limit Israel’s access to the animal world.”594
The terms “fish” or “seafood,” therefore, are already far too broad when speaking
about Jesus. Since, in Jesus’s time, water creatures without fins and scales were expressly
forbidden to all Jewish sects, we can safely assume that Jesus did not eat catfish, shrimp,
crab, shellfish, dolphin, whale, octopus, and much more just as he did not eat pigs, ducks,
rabbits, and other land animals that Mosaic dietary laws explicitly or implicitly forbade
(Lev 11 and Deut 14). We do not know the exact species, but Jesus’s Jewishness already
limits the broad category of “fish” to far fewer species than such a catchall term suggests
to English-speaking ears. So the first word in thinking theologically about this passage I
would offer is limit-with-purpose. The purpose of the dietary limitations was
peaceableness: God is peaceable; humans made in God’s image ought to be peaceable
too. Linzey offers the same point, but by way of an unwarranted textual interpretation.
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Jesus’s Jewishness would have provided Linzey with a better route.595 Once again,
Jesus’s Jewish particularity becomes important.
I submit that Jesus’s Jewishness is the decisive factor in the act of fish-eating in
Luke. Not only was his own access to fish severely limited by virtue of the fins-scales
criterion, but the few fish he and his disciples would have had access to even while
engaging in fishing were severely curtailed.596 The entire point of this Jewish limitation
was to point Israelites back to the peaceable kingdom vision of Genesis 1 and forward to
the prophetic vision of a renewed creation. Perhaps we could say that it would have been
better for the Son of God to have abstained from fish altogether under that pedagogical
tool. But that Jesus ate fish at least once still fits within the Jewish tradition’s limitation
of human violence toward other animals. To condemn Jesus for eating a piece of fish
misses the radical Jewish disruption of humanity’s desire for consumption. Even if Jesus
ate a piece of fish, that consumption is already encircled by a system designed to limitwith-purpose, pointing backwards to God’s intentions for all creatures and pointing
forwards to new and transformed relationships between all creatures. Indeed, one could
argue, as I will in this chapter, that eventually the church came to see that relationship
embodied in the person of Jesus’s ascended body, where the predatorial lion and the
gentle lamb finally come to rest.
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Clearing Away Another Challenge: Descartes’s Humans and Animals

I began this chapter with the challenge of Jesus’s confrontation with Legion and
the pigs’ subsequent action as well as Jesus’s fish-eating not only because they challenge
my working idea that Jesus’s particularity as a human helps rather than hinders
theologians to develop an “animal theology.” But I have also used these stories because
they illustrate that we never read these texts as if they are simple bare facts. We come to
them with prior assumptions and interpretive grids that can stifle the liberating trajectory
of the Incarnation.
If we assume that only humans are capable of rational foresight and active
agency, then of course we will either have to accuse Jesus of lesser evil thinking, being
callous, or being a speciesist (for better or worse). If we assume that Jesus’s fish-eating in
Luke gives carte-blanche permission to Christians to kill and destroy whatever nonhuman
animal we like, then obviously Jesus’s humanity stands as an insurmountable obstacle to
animal liberation within a Christian framework.
Yet different assumptions can open up these texts in liberating ways for not only
nonhuman animals but also for humans. Reading the texts with different assumptions can
free us from the responsibility of being lords and masters over others (cf. Luke 22:25 and
Matt 20:25). Violent dominion harms everyone involved, or as Pope Francis repeatedly
argues in Laudato Si’: “everything is connected.”597 This statement stands in stark
contrast to the binary cuts made in theological anthropology at least since the time of
Descartes.
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Descartes declared that animals are nothing more than divinely created
“machines.”598 We can know the difference between “man and beast,” according to
Descartes, because “it is quite remarkable that there are no men so dull-witted or stupid . .
. that they are incapable of arranging various words together and forming an utterance
from them in order to make their thoughts understood; whereas there is no animal . . . that
can do the like.”599 This is not because animals do not have the necessary body parts but
because “they have no reason at all.” All they can do is mimic speech like any robot
humans might devise. “They have no intelligence at all.” Animals are simply a
conglomerate of “bones, muscles, nerves, arteries, veins and all the other body parts that
are in the body of any animal.”600 Animals are totally devoid of λόγος. Only the rational
soul that humans have can possess this λόγος. Otherwise, we are looking at mere animals
who are like machines, like clocks whose motion and parts are entirely devoid of reason
and thought.
Descartes seems to have believed that animals cannot feel pain because they have
no perception or interior senses at all, which are the conditions for suffering. Between
humans and animals there is only an abyss. The “marvelous connection of all things”
about which Thomas Aquinas spoke becomes flattened into a binary with Descartes: the
human and the animal, that which has reason or λόγος and that which does not.
Speaking about Jesus’s “humanity” risks appropriating him into our modern
human/animal binary. Jesus was not a modern “human” whose humanity was essentially
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and fundamentally at odds with the “animal.” When thinking about Jesus’s humanity in
our time it is important to note that Jesus’s humanity has nothing to do with Descartes’s
binary in which what is human is defined against animals. In the first chapter of this
dissertation I examined the roots of  ָבּשָׂרand σάρξ, showing that these terms connect
humanity with all other animals without making a binary hierarchy. All flesh, the
Psalmist writes, is “like grass; they flourish like a flower of the field; for the wind passes
over it, and it is gone, and its place knows it no more” (Ps 113:15–16).
In contrast to a Jewish understanding of difference and commonality amongst
animal creatures, Descartes not only strips animals of any possible connection to reason,
he also cuts away everything except the formless and shapeless “mind” in humanity: I
think therefore I am. Nowhere in Scripture do any authors define humanity and other
animals in this way. Rather, humans and nonhuman animals are living beings who all
have God’s breath. It is God’s Spirit that defines the living being, not a special
“substance.” Unlike every other creation that God declares good, God never says that
humans are good. Instead, Genesis says that God saw everything, “and indeed it was very
good” (Gen 1:31). Humans, in this view, are only good in relationship to everything else
and not set apart from it in a binary opposition. Therefore, if we are to define humans and
other animals within the Descartean binary, then Scripture does not contain any animals
or humans. This all too common modern lens for reading theological anthropology and
views about animals in Scripture simply flattens the swarming and teeming world of the
Bible. Such a lens will not do for understanding Jesus’s humanity.

273
Animal Rights and Homogeneity

Descartes’s view stands in a long line of defining what it means to be human by
looking for characteristics that are unique to humanity such as “reason” or “language” or
“self-consciousness.” Yet something has happened in our time that radically challenges
this classical anthropology. We now realize not only that humans are an evolved creature
with deep connections to other creatures, but that the qualities theologians and
philosophers once posited as uniquely human are also found in a variety of other species
to one degree or another. The issue then becomes matters of degree not qualitative
differences. This is an important and fundamental modern development.
Consequently, some modern theologians and theorists have tried to reimagine
human/nonhuman animals relationships based on the idea that those nonhuman animals
that exhibit the human-like traits of reason and rudimentary language skills should be
given rights and generally treated as we would other humans.601 This view is generally
based on a static notion of humanity. Beyond the static notion of humanity, animal rights
viewpoints have some other tensions to resolve.
First, rights language posits anthropocentric characteristics as the determining
factor for ethical consideration. Why not use echolocation found in bats and dolphins, for
example? Second, those creatures who do not exhibit the necessary capacities for equal
treatment do not have rights. This reinforces human domination rather than helps to
undercut it. Third, this viewpoint lacks a robust anthropology since not even all humans
exhibit the qualities necessary to be human. Mentally incapacitated humans, for example,
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may not have the necessary qualities that define humanity. So the classical definition of
humanity does not even really include all humans. There are structural flaws in the
anthropology from the start. Fourth, animal rights advocates often value “reason” over
other traits, like emotions. If we must base treatment of nonhuman animals on reason
alone, then this is a peculiarly narrow way to see humanity, and historically a maledominated viewpoint. Why should emotions that elicit compassion, pity, and love be
excluded?602 This hearkens back to the third point: what is most human is maledominated reason, with the more “emotional” aspects equated with females who are
human but not ideally so. But once again, this is not how we should best define Jesus’s
humanity.
Framing a Hermeneutic: Derrida, Deleuze and Guatarri, and Agamben

Having started the chapter with Scriptural challenges that at first seem to establish
Jesus’s humanity as violently dominant but on another reading do something very
different, in the following section I will detail some current philosophical currents that I
think provide a good lens for interpreting Jesus’s humanity. I do not wish to impose these
on the text anachronistically. However, these ideas provide some lenses through which to
view the Incarnation and open the texts to new insights. That is, I will use the ideas from
the next section to help re-read Jesus’s humanity all while trying to allow the alienness of
texts from two thousand years ago to speak into the modern world.
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Jacques Derrida: The Animal Difference

In response to ideas examined earlier that would homogenize creatures by forcing
them into a standard of humanness, Jacques Derrida argues that we should heighten and
expand differences rather than try to flatten them into sameness. If Derrida’s body of
work is taken as a whole, he wrote more about nonhuman animals than any other
subject.603 He claimed, “Since I began writing” that he had addressed issues about the
human/animal binary “a thousand times.”604 Derrida argues that Western philosophy has
erroneously posited an isolated human individual without attending to the complex
systems and network of differences that make such individuals possible in the first
place.605 So the primary task of philosophy is to recover differences, which includes
examining the human/animal binary that defines modern anthropology.
Rather than finding human traits like language or reason in nonhuman creatures
like great apes or dolphins, Derrida multiplies differences. For example, he calls into the
question the term “animal.” This “catch-all concept” covers every creature we do not
consider human fellows “in spite of the infinite space that separates the lizard from the
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dog, the protozoon from the dolphin, the shark from the lamb, the parrot from the
chimpanzee, the camel from the eagle, the squirrel from the tiger, the elephant from the
cat, the ant from the silkworm, the hedgehog from the echidna.”606 This homogenizing
designation erases difference and involves a power relationship. It is not a neutral
classification. Human and animal are asymmetrical classifications:
We have to notice that these two plurals (beasts, men) are asymmetrical and
problematical. . . . in that the two plurals do not correspond to two classes or two
species, two comparable sets. All men are supposed to belong to the same species
or the same genus, the human species, the human race, whereas the beasts . . .
designates a set with no other unity, any more than that of said animal which has
no other supposed unity than a negative . . . namely that of not a human being.
But there is no other positively predictable unity between the ant, the snake, the
cat, the dog, the horse, the chimpanzee . . . or the sperm whale.607
Derrida charges that the general concept “the animal” only reduces all the diversity of life
“by violence and willful ignorance . . . The confusion of all nonhuman living creatures
within the general and common category of the animal is not simply a sin against
rigorous thinking, vigilance, lucidity, or empirical authority, it is always a crime. Not a
crime against animality, precisely, but a crime of the first order against the animals,
against animals.”608 It is also, he elaborates, an affront to humanity: “The simplisticness,
misunderstanding, and violent disavowal that we are analyzing at present also seem to me
to be betrayals of repressed human possibilities, or other powers of reason, or a more
606
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comprehensive logic of argument, or a more demanding responsibility concerning the
power of questioning and response, concerning science as well, and, for example . . . as
regards the most open and critical forms of zoological or ethological knowledge.”609 But
the violence directed against animals, Derrida charges, is largely a result of male violence
in particular (an argument in line with the previous chapter’s analysis of masculinity and
animals). He also connects a long-standing hatred of Jewish people with misogyny and
violence toward animals.610
According to Derrida, introducing more homogeneity by identifying certain
“animals” with “humans” does not solve the problem.611 Such an enterprise is impossible
anyhow because not all “humans” exhibit the necessary traits for the label. Of course,
various creatures do have things in common. Humans and animals are living beings who
die, Derrida maintains (in harmony with his Jewish tradition). He writes about a
hedgehog rolling itself up into a ball to protect herself from an oncoming car. She might
not see death coming, but this hedgehog dies all the same. Derrida speaks of the
“hedgehog” rather than “the animal.” He often tries to speak of this or that creature rather
than generally about “the animal.” He claims, contra Heidegger, that it is not certain that
humans can experience death as such any more than we can deny that any other creature
like a hedgehog can experience death. He finds Heidegger’s assertion that animals are
609
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“poor in the world” and cannot experience death to be an absurd dogmatic statement that
shows his inability to transcend the human/animal binary.612
Rather than starting with his own rationality, Derrida reflects on his cat. He must
talk about his cat in particular ways—as a cat, as a “little” cat, etc. Yet the individual cat
precedes all categorization. This cat “refuses to be conceptualized” because she has her
own outlook, which he recognizes but cannot comprehend.613 Before Derrida-thethinking-human ever arrives on the scene, there is a cat who has her own point of view.
The cat watches him before he watches the little cat.614 The cat’s gaze precedes Derrida’s
autonomy. So before asking the question about capacities—Do they have language? Can
they reason? Do they feel pain and suffer?—an encounter elicits the questions.615
For Derrida, to posit an “identity” between humans and other animals based on
traits like reason, language, tool-making, etc., flattens the animal kingdom’s diversity into
a human/animal binary. Instead, Derrida would have us multiply difference. Indeed,
Derrida is not against finding a human difference. He thinks that our attempts to separate
ourselves absolutely from other creatures have failed. Humans may have differences with
every other creature. But these differences do not reduce into an abyssal human/animal
binary with humans as dominant. The “animal” cannot contain creation’s rich diversity.
So we must differentiate between creatures and individuals. But we can differentiate in
different ways and for different purposes. The Valentinians (chapter 2) differentiated
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between different types to find an “elect” class. Orthodox Christians rejected this divisive
hierarchy of being. They stressed creation’s oneness before God and defined creation’s
multiplicity within the infinite “distance” between the persons of the Trinity.616
But are the only options either to identify animals with humans (animal rights) or
multiply differences so that species no longer make sense (Derrida)? Matthew Calarco
suggests a third option, one that uses Derrida’s ideas. Calarco argues that setting aside the
human/nonhuman animal distinction altogether is a wiser path than these other two
options. The purpose of leaving alone the human distinction is so that new ways of
thinking can develop.617 Calarco calls this third option “indistinction.”618 Indistinction
does not homogenize differences. When it comes to humans and other animals, “we are
dealing with a field so utterly complex and so deeply relational that any and all concepts
we use to refer to it will be inadequate.”619 Creation’s diversity reveals human language’s
limits by showing us “that which exceeds our conceptual mastery.”620 Moving too
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quickly toward new conceptual maps to replace the traditional binaries might cause us to
miss what we can learn in the collapse of the human/animal distinction.
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guatarri: Becoming-Animal

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guatarri develop a highly relevant idea to Jesus’s
humanity. They write about “becoming-animal.” They open up space in the zone of
indistinction for imagining the Incarnation in fresh ways that deepen deep Incarnational
thinking. Deleuze and Guatarri focus much of their work on issues around identity, which
they argue is always in motion even when it seems fixed. In explaining what this
becoming means for Deleuze, Damian Sutton and David Martin-Jones use a coffee mug
as an example:
If we pick up a coffee mug and look at it, we can have no doubt that it is a fixed
object in time and space. It is, in fact, fixed to the extent of being brittle. It will
smash if we drop it, and its “essential” identity would be at an end. What we are
really looking at, however, is a moment (no matter how long) of apparent rest in
the life of its molecules and atoms. It was once wet clay, formed and shaped,
glazed and fired under pressure. It continues to change, cracks and fissures
forming on its surface, until we break it, when it will be tossed aside as rubbish,
returning to the earth. This “fixed” object in space is also a fixed object in time . .
. only inasmuch as we isolate it in our minds from the continual change of the
universe.621
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The mug’s identity changes in relationship to the table upon which it sits, to the coffee it
contains, to the human who uses it, to the floor upon which it smashes. So the mug is
what it does: “we will avoid defining it by Species or Genus characteristics, instead we
will seek to count its affects. . . . A race horse is more different from a workhorse than a
workhorse from an ox.”622 Human identity changes as well. God said to Adam: “By the
sweat of your face you shall eat bread until you return to the ground, for out of it you
were taken; you are dust, and to dust you shall return” (Gen 3:19). Deleuze and Guatarri
call this haecceity: Adam-in-the-garden-at-five-o’clock-hearing-God’s-judgment; Adamstaring-at-the-angels’-flaming-swords; Adam-exiled; Adam-father-of-Seth; and so on.
Becoming involves continuity and change. Humans “are” dust, God said. Adam is a pile
of molecules and particles slamming into one another, a motion that continues after
death. He will leak into the ground and become part of it once again. His body is an
assemblage of differences, but he is not above other creatures. Becoming is a fact of
life. Deleuze and Guatarri argue that appreciating becoming means seeing identity as
formed through differences.
Deleuze and Guatarri see “man” as the principal identity around which human
identity is pressured. The male-female binary places the male as the dominant pole by
which to judge identity. But “man” also marks a human-animal binary. In this binary, the

622

Deleuze and Guatarri call this haecceity. These individualities are a sum of particle and
molecule movement and rest as well as their capacity to affect or be affected (to make the hand feel heavy
or to be broken on the ground). The climate, wind, season, and time, are all part of the haecceity. “The
street enters into composition with the horse, just as the dying rat enters into composition with the air, and
the beast and the full moon enter into composition with each other. . . . Climate, wind, season, hour are not
of another nature than the things, animals, or people that populate them, follow them, sleep and awaken
within them. This should be read without pause: the animal-stalks-at-five-o’clock. . . . Five o’clock is this
animal! This animal is this place! . . . We are all five o’clock in the evening, or another hour, or two hours
simultaneously, the optimal and pessimal, noon-midnight, but distributed in a variable fashion.” See Gilles
Deleuze and Félix Guatarri, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 260–65. The quotation is from ibid., 262–63.

282
(male) human serves as the canvas upon which all other identities must be cast. To
dismantle patriarchy and anthropocentricism, we have to see from a minority view. One
has to pass through the minority view, becoming-woman and becoming animal. This
involves seeing from the minority point of view, which is not an essence but a
“molecular” identity.
Becoming does not imitate: “becoming is not to imitate or identify with
something or someone.”623 So becoming-animal does not involve trying to biologically
change into a difference species. Imitation, for Deleuze and Guatarri, replaces and erases
the other. Moreover, imitation has a mechanical quality. A person becomes animal in a
static sense by learning how to sing like a bird, making wings, and so on. Instead,
becoming-animal moves from stable identity to a “nomadic existence” defying definition.
Deleuze and Guatarri point to werewolves and vampires. Yet they insist, “becomingsanimal are neither dreams nor phantasies. They are perfectly real.”
Nevertheless they acknowledge, “The human being does not ‘really’ become an
animal any more than the animal ‘really’ becomes something else.”624 The human does
not cross a species barrier. Rather this person occupies an in-between state where the
distinctions between human and animal begin to fall apart. It is to pass through the animal
to see through the animal’s eyes. “To become,” claims Deleuze, “is not to attain a form
(identification, imitation, Mimesis) but to find the zone of proximity, indiscernibility, or
indifferentiation where one can no longer be distinguished from a woman, an animal, or a
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molecule—neither imprecise nor general, but unforeseen and non-preexistent,
singularized out of a population rather than determined in a form.”625
Captain Ahab in Herman Melville’s Moby Dick serves as Deleuze’s illustration.
Ahab does not imitate the whale. Rather, he enters a “zone of proximity” in which “he
strikes himself in striking the whale.”626 In What Is Philosophy, Deleuze and Guatarri
argue that philosophers “are not responsible for the victim but responsible before them.
And there is no way to escape the ignoble but to play the part of the animal (to growl,
burrow, snigger, distort ourselves): thought itself is sometimes closer to an animal that
dies than to a living, even democratic, human being.”627
They chide Heidegger for his views of animals as poor-in-the-world and connect
these views to his Nazism. Deleuze and Guatarri, by contrast, claim to write “for”
animals and to “become animal so that the animal also becomes something else. The
agony of the rat or the slaughter of a calf remains present in thought not through pity but
as the zone of exchange between man and animal in which something of one passes into
the other.”628 This “double becoming” happens as one begins to realize and see through
the eyes of the slaughtered calf, which changes the calf too. Things are never the same for
those who see “the war on animals” (as Derrida names it) for what it is.
Deleuze and Guatarri argue that we have a mysterious and enchanted world, filled
with wonder. Becomings are imperceptible events, not voluntary choices. Becoming is a
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metaphysical event (which is why some have accused Deleuze of being a mystic).629
They refer to children, who often seek a zone of indistinction between themselves and
other animals. But their becomings are not the result of rules but of play. The becomings
are like events.
For this reason, Deleuze and Guatarri argue, becoming-animal is not imitation.
Imitation reinforces essentialist, static identities within the human/animal binary, and a
world without enchantment. Yet children learn how to do things by imitating adults, so
imitation has its place. But becoming happens at a different level than mimicry.630
Deleuze and Guatarri seek to decenter humanity from the dominant position in
order to work toward a more just and peaceable order. They also present a view of world
that is far more mysterious and fascinating than naturalistic, scientific reduction. They
argue for seeing the world through the eyes of children.631 Children serve also as an
example of how society “steals” bodies and becomings. Little girls are told not to act like
“tomboys” and little boys are told not to act like “girls” but only to see girls as objects of
desire, imposing “a dominant history.”632 Deleuze and Guatarri aim for liberation from
these stolen becomings. What might “becoming-animal” look like then?
Deleuze finds inspiration in the twentieth-century painter Francis Bacon. Bacon’s
paintings depict human faces as pieces of meat.633 Bacon painted scenes of the
Crucifixion in which a carved up carcass formed the center of the triptychs. In “Painting”
(1946), a carcass hangs, arms outstretched, behind a monstrous looking “human” whose
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flesh hangs from his jaw, exposing bare teeth and ligaments. Deleuze quotes Bacon: “I’ve
always been very moved by pictures about slaughterhouses and meat, and to me they
belong very much to the whole thing of the Crucifixion . . . . Of course, we are meat, we
are potential carcasses. If I go into a butcher shop I always think it’s surprising that I
wasn’t there instead of the animal.”634 Bacon confronts viewers with their vulnerability
by painting “a zone of indiscernibility of undecidability between man and animal.”635 We
are “meat.” Deleuze finds in these monstrous paintings a space in which humans becomeanimal by the mere fact of glimpsing “that every man who suffers is a piece of meat.
Meat is the common zone of man and beast.”636 Rather than defining humanity as
rational, Deleuze pushes his readers to accept their “flesh.” In accepting our flesh, we
become-animal. We are not above the predator-prey relationships in this world. We too
are edible. Yet the struggle for survival is a struggle to be more than meat, more than
mere consumer and consumed.
This is a position different from describing animals as “like us.” In A Thousand
Plateaus, Deleuze and Guatarri deny that the human “face” elicits responsibility and care
for another. For Emmanuel Levinas, the face troubles us because it calls us to respond.
But Deleuze and Guatarri counter: “the face is a horror story.”637 The face has functioned
as a gate through which a person can enter human society. But it is the white male face
that has formed the standard from which all other faces descend by “filiation.” Women,
people of color, children, gorillas, cats, and others must pass through the white male face.
So Deleuze and Guatarri attack the face. Rather than establish new dominant identities
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(this face is like that white male face; this face is like the human face so it elicits ethical
consideration), Deleuze and Guatarri ask us to imagine what it would be like to have a
face one turns away from in disgust. We learn to measure faces. We can dismantle these
biases through “becoming-animal” and rejecting norms of beauty.638 So to inhabit the
“zone of indistinction” in becoming-animal does not involve looking for human traits in
other animals. The identity approach dissolves differences and absorbs the other into the
dominant. Becoming-animal involves passing through their position as a minority and
oppressed group who resist domination as a “pack.” Becoming-animal, therefore,
involves becoming like animals: becoming “meat.” Becoming nameless.
By taking on this vulnerable, fleshly, meat-like existence we can more fully
appreciate what it is like for animals to exist in our social and political economies.639
Deleuze and Guatarri claim that “we become animal so that the animal also becomes
something else.”640 While capitalist society in particular seeks to reduce animals to mere
“meat,” they are never this.
Deleuze and Guatarri’s notion of becoming-animal will play an important role in
how I interpret Jesus’s humanity. The notion that we should give up seeking a human
uniqueness that sets us apart from all other creatures fits well with a certain reading of
Jesus’s humanity. When coupled with the idea that identity is never really static but
always negotiated and changing as well as passing through a deep shift when one comes
to see and become-animal, Jesus’s humanity will take on a radical role in the Incarnation.
But before shifting into this theological reflection, there is another lens to add.
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Giorgio Agamben: The Anthropological Machine

In Descartes we can see what Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben calls “the
anthropological machine.” For Agamben, the separation of bare animal life (ζωή) from
political human life (βίος) undergirds Western politics.641 This anthropogenesis—a
metaphysical process—creates the human by separating what is human (language,
thinking, self-consciousness, etc.) from the animal (emotion, irrationality, the body, etc.).
This process opens a gap between the human and the animal.642 This “anthropological
machine” demarcates within every human what is and is not human, those parts that
belong to politics and those that do not. This anthropological machine does not describe
the “real” world. The anthropological machine is not a natural process. It is religious,
social, and political. The anthropological machine enacts this separation and creates the
world we take for granted. Things could be otherwise.
The anthropological machine undergirds a great many atrocities, according to
Agamben. If any creature does not measure up to the human standard, those creatures
will become vulnerable because they have slipped from the political to the nonpolitical
and might be killed. Those who are dehumanized and therefore animalized are subjected
to slavery and even to gas chambers in the twentieth century.643 The separation of human
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from animal entails opening up a “zone of indistinction” between the human and the
animal, a place that corresponds elsewhere to Agamben’s “state of exception” in which
the rule of law no longer applies: the place of both animals and sovereigns.644 This is the
space in which one can kill or be killed.645
Indeed, Roman law made provisions for the homo sacer. This is a person who can
be legally killed because he or she is outside the law. Agamben cites Pompeius Festus, a
Roman lawyer, who wrote that once the plebes had seceded, they were granted the rights
to hunt down and kill—as individuals or as a mob—anybody they had collectively
condemned to die. This hunted and condemned individual was called homo sacer. Killing
this person was neither homicide, nor a punishment, nor a sacrifice, because unlike a
killing under capital punishment, the killing had no purification rites. Indeed, such rites
were explicitly forbidden. The condemned person was sacer: cast out, abandoned. This
meaning of the word sacer is more ancient than the idea of the “sacred,” which connects
animals sometimes looked like the fate of Jews, unless it was actually the other way around. This analogy
is no doubt up for discussion, yet it cannot be repudiated as blasphemy for it comes from men who suffered
in their flesh and their history and who knew what they were saying when they evoked human malice.” de
Fontenay, Without Offending Humans, 61. Derrida cites an earlier but similar statement by de Fontenay
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that Emmanuel Levinas’s denial of a “face” to animals and therefore any duties toward them from humans
as “surprising” more than from Kant and Heidegger because Levinas is Jewish and “the principle of life . . .
a great intangible Judaic principle.” In other words, Derrida recognizes the Jewish protections and
principles in Judaism about nonhuman animals I laid out in previous chapters as something that should lead
modern Jewish authors to see in animals a call to something better than philosophy has provided. See ibid.,
112. It should be noted, moreover, that Derrida himself is Jewish by birth. He repeatedly uses Scripture in
his analysis of the human/animal binary, which most philosophers who are following Derrida on the issue
of animals do not do and mostly ignore.
644
See Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 2005).
645
“The camp is the space that opens up when the state of exception starts to become the rule. In
it, the state of exception, which was essentially a temporal suspension of the state of law, acquires a
permanent spatial arrangement that, as such, remains constantly outside the normal state of law.” Giorgio
Agamben, Means without Ends: Notes on Politics, trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 38. In this book is an essay titled, “The Face” which
demonstrates that Agamben had not yet thought deeply about the human/animal distinction that becomes
more important in his later work. In “The Face,” Agamben basically takes a position similar to Emmanuel
Levinas in which the human face of the other calls us to act responsibly toward him or her. Animals,
however, do not have faces. For the historical development of the idea of an anthropological machine in
Agamben see Calarco, Zoographies, 79–102.

289
to the notion of sacrifice and holiness.646 The homo sacer is therefore animalized and
reduced to bare life.
Now more than ever, Agamben argues, we are aware of the anthropological
machine’s contingent and dangerous elements. Therefore, he claims, “It is more urgent to
work on these divisions, to ask in what way—within man—has man been separated from
non-man, and the animal from the human, than it is to take positions on the great issues,
on so-called human rights and values. And perhaps even the most luminous sphere of our
relations with the divine depends, in some way, on that darker one which separates us
from the animal.”647
But Agamben’s critique reaches back further than Descartean anthropology
starting with Aristotle. The medieval chain of being, Agamben would tell us, also trades
on the anthropological machine even if it is more nuanced than Descartes about the
nonhuman world. Scripture has other ways way of speaking about Jesus’s humanity. The
question becomes whether Jesus breaks the anthropological machine in the process of
becoming-animal.
Jesus Becoming-Animal

What does all this have to do with Jesus’s humanity as a particularity with which
theology must wrestle in relationship to thinking about animals? In Christian doctrine
Jesus is human and divine. Any theological anthropology must start with the person of
Jesus Christ. As Karl Barth declared, “The nature of the man Jesus alone is the key to the
problem of human nature.” Jesus is human, according to the tradition. Yet the Gospels
646
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say nothing about the “nature” of Jesus’s humanity. The “rational animal” of Christian
theology does not appear in the Gospels. If human means a creature with a rational soul
distinct from all the irrational animals, then the Gospels do not have any human
characters. Cutting humanity off from other creaturely life is alien to the Bible.
Deleuze and Guatarri would be skeptical of my claim that Jesus Christ tells us
something interesting about resistance to majoritarian rule. They state clearly: “Theology
is very strict on the following point: there are no werewolves, human beings cannot
become animal.”648 Yet the Gospels depict Jesus as doing just that.
Jesus speaks about himself in ways that challenge Deleuze and Guatarri. As I
noted in chapter 4, Jesus said, “Foxes have holes, and birds of the air have nests; but the
Son of Man has nowhere to lay his head” (Matt 8:20). Jesus designates himself as “the
Son of Man,” which might mean human. He then claims that his homelessness places him
culturally beneath foxes and birds. Jesus also compares himself to a threatened “mother
hen” who wishes to protect her young (Matt 23:37–39 and Luke 13:31–35). Jesus
repeatedly speaks about birds and sparrows. Society, Jesus says, tends to views these
little creatures as less valuable than humans. Jesus has less value than a sparrow. In the
hierarchy of being, Jesus does not fit a little above the “animals” but a little lower than
the angels. Rather, Jesus sleeps beneath the sparrow’s nest. This “becoming-animal”
allows Jesus to see life from a different vantage point than anthropocentrism.
Jesus: Homo Sacer, Becoming Animal

The passion narratives, however, provide a powerful context within which to view
Jesus’s becoming-animal. John Milbank argues that the Gospels present Jesus as a homo
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sacer in three ways. “Once, because he is abandoned by Jewish sovereignty to the Roman
executive. Twice because he is abandoned by Roman sovereignty to the sovereignexecutive mob; three times, because he is in some obscure fashion handed over by the
mob to the Roman soldiers and executed after all in a Roman fashion.”649 Understanding
Jesus as a homo sacer means that Jesus’s death was not a murder, an execution, or a
sacrifice. Such interpretations miss his death's full significance because they make
Jesus’s humanity decisive. Rather, Milbank argues, a lynch mob reduced Jesus to
something “beneath humanity” to a “half-animality.” Jesus is the wolf-man whom the
community casts out and whom the community can kill with impunity.
The implication is that Jesus’s death is not that of a martyr who witnesses to a
cause. Jesus’s death occurs because of a resentment at his divinity and also a death of
humanity itself. Jesus suffered “a kenotic death of utterly emptied out humanity.”650 Said
in other terms, Milbank’s analysis points toward Jesus’s death as a kenosis of
anthropocentricism and speciesism. Jesus did not have the dignified death of a political
threat. His death was meaningless. Everyone abandoned him. His death proved
sovereignty’s arbitrariness. “Christ then was reduced to ‘bare life.’”651 But the
anthropological machine produces bare life too.652 Christ is “bare life,” the animal. Pilate,
the mob, and much of the Jewish leadership represent the human. Jesus was cast out from
all protections that the Torah or Roman law might afford him. From a different vantage
point than I took in chapter 3, Jesus’s death was not an animal sacrifice in any strict
sense. Those sacrifices actually protected and limited human violence and sovereignty.
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Rather, his death exposed animal sacrifices as arbitrary sovereignty. The anthropological
machine produces this sovereign arbitrariness. Jesus was emptied of his humanity and
becomes-animal. He becomes the wild animals that Deuteronomy allows Jews to kill.
These wild animals were not sacrifices or executions. They were of those undomesticated
creatures anybody could kill.
Yet the description from chapter 3 of Jesus’s death as an animal deserves
repetition. He died as a homo sacer, as a becoming-animal. The Gospel of John in
particular depicts Jesus’s death as one that is nonhuman. Jesus’s bones remain unbroken
like the paschal lamb (Exod 12.46; John 19.33, 36). Like the dead lamb who had to be
consumed before daybreak, Jesus’s body was taken away before the next day (Exod
12.10; John 19.31). Jews used hyssop to smear the lamb’s blood on the doorpost;
likewise Jesus was offered liquid on a branch of hyssop (Exod 12.22; John 19.29).
Jesus’s body was run through with a sharp weapon, as would a lamb’s body.653 Many
biblical scholars argue that Jesus died at the exact time that lambs would have been killed
in the Temple.654 Moreover, Christian artists through the ages have depicted Jesus as a
nonhuman animal. To pull just one example from chapter 3, in a twelfth-century
illuminated manuscript, Jesus’s crucifixion is depicted above the sacrifice of a calf.
Below the calf is written, “For the blemish of sin a calf is given, worship’s sacrifice; this
inscription teaches that Christ is the calf.”655
But the sacrificial similarities also harbor dissimilarity. It was forbidden to
sacrifice a human in Jewish Torah. The Torah limited Jewish sovereignty over animals.
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They could not sacrifice an animal at any time or place, for any reason. Nevertheless, the
sacrificial system still allowed a division between the animal and the human. Jesus’s
death was not a sacrifice. The Law expressly forbids human sacrifice. His death exposes
the anthropological machine. His death sunk beneath that of the domesticated creatures of
Jewish Torah who had the most protection. His was more akin to the wild creatures who
were far less regulated. He resembled the hunted ones whom Solomon killed. His was
more like a sport hunt than a sacrifice.
By contrast, some interpret Jesus as a nonviolent radical executed for being a
threat to Roman imperial power. But these readings of Jesus often miss the
anthropological machine in their own theologies. For example, nowhere in John Howard
Yoder’s writings does the idea appear that Jesus died the death of an animal. Yoder
reduces Jesus to a political figure. The Romans executed Jesus because he
threatened Roman economics and political power. Jesus’s alternative vision for social life
challenged the violent regimes of this world. His nonviolent action in the temple
triggered his arrest. But his entire ministry hinged on creating a new body politic.
But Yoder’s body politic is purely human. It never includes nonhuman animals.
Despite his interest in Jewish-Christian relations, he casts aside Jewish law on nonhuman
animals. Consequently, the basic protections Jewish law provides other animals from
human aggression disappear entirely as Jesus’s followers diverge from their Jewish
heritage. Yoder does not include in his pacifism Isaiah’s visions of peace between
animals. So reading Jesus solely as a political figure does not get to the heart of what
establishes Western politics. The anthropological machine produces a fissure that
establishes the human as the sovereign over that which is nonhuman, and the political as
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a space where every human becomes a potential homo sacer. The anthropological
machine runs quite smoothly throughout Yoder’s writings. So he limited the peace he
found in the gospel to the humans. But this peace is on shaky ground because Yoder’s
peace vision entails an egalitarianism of love in which human enemies must be on equal
footing to human friends, lest one animalize (dehumanize) those enemy others and reestablish violence. I take this to be at the heart of the problem of Yoder’s work and some
of his theological disciples. Jesus is not becoming-animal but exhibits the full human
“rationality” God intended by being nonviolent. The struggle for an egalitarian love
between humans masks the anthropological machine underneath the nonviolence. So a
violence more basic than peace runs through Yoder’s work.656 Reading Jesus more as the
homo sacer of Roman law gets to the more basic divisions that lead to violence than only
reading him as a political pacifist.
Milbank’s suggestion that Jesus’s death signals “a kenotic death of utterly
emptied out humanity” needs further development.657 What is it exactly that Jesus
empties? Milbank equates Jesus with bare life but does not go so far as to identify bare
life with animal life, perhaps because Agamben did not make the connection in his book
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Homo Sacer that Milbank used but in the follow-up volume, The Open. The traditional
way to speak about theological anthropology is to see human λόγος in continuity with the
divine Λόγος. Indeed, this is the presupposition of Gregersen’s idea that Stoic philosophy
undergirds a radical view of the Incarnation. Continuity between the divine and the
human makes the Incarnation in human form appropriate. This is one way to view the
Incarnation and theological anthropology. Human λόγος, whether defined as reason,
language, thought, discourse, or rationality, has long been the defining factor of humanity
that separates us from other animals. If Jesus’s kenotic death “empties out humanity,” as
Milbank argues, then human λόγος—as the self-definition of humanity—must be part of
this kenosis.
Jesus’s Kenosis of Humanity

Donna Haraway has expressed a popular viewpoint among critical animal
theorists: “The boundary between human and animal is thoroughly breached. The last
beachheads of uniqueness have been polluted if not turned into amusement parks—
language, tool use, social behavior, mental events. Nothing really convincingly settles the
separation of human and animal.”658 All the traditional ways humans have defined
ourselves against other animals no longer hold. They are not utterly unique to humanity.
Drawing on Freud, Derrida writes of “three great historical wounds to the primary
narcissism of the self-centered human subject”: 1) the Copernican revolution that
decentered the Earth; 2) the Darwinian revolution that decentered humanity, placing us
back amongst the creatures; and 3) the Freudian revolution that decentered human
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consciousness by revealing the unconscious (this decentering involves pushing aside
human λόγος in favor of unconscious processes and formations that affect a person).659
These “wounds,” as Haraway rephrases them, signal that the quest for human uniqueness
has been so thoroughly undermined that attempts to reassert any anthropocentric
worldview is implausible. Rather than looking for divisions, Haraway argues, let the
divisions go in favor of intersectional mapping to discover how to live together. What
this suggests, according to Matthew Calarco, is leaving aside a search for human
uniqueness so that we can create space “to think about the field of human beings and
animals in new ways. . . . creating the conditions for other modes of thought—different
ontologies and different practices—to emerge.”660
Jesus’s kenosis of humanity fits this letting go of human uniqueness. Jesus’s
kenosis creates space for new thinking and practices in our relationship to animals by
abandoning the search for and assertion of human specialness. Jesus’s humanity opens
space for new thinking and ways of being as creatures, precisely by giving up humanity.
Milbank reads Jesus’s death as the kenosis of humanity. Deepening Milbank’s
analysis should involve thinking about how we often define what is human as λόγος. To
take Milbank’s analysis further, Jesus empties humanity of content not only in death but
also in the becoming flesh. I will now revisit the Gospel of John and pay attention to the
interplay of flesh, life, and humanity.
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The Gospel of John declares that ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο. This λόγος is the one who
created all things in the beginning and came into the world, and yet the world did not
recognize the λόγος. The prologue also states that in the λόγος is ζωή: ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν
(John 1:4a). Without arguing what the text “originally” meant, in light of the death and
resurrection we might read the ζωή in the λόγος as that which all creatures have in
common. The ζωή is bare life.661 The prologue continues by stating καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἦν τὸ φῶς
τῶν ἀνθρώπων (John 1:4b). It is ζωή that is the “light” of “humanity.”
It is as if John’s prologue announces the kenosis of humanity from the start and
not only with Jesus’s death. Since Aristotle, humans have defined themselves against
other animals by pointing to the human λόγος (speech, reason, rationality, discourse,
meaning making, or even self-consciousness). Yet John's Gospel declares Jesus to be the
λόγος, and it is bare life (ζωή) that is the light shining into the darkness of humanity.
Reason and rationality should enlighten humanity. But the Gospel declares that the
human world is full of “darkness.” Humanity—self-defined as unique through λόγος—
could not recognize the divine λόγος because the divine λόγος was full of bare life (ζωή).
In other words, Jesus was full of the cast out animal life people could kill with impunity.
The homo sacer, the werewolf (man-wolf) who is driven out of the human city and into
the wilderness, the ζωή (bare life) that sustains all creatures was utterly incomprehensible
to humanity defined as λόγος.
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The Gospel of John empties humanity of its most precious self-definition,
positing only the divine λόγος. The Gospel denies that humans have this λόγος because
they do not “believe in him” (John 5:38). Even the disciples could not recognize the true
radicality of the Incarnation, the kenosis of humanity. They could not see how Jesus’s
crucifixion could redeem Israel from its oppressive situation and establish Jerusalem as
the center of the world. Jesus’s male disciples fled. Humans, particularly male humans,
self-defined against and above animals, could not recognize that Jesus’s “bare life” saves
us. The Gospel of John tells us that four women were present as Jesus died on the cross
(John 19:25). It is as if the author is telling us, prefiguring Deleuze and Guatarri by two
thousand years, that male readers must become women to see the real significance of the
Incarnation. It is through becoming-woman that the rest of the becoming happens to the
readers. Jesus’s theological body—to recall arguments from chapter 3—is a becomingwoman. But it is also, and perhaps through becoming-woman, a becoming-animal.
In the Incarnation, the Son becomes “flesh” so that “flesh” can become something
else (to appropriate Deleuze and Guatarri). If human identity entails the “sacrifice” of
bare animal life, then the Incarnation explodes this self-definition. The Incarnation
empties humanity of meaning and points back to animals. Jesus the human must become
nonhuman so that the nonhuman animal can become something other than what humans,
in violent acts of “dominion,” have named them to be (meat, fur, leather, and pets). Jesus
becomes “meat” so that what we call “meat”—other animals—can become something
else.
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Becoming Animal: Ecce Agnus Dei

Beyond Jesus’s thinking about foxes, “worthless” sparrows, hens, and his own
slaughter outside of Jerusalem, the New Testament’s most pervasive image for the Son’s
Incarnation is a lamb. Through the ages Christian artists have often depicted Jesus as a
Lamb. By the mid-fourth century CE, the Lamb replaced depictions of a human Jesus. In
a mid-fourth-century painting found in the Roman Catacomb of Commodilla, a lamb
multiplies loaves into seven baskets (see Matt 14:13–21, Mark 6:31–44, Luke 9:10–17,
and John 6:5–15).662 Likewise, in the famous Junius Bassus sarcophagus built in 359 CE,
a lamb holding a wand multiplies loaves into three baskets and another panel contains a
relief of a lamb raising a mummified Lazarus from the dead.663 The Church of Saint
Cosmas and Saint Damian contains a fifth-century mosaic in which the twelve apostles
are depicted as lambs with the Lamb of God standing on a hill from which the four rivers
of Paradise flow.664 Even the sarcophagus of Emperor Valentinian III, who ruled the
Western Roman Empire from 425–455 CE, has a relief of a lamb standing before a cross
encased between two pillars and roof.665
This lamb imagery pushes the boundary between human and nonhuman animals
in ways that has offended Christian leaders’ anthropocentric views. For some, the lamb
was too much and threatened the divine-human connection. So in 692 CE, the Council of
Trullo forbade depicting Christ as a lamb:
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In order therefore that “that which is perfect” may be delineated to the eyes of all,
at least in coloured expression, we decree that the figure in human form of the
Lamb who taketh away the sin of the world, Christ our God, be henceforth
exhibited in images, instead of the ancient lamb, so that all may understand by
means of it the depths of humiliation of the Word of God, and that we may recall
to our memory his conversation in the flesh, his suffering and salutary death, and
his redemption which was wrought for the whole world.666
The Council seems to have been worried that depictions of the Son of God as a lamb
undermined the hard-won gains of seeing Christ as having a truly human nature. The
Seventh Ecumenical Council in 787 CE reaffirmed the decision of the Council of Trullo.
From that time forward, Christ was to be depicted as a human. The lamb was forbidden
and cast out of Eastern art. The Council did not attempt to destroy old images. New
icons, however, should depict the humanity of God exclusively. As a result, images of a
baby Jesus lying in a bread pan on the worship altar began to appear. Previously, a lamb
would have occupied this position in iconography. But in response to the prohibitions
against depicting the Incarnation in terms of a lamb, these new images arose and replaced
images of the lamb across the Byzantine Empire.667 Deleuze and Guatarri would seem to
be correct: Christian theologians in the East are uneasy with the idea of Jesus becominganimal.
Yet Christians in the West did not follow the decisions in the Byzantine East,
which were in large part a response to the iconoclastic controversy. Catholics continued
to depict the Son as a lamb. The lamb even grew in popularity in the West as an image
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for Jesus. Even illuminated manuscripts depicted Jesus as a lamb. For example, the
Codex Aureus of Saint Emmeran (c. 870 CE) depicts Jesus as a lamb at the beginning of
the Gospel of Luke.668 Even when Jesus himself was depicted as human, a lamb was
often present as well. For instance between 1512–1516 CE, Matthias Grünewald painted
the Isenheim Altarpiece for the Monastery of St. Anthony. In the center, Grünewald
painted Jesus’s beaten and diseased human body on the cross, his hands displaying the
agony of crucifixion. At the foot of the cross stands a lamb, holding a cross and pouring
out blood into a chalice. A search through the online images at the Koninklijke
Bibliotheek at The Hague, the National Library of the Netherlands, reveals dozens of
examples of the Agnus Dei in illuminated Bibles from the medieval collection.669
The lamb, therefore, has been and remains a powerful image for Christology. But
the question remains as to what kind of image the lamb is for Christian theology. The
Council of Trullo signals a lingering notion amongst Christians that the Lamb of God is a
mere metaphor that we can cast aside in both word and image for literal language. Christ
is human. Jesus’s particularity as a (male) human is the literal stuff from which theology
must draw rather than from unnecessary metaphorical devices. As one Orthodox scholar
has put it:
Christ is only metaphorically called “the Lamb of God.” He is not the offspring of
a ram and an ewe. It suffices to think in this connection of the Orthodox refusal to
depict Christ in the icons as a lamb, as he is frequently depicted in the religious
art of the Latin West. Such a depiction—a confusion of metaphor with reality—
not only inadvertently blasphemes our Lord; it levels the distinction between man
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and the other creatures, downplaying the central claim of Christianity that God, in
the Person of the Son, ennobles human nature, itself already an image of the
divine nature, by assuming human nature in his Incarnation, by redeeming human
nature in his passion and resurrection, and, in his ascension . . . . It is human
nature, human flesh-—not the nature of a sheep, or a tree, or a river, or a
mountain, or a star-—that, in the person of the Son, has been incorporated into the
life of the Trinity.670
Here the particularity of the Incarnation in humanity is set up as a test of faithfulness of
Eastern Christianity over Western Christianity in artistic depictions. Mere metaphor must
give way to “reality.” Based on Jesus’s particularity as human, all other creatures are
excluded from the Incarnation’s significance. Using an image of the lamb, regardless of
its biblical pedigree, threatens to undermine the anthropocentric nature of Christianity.
This kind of statement finds continuity in John of Damascus’s distaste for animal
imagery in Christian art, as I examined and critiqued in chapter 3.
Jesus of Nazareth was a male, Jewish, human who lived in first-century Palestine.
I do not dispute this historical claim. But Carey and John of Damascus, as demonstrated
in chapter 2, argue a theological point about Christ’s human nature and therefore human
nature in general. They assert that humans contain some quality that makes humanity
worthy of the Incarnation. Other creatures completely lack this quality, making them
unworthy of the Incarnation. This is the anthropological machine at work. The lamb
imagery threatens the theologian’s anthropology that segregates humans from other
creatures. The consequence of their claim is that Jesus should not be depicted as a lamb.
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By contrast, I am arguing that a sharp division between humanity and other creatures
does not withstand scrutiny. Even if it is historically true that Jesus was a male, Jewish
human, Carey’s belief that other creatures are not linked to Christ’s Incarnation does not
follow.
Moreover, down through the ages Eastern and Western depictions of the human
Jesus have not generally depicted him as a first-century Palestinian Jew, but as a
contemporary Greek or Roman male with white skin. Even depictions of Jesus as a
human, therefore, have tended toward the “metaphorical” rather than the “literal.” The
main difference between the metaphorical lamb images and the Greco-Roman Jesus
images is that the latter have no biblical basis. Rather, these Christians have made Jesus’s
humanity into the image of contemporary human culture rather than allowing it to be
what it is and was: Jewish. In this sense, by ignoring Jesus’s Jewishness, the depictions of
Jesus in Greek icons do far more injustice to the Incarnation’s particularity than do
images of the lamb.671 Yet both his Jewishness and the animal imagery for Jesus have
been discarded. When theologians and Christian artists systematically exclude every
aspect of Jesus that is “minoritarian,” we are left with a Christ of power and might made
in the image of the dominant in society. But this was not the Jesus who died a lamb’s
death.
It would be helpful at this point to look at the way the Fourth Gospel uses the
lamb imagery for Jesus. John the Baptist declared Jesus to be the “Lamb of God” (ὁ
ἀµνὸς τοῦ θεοῦ) in John 1:29 and 1:35. In verse 29, the Baptist says that Jesus is “the
671
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Lamb of God who takes away the sin of the world!” In the following section I will look at
this statement a bit more closely. But I will do so by comparing John the Baptist’s
statement, “Behold, the Lamb of God” with the statement of Pontius Pilate, who after
having Jesus beaten severely, marches Jesus out in front of a crowd and exclaims,
“Behold, the man!” (John 19:5).
The Gospel of John Again

John the Baptist’s statement that Jesus is the “Lamb of God,” is unique to the
Gospel of John, though a little lamb appears in Revelation using a different Greek
term.672 Scholars have extensively examined the Baptist’s statement, particularly the title,
“the Lamb of God” and have posited various backgrounds for the phrase. To date, there is
no scholarly consensus on whether a precise reference forms the main backdrop for the
statement.673
Some scholars argue that the most appropriate background is the near sacrifice of
Isaac in Genesis 22, traditionally called the Akedah.674 Other scholars claim that the
Suffering Servant of Isaiah 53 provides a background for John 1:29.675 Isaiah 53:7 says
about the servant that he will be “like a sheep that is led to the slaughter, and like a lamb
that before its shearers is silent.” Acts 8:32 quotes this passage, indicating that it was in
672
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use amongst Christians as a text about Jesus. Some biblical scholars argue that the
Passover lamb in Exodus 12 is the most appropriate context.676 John 19:36 explicitly
quotes Exodus 12:46, which deals with the Passover lamb: “These things occurred so that
the scripture might be fulfilled, ‘None of his bones shall be broken.’” Finally, Jewish
apocalyptic literature may also provide a background for the lamb imagery in John 1:29.
Though scholars generally see the lamb-who-becomes-a-ram in 1 Enoch 90:6-19 as a
reference to Judas Maccabeus and the military wars he led.677 None of these ways of
interpreting John 1:29, 36—“Behold, the Lamb of God who takes away the sin of the
world”—stands in opposition to the others. They all have interpretive problems. They all
also have many merits as ways of reading the phrase. It is possible as readers to blend
together several of these readings to make the Johannine lamb of God.
All of the approaches attempt to locate lamb Christology in Jewish tradition. The
idea that Jesus is a paschal lamb and the suffering servant seem to fit best with the
Johannine context. The Akedah tradition is simply not mentioned in the text, though it
does in some sense connect with the paschal notion of sacrifice, and the apocalyptic lamb
seems too problematic historically to be useful as an interpretive lens for this particular
image. To deny the Incarnation its lamb imagery with exclusive focus on his “humanity”
is to lose the rich Jewish intertextuality of the Incarnation and to miss the wider
significance of Jesus.
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Nevertheless, the search for a background to the imagery of the Gospel of John
can obscure what the imagery does in the Gospel with a view toward theological
investigation. To take Deleuze and Guatarri’s notion of becoming-animal as a potential
guide, the imagery of a lamb runs much deeper than references and metaphors. Or
perhaps a better way to see this is to note how Derrida argues that metaphors are not
easily separated from real world consequences.678 In other words, we cannot separate
Jesus the lamb of God from what happens to real lambs in these stories and life. The
“metaphor” of Jesus as the lamb of God is depicted as violently killed outside the city
gate, an activity that is perfectly acceptable according to the dominant ideologies of
anthropocentricism. Humans kill lambs all the time. Why should Jesus’s death as a lamb
be a problem if his death is understood in this way?
The story that follows the prologue illustrates what it means for the Word to
become flesh. The Word takes on a human name—Jesus—but as a lamb remains
nameless, hidden from sight and barely noticed until somebody decides to violate her.
The Baptist announced the lamb of God and then that lamb recedes from view in the
story. Perhaps a better way to say it would be that the subtle becoming-animal that must
take place for Jesus to truly be the lamb of God happens at a different level. Jesus did not
go around bleating and eating grass. He did not imitate a lamb. But something else
happens to Jesus.
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Becoming-Meat

In the first chapter I looked at the bread of life discourse as an example of the
Gospel of John’s use of σάρξ as a broader term than that which would simply mean
“human.” Jesus’s monologue in John 6 could be read as connecting to the lamb as he
repeatedly speaks about his body being the bread of life and “flesh.” Those who heard
him were offended to the point that even some of his disciples left him. When Jesus saw
that some of his hearers did not understand, he did not make it easier. When he saw that
some were offended, he did not make his statements more palatable. His own disciples
began to complain about him (John 6:61). When they left him specifically because he
spoke about people having to eat his body and drink his blood, saying that his body was
“meat” for consumption and a mandatory ritual of the new order, Jesus did not try to
bring them back into the fold. It is hard to believe that Jesus was simply being enigmatic
and deliberately obtuse. Jesus envisioned himself as consumable. His flesh could be
eaten. His humanity was not such that he was above all other animals.
Val Plumwood describes her experience in 1985 of surviving a crocodile attack
while searching for an Aboriginal rock art site in Australia. Her story may illuminate
Jesus’s becoming-animal in John 6. As Plumwood paddled along a side channel she had
the strong and “unfamiliar sensation of being watched.”679 Soon she saw what looked like
a floating stick, but the stick suddenly had eyes. It was a crocodile coming toward her
canoe. The crocodile repeatedly attacked her canoe, so she hurried toward a bank lest she
be capsized. As she reached for a tree limb to pull out of the canoe, she recalls seeing “a
679
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blurred, incredulous vision of great toothed jaws bursting from the water, as I was seized
between the legs in a red-hot pincer grip, and whirled into the suffocating darkness.”680
For a moment she could not believe it was happening—it must be a nightmare—only to
realize that her own death was likely very near. “Indescribable, an experience beyond
words of total terror, total helplessness, total certainty, experienced with undivided mind
and body, of a terrible death in the swirling depths.”681 But she survived the crocodile’s
death roll, only to be subjected to a second bite and death roll in the river. Surviving
again, she pulled herself free to a branch, yet the crocodile lunged out of the river again,
biting her leg and pulling her under the river water, rolling furiously a third time. She
survived but was badly wounded and the crocodile was growling as it still held her leg.
She gouged its eyes and reached for a tree branch again, the crocodile let go and she was
able to climb to safety, fortunately being found within hours or else she would have died
in the swamp from the bite wounds.
Plumwood was and is a proponent of vegetarianism and environmentalism.
Rather than allowing this attack to turn her against other animals or the environment
more generally, Plumwood only deepened her commitments and was led to reconsider
the place of humans in this world. Her incredulity at being the prey of a crocodile was
part of the human exceptionalism that allowed humans to think of themselves as inedible
while other animals are their food. She argued against rangers hunting and killing the
crocodile, noting that the press and the park service both ignored her individual account
of what happened, thus silencing her for their own purposes. But more profoundly, she
began to see that her humanity was not apart from this world; she too is potential meat.
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Yet her struggle to survive cried out that she is more than this. This becoming, as we
might call it, led her to see through the eyes of a slaughtered cow or a hunted gazelle,
whose will to survive testifies to all flesh being more than meat. In becoming “meat” or
“prey,” as she calls it, she was transformed but so too were other animals.
Are we to imagine Jesus flippantly speaking about his “flesh” being consumed or
was he serious? Was he merely trying to provoke his interlocutors with outlandish riddles
or was he pointing to something thoughtful and concrete? Over and over he reiterates that
his σάρξ is ζωή. He himself will be reduced to “bare life,” to animal life, and his flesh
will have to be consumed.
Is it possible to hear the terror of Gethsemane in the places where he speaks of his
flesh being consumed? “I am deeply grieved, even to death; remain here, and stay awake
with me” (Matt 26:38; cf. Mark 14:34); “In his anguish he prayed more earnestly, and his
sweat became like great drops of blood falling down on the ground” (Luke 22:44).
“Deeply grieved,” “anguish,” “sweat . . . like drops of blood,” these are the terms that
resonate with Plumwood’s “experience beyond words of total terror.”
Becoming σάρξ is risky business. The real scandal of the bread of life discourse is
that Jesus is showing himself to be the lamb of God in a more disturbing manner than his
disciples could have imagined when John the Baptist announced it. He would be hunted,
killed, and consumed. He would lose his name and become a corpse. In the Gospels he
cries out an indecipherable cry as his last act before dying. He would lose his language,
the ostensible hallmark of humanity. He will become prey, but unlike Plumwood and like
billions of other animals, he would not escape. The Roman abattoir will take him. There
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is, it seems, a deep becoming in John 6: a becoming-animal. If there is a kenosis of
humanity as Milbank suggests, there is a simultaneous becoming-animal.
In this regard, Saint Antony, whom Athanasius wrote about and I examined in
chapter 2, provides another example. Like Jesus, he went into the wilderness and lived
“with” the nonhuman animals. He lived with them peaceably, refusing to harm even
those who had eaten the food in his garden. His kenotic life, in which he continually
emptied himself of the desire to rule over others and define himself against others, but let
other be who God created them to be, looks very much like Jesus. Athanasius thought we
should imitate Antony, but Deleuze and Guatarri would warn us that Antony did not
“imitate” Jesus. Rather he occupied a zone of indiscernibility like Jesus in which his own
identity was constantly in negotiation and movement as he emptied his desire to use
others for his own selfish desires even when it would have been “reasonable.”
But Jesus was not a mere passive victim. Like the pigs in Galilee who acted to
destroy the demon legion, like so many other animals who do not give up their lives
easily or willingly, like Plumwood who fought to save her life, Jesus cries out on the
cross asking, “My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?” (Mark 15:34). This cry is
a cry that his flesh is more than meat. His life is more than the prey of a senseless
hunter.682 When his own villagers tried to throw him over a cliff, he ran and escaped.
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Before his arrest he searched potential routes to forestall or halt the coming doom, only to
find all paths blocked save those that would completely betray his own becoming-animal.
The Lamb of Revelation

The Book of Revelation carries out the becoming-animal theme further. The
resurrected lamb comes into full view. Revelation begins with John’s vision of a human
in the heavens: “one like the Son of Man, clothed with a long robe and with a golden sash
across his chest. His head and his hair were white as white wool, white as snow; his eyes
were like a flame of fire, his feet were like burnished bronze, refined as in a furnace, and
his voice was like the sound of many waters. In his right hand he held seven stars, and
from his mouth came a sharp, two-edged sword, and his face was like the sun shining
with full force” (Rev 1:13–16). This human says he is “first and last” and “I was dead,
and see, I am alive forever and ever” (Rev 1:18). John leaves no doubt that Jesus, risen
from the dead and ascended into the heavens, is the one speaking.
Many Revelation scholars are quick to point out the historical background to the
imagery in Revelation 1. For example, this Son of Man has a cosmic element as he holds
seven stars, recalling a coin from the time of Emperor Domitian (81–96 CE) in which
Domitian’s son, whom Domitian declared to be a god, sits on the earth as Apollo, holding
seven stars.683 Within this historical context and highly charged iconography, John
declares that Jesus, not the Roman Emperor, is the one true God who demands allegiance.
Yet this human Jesus quickly fades away in the face of the most prominent image
for Jesus in the book, that of the lamb (τό ἀρνίον), who first appears in Revelation 5:6.
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The human shifts into the nonhuman. The lamb’s appearance surprises the reader because
of what the elder tells John he will see: “Then one of the elders said to me, ‘Do not weep.
See, the Lion of the tribe of Judah (ὁ λέων ὁ ἐκ τῆς φυλῆς Ἰούδα), the Root of David, has
conquered, so that he can open the scroll and its seven seals’” (Rev 5:5). Yet, when John
looks he does not see a lion. He saw “a Lamb standing as if it had been slaughtered”
(5:6). From here on out, the lamb appears throughout the book (Rev 5:8, 12, 13; 6:1, 16;
7:9, 10, 14, 17; 12:11; 13:8; 14:1, 4, 10; 15:3; 17:14; 19:7, 9; 21:9, 14, 22, 23, 27; 22:1,
3). The “lion of the tribe of Judah,” by contrast, never reappears in the book, recalling the
lamb-human shift in John in which the lamb of God recedes into the background as the
human Jesus goes to the cross.
Many scholars think that the seer deliberately shifts from a lion to a lamb.684 The
lion, it seems, was too complicated and ambiguous to associate with the Messiah in early
Jewish Christianity. The lion was associated with violence, domination, and threat.685 The
lion is a warrior and hunter who produces victims. Bauckham claims that the
announcement that John would see “the lion of the tribe of Judah, the root of David” who
“had conquered” (Rev 5:5) are messianic titles that “evoke a strongly militaristic and
nationalistic image of the Messiah of David as conqueror of nations, destroying the
enemies of God’s people.”686
But what John sees is a slaughtered lamb. The contrast with a fierce, carnivorous
lion could hardly be more dramatic. Lambs do not kill other creatures. They do not
684
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threaten other creatures. They eat plants. They are vulnerable to attack and defenseless in
the face of a lion. Even if there was a Jewish expectation of a Messiah who could be
called the Lamb of God and who would violently overthrow Israel’s enemies as scholars
like John O’Neil claim,687 that is not the portrait Revelation paints of the lamb: The lamb
that John saw had been murdered. The expectation of a conquering lion or a conquering
lamb is dashed with the image of a bloodstained, mortally wounded lamb.688 The lamb is
nameless, like so many slaughtered lambs (and women characters of the Gospels).
Commentators routinely note the book’s high Christology. For instance Thomas
Schreiner states, “Even though Revelation is an apocalyptic work, the Christology is
astonishingly explicit and high. Indeed, the Christology is analogous to that in the Gospel
of John. Jesus as the Lamb is on the same plane as God and is worshiped as a divine
being. . . . Just as God is the Alpha and Omega and the first and the last, so too Jesus is
the Alpha and Omega and the first and the last.”689 But as Stephen Moore has remarked,
“Revelation’s Christology is highest when it is an animal Christology.”690 It is as a lamb
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not a human in Revelation that Jesus receives worship (5:8–14; 7:9–12, 15–17; 19:7, 9;
21:22–23; 22:3). At the center of the throne room of heaven and the center of the New
Jerusalem stands the Lamb, a curious icon of power through nonviolence. At the very
heart of God’s power, the “situation room” of the universe, sits a slaughtered lamb,
whose iconography signifies a rejection of the absolute power that so pervades political
and military machines. But this lamb is also a critique of anthropocentricism. It is this
lamb who holds the key to history, not the one Revelation first announced who looked
like a human. It is as a lamb, that God interacts most fully with the world, a human
emptied of his male and human pretensions.
Jesus’s death, in Revelation, is explicitly rendered in terms of an animal slaughter.
Jesus’s death was one fitting for a nonhuman animal, not a human. Yet Revelation takes
up this dehumanizing death into the very center of the divine. Any clear difference
between humans and other animals in this theological vision is rendered insignificant.
Jesus’s death and resurrection become linked to nonhuman animal life. To dehumanize
Jesus is to put him in solidarity with the least of the animal creatures and only reaffirm
his humanity even more strongly. God’s humanity is intimately linked to God’s animality
and talk of one without the other would vacate Revelation of its most potent iconography
for Christology.
It is in Revelation that humanity regains animality most fully in Scripture. Uniting
human and nonhuman animal in the iconography of Christ, Revelation challenges us to
think about what it means to be human without neglecting our animality. Does it mean
we will ultimately resort to the “baser” instincts that so many theologians have feared
through the ages? The lion, with its rich imagery in Davidic monarchy and military
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might, recedes into the background, giving way to the slaughtered lamb. But this lamb
wages a war. There is a sense in which the nonviolence of Revelation is horrifically
violent. But the lamb wages this “war” with words alone, a sword that comes from his
mouth. The lion/lamb/human Messiah of Revelation speaks rather than bearing canines or
wielding a sword.
However, the scholars who argue that the lamb displaces the lion may argue too
hastily. J. Nelson Kraybill, for example, says that the “ferocious carnivore” who is a
“might Lion” would have to be powerful enough to defeat the beast. In other words, it
made sense to announce a lion as the opponent of the monstrous beast in Revelation.
Kraybill sees the lion as a metaphor or symbol of violence. “God’s fullest self-revelation
has not come with brawn and bluster to match the muscle of Rome.”691 Furthermore,
Kraybill only uses imagery from the Roman context in which Revelation was written.
The “lion of Judah” that the angel announces seems to refer to something in Jewish
tradition every bit as much as the lamb.
The Hebrew Bible sometimes describes God as a lion. In fact, Scripture describes
God in terms of a lion more than any other animal. Job accused God of hunting him like a
lion (Job 10:16), which helps interpret Job’s later statement that God has “torn” him
(16:9), since lions hunt, tear apart, and eat their victims. Jeremiah 49:19 and 50:44 depict
God as a lion on the hunt ready to punish Edom and Babylon. “Like a lion coming up
from the thickets of the Jordan against a perennial pasture, I will suddenly chase
Edom away from it” (Jer 49:19). The prophet goes on to ask who can stand before such a
691
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lion. When God sets out like a young lion on the prowl, the result is that the land is laid to
waste: “Edom shall become an object of horror; everyone who passes by it will be
horrified and will hiss because of all its disasters” (49:17). A corpse devoured by a lion
would be just such a horror show.
The first thing to learn from this Jewish tradition is that the “ferocious carnivore”
and “mighty lion” of Revelation are worthy of being associated with God in Jewish
tradition. While the language might seem like mere metaphor, as Derrida reminds us, this
kind of language is never divorced from our practices. Western hunters pay tens of
thousands of dollars to kill lions in “exotic” locations. The erasure that Kraybill sees in
Revelation plays out in real life colonialism where an American dentist, for example, can
lure a protected lion out of its sanctuary in Zimbabwe and shoot it with a bow as it eats.
So whether the language of lions and lambs is code for political activities happening in
the first century does not deal with the way that the metaphors still work to erase some
creatures and reestablish the anthropological machine.
I would like to read the metaphors a little more literally for once and see the Son
of God becoming animal. This way of seeing Revelation sits within a trajectory used
within other Johannine literature, as I already noted. But even more, I would see this
imagery within the Jewish vision for the peaceable kingdom:
The wolf shall live with the lamb, the leopard shall lie down with the kid, the calf
and the lion and the fatling together, and a little child shall lead them. (Isa 11:6)
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The wolf and the lamb shall feed together, the lion shall eat straw like the ox; but
the serpent—its food shall be dust! They shall not hurt or destroy on all my holy
mountain, says the Lord. (Isa 65:25)
More basic than references to Roman imperial politics are the underlying Jewish images
of Revelation.692 Revelation alludes to the prophet Isaiah at least 122 times.
Scholars routinely claim that the author juxtaposes the lion with the lamb. The
lamb contrasts with the lion as an alternative way of living on the earth. The lamb equals
nonviolence. The lion means violence. But if we see Isaiah 11 and Isaiah 65 as the
background to this passage, then the lion should not be contrasted with the lamb so
sharply. Rather, Jesus’s becoming-animal is a fulfillment of Isaiah’s prophecy that
predatorial creatures will lie at peace with prey. In Jesus’s eschatological body, a body
explicitly animalized in the strongest of terms—Jesus is called a lamb more times than
“Jesus” in this book—the lion lies with the lamb.693 Rather than distancing the lion from
the divine as a metaphor for unworthy violence, a better strategy is to read this passage as
a fulfillment of Jewish peace visions.
Reading these images as pure “metaphors” for human politics alone erases the
creation-wide redemption of Jewish peace visions. This is a common strategy in pacifist
literature as well as the general literature on Revelation. But erasing the lion in
Revelation has real-world consequences, as I already noted. The politics of animal
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erasure, as Keller names it, is not simply read in benignly, but the erasure is “read” onto
the bodies of real lions (and I would add all the major predators like wolves) as they are
nearly rendered extinct. God, in these theological readings, has nothing to do with the
lion. In the human realm, humans have nothing to do with lions either. The ethics of this
reading has drastic consequences. Seeing Jesus’s theological body as utterly animalized
as a lion-lamb within a Jewish vision for creation-wide peace erases the politics of
violence much more thoroughly than the standard reading in which Revelation 5 engages
in a bait and switch with the lamb for the lion. Revelation’s Christology is not highest
when it speaks simply about the lamb, but when it announces the lion of Judah and also
shows us the lamb. Jesus’s becoming-animal, to use Deleuze and Guatarri again, is so
that animals can become something different. The lion can no longer be used as a mere
negative trope for human violence. The lamb can no longer be used as a negative
sacrificial “animal” whose body functions to establish human identity. Neither the lion
nor the lamb is simply “bare life” in contrast to the humanity. The anthropological
machine comes to a halt most fully in Revelation 5. The human/lion/lamb all live in
Jesus’s theological body without regard for distinction.
Conclusion: “Behold the Man!” Or “Behold the Lamb!”

When the Church leaders at the Council of Trullo forbade the imagery of a lamb
and demanded an exclusive focus on the humanity of God in the Incarnation, they
unwittingly undercut the Incarnation’s most radical elements in halting the
anthropological machine. But the Council was not the first to focus solely on Jesus’s
humanity alone. This happened first in Jesus’s own life:
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Then Pilate took Jesus and had him flogged. And the soldiers wove a crown of
thorns and put it on his head, and they dressed him in a purple robe. They kept
coming up to him, saying, “Hail, King of the Jews!” and striking him on the face.
Pilate went out again and said to them, “Look, I am bringing him out to you to let
you know that I find no case against him.” So Jesus came out, wearing the crown
of thorns and the purple robe. Pilate said to them, “Here is the man!” (John 19:1–
5)
“Behold, the man!” or in the famous Latin translation “Ecce Homo!” Pilate’s words focus
squarely on Jesus’s humanity and present us with a vision of Jesus as a male human.
In John 19, we look squarely at the particularity of the Incarnation through the
eyes of the Romans. The Roman soldiers beat and mock Jesus, attacking his masculinity
by calling him “King of the Jews.” This male king is powerless against Roman male
aggression. Like all Jews, his maleness is suspect to the Romans. He is human. But his
masculinity is effeminate and passive in Roman eyes. Pilate parades Jesus out to the
crowd and puts his male humanity on full display: “Here is your male aggressor, utterly
beaten into submission and passive.” Here is his humanity, barely human at all in the
eyes of Pilate. This pathetic man is no threat to Roman power in Pilate’s eyes.
Ecce homo. “Behold the man!” He is only human. He is no god. Jesus, for Pilate,
is nothing akin to the heroes of legend, the male warriors who threaten to take down
kingdoms such as Odysseus and the great warriors of the Trojan Wars. He is just a
human. He is just a male Jewish human, and to Pilate, that is to be subject to the true
heroes of that world: Roman military and political warriors.
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But there is an irony in Pilate’s statement. Though he and his soldiers mocked
Jesus’s humanity and paraded it in front of the Jewish crowds as a passive colonial
subject who could never present a real threat to Roman power let alone any patriarchal
Jewish viewpoint, that view of Jesus’s humanity has deep roots in Jewish tradition and is
ultimately the greatest challenge to violent masculinity. Pilate attempts to place Jesus in a
taxonomy that makes Jews passive doormats for Roman conquest. He rips Jesus out of
the prophetic tradition. Pilate situates Jesus within a Roman story. Jesus is certainly a
Jew, but one defined by Roman military might.
To focus on Jesus’s “humanity” without situating that humanity within the
particularities of what it means to be a male, Jewish person in that time and place is to
distort Jesus’s humanity. By focusing on Jesus’s humanity without noting the Word
becoming “flesh” and becoming animal—a lamb—Pilate and the Romans only see a
parody of humanity. They see a mere object, whose masculinity is barely intact, more
akin to females than males because of the visible cuts on his genitals—they disrobed
Jesus—and the subjected place of his people. But this is to miss the way in which Jewish
tradition often situates masculinity at different place that does not make violence the
defining character of what it means to be male. What it means to be male is to do the
nonviolent work of listening to the Word of God and giving up all claims to ruling. It is,
as Mary Douglas claimed, a “kenosis of patriarchy.” What it means to be human is to be
in God’s “image.” And that image is performed in taking care of the earth and
befriending nonhuman animals in Genesis 2.694 It is to take on σάρξ, animality, and lay
down one’s life as a good shepherd on behalf of another creature. It is not to claim special
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lordly status within creation based on some fictional attribute within humanity (reason or
language). Being human, as defined by the Incarnation, is a kenosis of
anthropocentricism.
The Council of Trullo and other Christians who see animals as a threat to the
doctrine of the Incarnation in general do not do justice to the particularity of the
Incarnation because they separate Jesus’s humanity from his Jewishness. They miss the
way the Baptist’s exclamation, “Behold the Lamb of God,” stands in stark contrast to
Pilate’s focus on Jesus’s humanity, “Behold, the man!” When the Baptist told his
followers to see Jesus as a lamb, whether he knew and liked it or not he placed Jesus in a
particular tradition that absolutely challenges the nations, their war machines, their views
of masculine violence, their stereotypes of female subjectivity and passiveness, and the
sharp lines we draw between humans who we do not kill and nonhuman animals whom
we do kill. Ecce agnus Dei coupled with the language of the Word becoming σάρξ is a
statement that the Word becomes human/animal/flesh/meat. The lion/lamb/human
Messiah who is human/animal/flesh/meat/bread is utterly incomprehensible to
anthropocentric theology. This is a monster Messiah if one has a commitment to human
exclusivity and uniqueness before God. But this is the cosmic Christ, Jesus of Nazareth,
for those who read it well.
And Jesus himself shifts our view of human identity away from a violent
dominion over others to one that serves and even dies for the other. When Jesus talks
about his own death in the Gospel of John, he does not depict himself as an involuntary
lamb going to the slaughter. Rather he reverses the Baptist’s imagery and makes himself
into the human shepherd who dies in place of and for nonhuman animals. Jesus is the
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shepherd who knows his flock intimately and loves them (all of which presupposes an
experience of lambs and sheep that is one of companionship not domination). All of the
imagery about the shepherd and the sheep are ones of affection and intimate knowledge.
The fact that Jesus talks about his own death as a human death for animals, human and
nonhuman, does not undercut the lamb imagery. To declare Jesus as human is also to
declare him to have taken on animality, in all that animality entails.
In fact, that Jesus refers to himself as a good shepherd and is yet also presented in
the New Testament as a lamb may underscore an important point to learn from the
Incarnation. What we too often want to see in Jesus is a reflection of our own glory and
immortality. Instead, what we see is a Messiah who gives up his privileges as a male and
human and who defies our strict boundaries. If Jesus is fully human and that humanity
defines our own, then we have to give up the strict boundaries of an anthropocentric
Christology. God took on σάρξ, a term with rich meaning and deep connections to other
creatures. If the Incarnation is to guide theological reflection, then it is in taking on σάρξ
that we become human, not in touting our mental prowess and linguistic skills (or
whatever unique trait we think sets us so apart from other creatures so that they are no
longer deemed worthy of consideration).
In this regard the Incarnation is a critique of human self-definition and grasping
for divinity by seizing λόγος. By emptying ourselves of this tendency we take on Jesus’s
most telling characteristic: Jesus the one “who, though he was in the form of God, did not
regard equality with God as something to be exploited, but emptied himself, taking the
form of a slave, being born in human likeness. And being found in human form, he
humbled himself and became obedient to the point of death—even death on a cross”
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(Phil. 2:6–7). This classic passage for kenotic Christology should be read alongside the
passages in which Jesus speaks of himself as edible, his flesh as meat, his seeing through
the eyes of a lamb.
A Challenge

Becoming-animal and becoming-flesh are a central characteristic of the
Incarnation in my reading. Jesus is the one who empties himself of his humanity to allow
a becoming that many humans think impossible and undignified. This is an exchange that
can lead further and further toward renewed relationships and a new creation in which
humans do not dominate other creatures. Yet, as I noted at the outset to this chapter, one
particularly troubling challenge to my project is that Jesus, even after his resurrection, is
said to have eaten a piece of fish. Regardless of the restraint we might note in this action,
it is still there. On the one hand it would be easy to simply say that Jesus inaugurated an
eschatology that is not fully realized, therefore his fish-eating is not as problematic. But
“not as problematic” is still problematic for the Prince of Peace, who empties himself of
humanity and becomes animal. Can he not, after experiencing the indescribable terrors of
the abattoir, refrain from committing the same?
So I will end my exloratory argument with a simple illustration of becoming
animal that points to a theological path forward. In Matthew 15:21–28 a Canaanite
woman approaches Jesus, requesting that he heal her demon-possessed daughter. In
response, Jesus answered callously, “I was sent only to the lost sheep of the house of
Israel.” She pleaded with him, but Jesus replied even more sternly, “It is not fair to take
the children’s food and throw it to the dogs.” Her answer elicited from Jesus surprise that

324
he commended her for her faith, something he never did to his own disciples. She said to
Jesus, “Yes, Lord, yet even the dogs eat the crumbs that fall from their masters’ table.”
Even before this encounter, Jesus had met a centurion who wanted him to heal his
servant. Jesus did so without any seemingly tone-deaf responses. Therefore, it was not
simply because the Canaanite woman was an outsider that Jesus refused her, but most
likely because she was a female and a Canaanite (people Israel had supposedly wiped out
according to some version of the conquest narrative).695 Postcolonial feminist readings of
this passage tend to focus on the fact that in relationship to a Canaanite woman, Jesus,
son of David, would have been a powerful colonizing male figure. In this vein, Leticia
Guardiola-Sáenz reads the Canaanite woman’s initial “shouting” at Jesus and his
irritation with her as her having a quite different tone than one of pleading, “a tone of
anger of the displaced and rebellious woman . . . coming to get compensation for what
was taken away from her.”696 She knew how to flatter Jesus by calling him “son of
David” and the proper formulas for asking powerful men for favors. She even kneels
before him. But this, according to Guardiola-Sáenz’s reading, is part of her persistent
agenda to get what she needs and deserves. She was not a submissive woman, but a
strong and determined person. Her presence before Jesus is a testimony that her condition
as an impoverished Canaanite is a consequence of Jesus’s own privilege seen in his royal
lineage, a family lineage that is replete with genocidal intentions in the monarchy.
Jesus calls her and her daughter dogs. According to Guardiola-Sáenz, “She will
not rest until the oppressor realizes that the cost of his privileges is not just the

695

On this interpretation, see Musa W. Dube, Postcolonial Feminist Interpretation of the Bible (St.
Louis: Chalice Press, 2000), 165.
696
Leticia A. Guardiola-Sáenz, “Borderless Women and Borderless Texts: A Cultural Reading of
Matthew 15:21-28,” Semeia 78 (1997): 76.

325
dehumanization of the oppressed, but his own dehumanization. That effect on himself is
due to his inability to respect and engage in dialogue with the Other.”697 While I certainly
agree that Jesus’s response to the Canaanite woman was one of disrespect born out of
male privilege based in a violent heritage, I am not sure that the best way to interpret this
story is to see the Canaanite woman as taking back her “humanity” and forcing Jesus to
recognize his own “humanity.” That reading relies much too heavily on the
anthropological machine: nonhuman animals are killable and subject to abuse; humans
are not.
But this woman challenges Jesus by taking the position of a nonhuman animal: a
dog that Jesus thought was not worthy of his messianic time. Yet the woman’s
challenge—that even dogs eat crumbs from their human masters’ tables—caught Jesus
off-guard. Is it that he recognizes her humanity and his own, or that the very idea that
there are creatures on this earth who should be cast away and given no compassion is
counter to the very idea of the Messiah? He sees the dog in her anew. Later in the story
Jesus does the unthinkable: he compares himself to a mother hen, a female chicken (Matt
23:37). This Canaanite woman, it seems, pushes Jesus’s anthropocentric boundaries to
the extent that he can now compare himself to a nonhuman animal that he at one point
would have used as an insult to another human.
It is possible to read Jesus’s encounter with the Canaanite woman as provoking
what Deleuze and Guatarri call a “becoming-animal” in which rather than simply
redrawing the lines of anthropocentricism to include a Canaanite woman, he begins to
obliterate the lines altogether. She provoked this becoming with her persistent, obstinate
demands of the oppressed. Jesus shifted as a result.
697
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With regard to the fish-eating in Luke 24, Christians could all be Canaanite
women to Jesus and ask him persistently but no less adamantly, “Can the Prince of Peace
do justice to all creatures?” “Are not fish God’s good creatures too?” “Do fish not also
receive God’s blessing?” These are the kind of questions that Jesus responded to with
favor and deep learning. Challenging Jesus toward peace and justice was something he
accepted. What he did not accept was challenges from his disciples in the other direction:
to reign down fire from heaven on detractors (Luke 9:54) and to fight the authorities with
swords (Matt 26:51). Jesus the mother hen, Jesus the lamb, these mark out the Son of
God and begin to sabotage the anthropological machine. Pushing the boundaries of the
Incarnation further in this direction just might elicit the wonderfully surprising response
of “see what great faith” that holding onto the anthropological machine will not.
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CONCLUSION

I have tried to show how Jesus of Nazareth, a Jewish, male human, matters for
how we think about the Incarnation in relationship to nonhuman animals (and to a lesser
extent creation as a whole). In recent decades, the Gospel of John’s statement that “the
Word became flesh” has served as a theological impetus to develop a view of the
Incarnation that has significance for all of creation. Focusing almost exclusively on
nonhuman animals and theology, Andrew Linzey was an early proponent of this idea,
though it never played a role beyond a few lines in his work. More recently theologians
such as Gregersen, Edwards, Johnson, and others have developed a notion increasingly
termed “deep Incarnation.”
Deep Incarnation is the idea that in taking up “flesh” the Son took up all that
“flesh” would consist in, including the stardust we now believe helped to form earth,
evolutionary history, and a sense of interdependence with other creatures and our
environment. For The Word to become human flesh, and be truly human, the entire
history and environment of creation has to be involved. Humans are not humans without
all of this. God takes it all up in becoming flesh. In the first chapter I argued that, indeed,
the idea of “flesh” in the New Testament is very much in line with much of what these
theologians have been saying.
Yet these theologians, including David Clough, who has written the first
systematic theology focused on issues around nonhuman animals, largely dismiss the
particularity of the Incarnation. Instead they focus on the cosmic dimensions of
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Christology. Jesus’s Jewishness, his maleness, and his humanity do not play an important
role in the recent literature.
I have tried to show that these three particularities are important for any doctrine
of the Incarnation. Bypassing Jesus’s Jewishness, maleness, and humanity leaves
theology impoverished and distorted. We have two early examples of this problem in
Athanasius and John of Damascus, who used the Gospel of John to claim that the Word
became “matter.” But in switching from the New Testament language of “flesh” with its
deep ancient Jewish roots and its ambiguous meaning (does it mean human, animal, flesh,
or meat?), these authors opened themselves to undermining basic insights of the
Incarnation from particularity. Athanasius prefers to speak about planets and stars rather
than nonhuman animals. Celestial bodies seem more fitting than animal bodies to his was
of thinking. The story he tells is one that looks hard for the beauty and goodness of
creation broadly speaking, but his story is mostly anthropocentric. It is also vehemently
anti-Jewish, which keeps him from looking at the particularity of the Incarnation. There
are similar problems in John of Damascus, who waxes eloquently about the necessity of
hypostasis, but misses the particularity of Jewishness, even deriding Jews as a bunch of
infants for painting animals in their synagogues, a practice that Christians also engaged in
at that time. Some of these mosaics reflected Jewish eschatological hope of creation-wide
renewal.
Jesus’s Jewishness is not a hindrance to developing a theology on behalf of
nonhuman animals. Rather it is extremely helpful and necessary. The eschatology
involved in the specific trajectory of Jesus has to do with a transformation of relationship
in creation so that predators like lions and wolves do not harm prey animals like lambs
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and calves. This eschatology looks forward, but Jewish people also look backward to
God’s original intention of vegetarianism, signaling peaceable relationships as God’s
intention all along. Even Jewish laws that restrict what Jews can touch or eat in
relationship to nonhuman animals point back to God’s intention, and possibly forward to
the messianic age in which the Torah would be fulfilled. That Christians have largely left
behind these laws as “Jewish” is one of the greatest tragedies of Christianity.
Jesus’s maleness shows us that Jesus was a male in a particular way: he was not
the Greco Roman ideal hunter/warrior. Rather, like most Jewish people, he was not a
hunter. When he was in the wilderness it was not as a killer of wild animals, but as the
peaceable messiah. Jesus’s circumcision marked him off in the Greco-Roman world as a
less-than-human male. But, in line with many Jews of his time, Jesus takes this
dehumanization and stands it on its head.
He does this by problematizing what it means to be human. I used a number of
contemporary philosophical ideas about animals and humanity to read Jesus’s humanity
in a way that challenges the most common definition of humanity as sole possessors of
language and reason. The idea that Jesus “becomes-animal” and challenges the
anthropological machine at the heart of defining human identity finds deep resonances in
the Bible as Jesus is depicted as several animals. Most notably this becoming-animal
resonates in Revelation’s human/lion/lamb Messiah, whose own body is animalized in a
way that fulfills the Jewish vision for a creation-wide peace.
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